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Reinventing the Courts: The Frontiers of Judicial
Activism in the State Courts
FRANK V. WILLIAMS, III*
I. ACTIVISM IN THE STATE COURTS
Court reform is generally thought of as an effort to curb judicial
activism. In the past decade, numerous measures have been proposed
in both Congress and state legislatures to restrain the judiciary from
rendering decisions that have little or nothing to do with the facts or
the law in particular cases.' Outrageous money judgments, questiona-
ble criminal sentencing, and the advancement of judges' social agen-
das are increasingly leading to a variety of efforts to restrain the
judiciary from using law as a tool by which the personal social visions
of the judges trump state and federal constitutions and democratically
legislated enactments.2
Judicial activism provokes vehement public protest and creates
opportunities for journalists in need of a story with broad appeal.
Recent news reports about the judiciary have focused upon a number
of controversial decisions by state supreme courts. With the advent of
judicially-imposed, same-sex marriages, the seething anger and dis-
* Chancellor, Ninth Judicial District, State of Tennessee. The views expressed
here are my own, and should not be construed to represent the views of others. I
would like to extend special thanks to my secretary, Rhonda Crass, who has prepared
numerous document summaries and preliminary text for this paper from when it
started as a project for a committee of the Tennessee Trial Judges Association. Also,
Roane State Community College provided two excellent interns, Kathye Settles and
Charlotte Lee, from its paralegal studies program, both of whom assisted in the
organization of large numbers of documents for this article. Finally, my son, Bradley
Williams, has faithfully critiqued this paper by asking probing questions and
suggesting numerous ways to improve a relatively brief treatment of difficult topic.
1. Stuart Taylor, Jr., Congressional Assault on High Court, N.Y. TIMES, May 30,
1981, § 1, at 8. ("More than 20 bills pending in Congress would remove the power of
the Justices, and of the lower courts as well, to enforce their constitutional rulings on
abortion, school prayer and busing, or to consider the constitutionality of the all-male
draft.").
2. William Glaberson, State Courts Overturning Limits on Lawsuit Awards,
LEXINGTON HERALD-LEADER (Lexington, K.Y.), July 16, 1999, at A14 ("More than a
decade after states began enacting laws to cut back big jury awards and curtail injury
lawsuits, state courts across the country are overturning one measure after another,
concluding that Americans have a powerful right to settle their disputes in court.").
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trust which many citizens and politicians once directed toward the fed-
eral judiciary has expanded to include the state courts as well.3
However, most people do not know that the state courts have been
involved during the last four decades of the twentieth century in forms
of activism that promise to reinvent not only the judiciary, but the
entire society. A new type of judge is emerging, together with a new
role for the courts in society, and both are based upon a new under-
standing of the "judicial power" broadly bestowed on courts and
judges by the various federal and state constitutions. By developing
new techniques of dispute resolution and expanding their direct
involvement in the affairs of the community outside the courtroom,
state court judges are now able to act upon and modify individuals
and entire communities in ways thought by them to be therapeutically
beneficial. Because of their new position and influence in government
and society, judges have become increasingly powerful social engi-
neers. As such, they believe they are producing new individuals and
new communities as part of a "preferred" future for the courts and
society.
Consequently, this article is about a movement to completely
reinvent the courts originating from within the ranks of the justices of
the state supreme courts, leading academics, and the large legal organi-
zations which support them. It stands in contrast to the popular
efforts at court reform intended to curb judicial activism. The latter
effort has been, with few exceptions, a failure, while the movement to
reinvent the judiciary from within has succeeded beyond anyone's
wildest expectations and raises serious questions about the survival of
personal liberty and representative government.
A. Redefining the Judicial Power
Simply stated, the American state courts are redefining the judi-
cial power conferred upon them by their respective state constitutions.
By doing so they are repositioning themselves within the overall
scheme of government, and perhaps more importantly, within the
social fabric of the nation. The judicial power conferred upon the
courts is essentially undefined by the various constitutions. For exam-
ple, the Tennessee Constitution, which roughly follows the language of
the United States Constitution, provides in Article VI, Section 1:
3. Robin Toner, The Culture Wars, Part II, N.Y. TIMES, February 29, 2004, § 4, at 1
("Social and religious conservatives feel under siege, furious over what they see as
judicial tyranny that is removing traditional values, one by one, from the public
square.").
592 [Vol. 29:591
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The judicial power of this State shall be vested in one Supreme Court
and in such Circuit, Chancery and other inferior Courts as the Legisla-
ture shall from time to time, ordain and establish; in the Judges thereof,
and in Justices of the Peace. . ..'
However, no other provision of the Constitution defines the term "judi-
cial power." This does not mean the term lacks meaning, but illustrates
that certain universal presuppositions existed when the Constitution
was framed and ratified.
Old court opinions, for instance, say that the judicial power is the
power of the judicial branch of government to declare the law, and to
render judgments and decrees in specific suits initiated by and depen-
dent upon issues raised by adverse parties. Typically, lawsuits involve
disputes affecting the life, liberty and property of litigants, and are
intended to protect their rights and their property from encroachment
by the state and others. The resulting judgment of the court may be
expressed as the conclusion of a syllogism having for its major and
minor premises issues raised by the parties' pleadings and relevant
proofs.5
The judicial power goes to the very heart of what it means to
have-to be-a court. A court is an instrumentality of sovereignty. It is
the "repository of [the sovereign's] judicial power, with authority to
adjudge as to the rights of persons or property, between adversaries. '"6
In the constitutional process, factual issues are resolved by eliciting
testimony from witnesses in adversarial proceedings, where the parties
or their lawyers examine the witnesses to test the accuracy of their
testimony. By filing the complaint and answer, litigants frame the
issues to be decided by the court. Consequently, the judicial power
contemplates courts that are decision makers applying rules of law in
suits between litigants.7
Where, however, is it mandated in the Constitution that the courts
proceed in this manner? Certainly, if a lawsuit is filed, there are proce-
dural rules that require the defendant be given timely notice of the suit
and an opportunity to answer and defend himself. But what requires
the court to wait until a formal lawsuit is filed before searching for
4. TENN. CONST. art. VI, § 1.
5. BLACK'S LAW DIcIONARY § Judicial Power (4th ed. 1968); see also Gunter v.
Earnest, 56 S.W. 876 (Ark. 1900); Fewel v. Fewel, 144 P2d 592, 594 (Ca. 1943); State
v. Denny, 21 N.E. 252 (Ind. 1889); In re Sanderson, 286 N.W. 198, 199 (Mich. 1939);
In re Hunstiger, 153 N.W. 869, 870 (Minn. 1915); Barlow v. Scott, 85 S.W.2d 504, 517
(Mo. 1935); Citizen's Club v. Welling, 27 P.2d 23 (Utah 1933); Campbell v. Wyoming
Development Co., 100 P. 2d 124, 132 (Wyo. 1940).
6. See Mengal Box Co. v. Fowlkes, 186 S.W. 91, 92 (Tenn. 1916).
7. 20 AM. JUR. 2D Courts § 37 (1995).
2007] 593
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conflicts between individuals and subgroups? What requires courts to
resolve disputed issues of fact? What requires courts to limit their con-
tact to the parties to a specific lawsuit when they can develop ways of
engaging entire communities of people? How does the judicial power
require the courts to be decision-makers, as opposed to healers, educa-
tors, and therapists?
If courts in the past properly understood the judicial power to
consist of adversarial proceedings culminating in a judicial decision,
then are the judges of today free to change the meaning of the judicial
power by giving themselves powers-and processes never before contem-
plated by those who framed and ratified the various constitutions? In
other words, if judges can reconceive the judicial power, then can they
not, by their own will, create a new identity, complete with new powers
for themselves and a new role for courts in society and government? If
so, they can redefine the judicial power and continue to claim that the
constitutional process remains intact.
As we shall see, the judicial branch of government is changing.
Judges and a variety of activists working with them are effectively rede-
fining the judicial power in response, they argue, to the changing
social context by adding an expanded repertoire of therapeutic tech-
niques to solve a broad range of social, economic and political
problems among individuals and entire communities. Judges are tran-
sitioning from decision makers to life changers, employing new tech-
niques to manipulate individuals and entire communities for the
purpose of modifying individual and collective life. And they purport
to do so without sacrificing any of the "traditional" forms and
processes.
Because of the complexity of this movement, it will be difficult to
adequately convey the magnitude of changes taking place in the state
courts all across the United States. Nothing even remotely comparable
to the transformation presently taking place in the judiciary can be
found in modern history. At some point in the future, historians may
see, in retrospect, a dramatic shift in power from individuals to the
state and a reapportionment of power from the popular branches of
government to the courts.8 There have been revolutionary transfers of
power countless times in history, but the term revolutionary hardly
describes the changes currently taking place in the American courts.
It is a quiet revolution; no bombs are being thrown, no buildings
8. The courts are assuming increased responsibility because other institutions
and branches of government are either unwilling or unable to do so. See Tom Tyler,
Conference Transcript, National Conference on Public Trust and Confidence in the
Justice System (1999) (a copy of transcript is on file with the author).
[Vol. 29:591594
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burned.9 It is, however, demolishing a branch of government; and a
shining new, conceptual edifice is rising up in its place, filled with new
people and new ideas about life and government. All of this is taking
place in plain view of anyone with an interest. However, only nominal
criticism has been directed at the phenomenon by the media,
academia, or even by the average trial judge. Most trial judges simply
want to go about their jobs, maintaining little interest in court politics.
As a consequence, judicial activists have been essentially unfettered in
their efforts to reinvent the courts.' 0
Finally, the reader should understand that this paper is about a
growing movement to reinvent the courts. While many national plans,
state reports, and scholarly articles tell us a great deal, particularly in
conceptual terms, there is much that they do not tell us. Consequently,
it is difficult to say in every respect what the new judicial system, once
9. Steve Smith, Local judge warns of "quiet revolution," MADISON PRESS (Madison,
Ohio), June 1, 2001, at 1.
10. But see Robert D. Nichols, "Judicial Governance Antithetical to Democracy,"
OIo LAWYERS WEEKLY, June 4, 2001, at 4.
The Trojan Horse of judicial reform stands before Ohio's Lady of Justice.
It is filled with the radical visions of Dr. James Dator, founder of the State
Courts Futures Movement. It contains subtle changes in substance and
procedure recommended by the Ohio Courts Futures Commission (Futures
Commission) and now promoted by The Ohio State Bar Association (OSBA).
It contains a new drive for merit selection of appellate judges. If we welcome
the Trojan Horse in, we will forever change the balance of Ohio's tripartite
government in an -incremental move toward an unarticulated but implicit
revolutionary theory of judicial governance.
Outside Ohio-and generally unknown to the bench, bar, General
Assembly and the public at large-there has been a national movement to
change the organization, structure and legal philosophy of state judiciaries. It
is called the National Courts Futures Movement (National Movement).
Dator, a futurist from the University of Hawaii, has a vision for state
courts to enact social and economic public policy from the bench. The
vehicle to carry out this vision is the court futures movement.
Dator's writings represent a repudiation of western culture, democratic
principles and our free market, capitalist economy. They contain a
deconstruction of our historical values of social compact, separation of
powers and the derivative authority of representative government.
Without deference to our constitutional and historic values, Dator
undermines public confidence in our fault-based, adversarial common law
legal system. He presents alternative futures imbued with leftist ideology that
deviate markedly from our shared national value of "America, the Melting-
pot." And he gets these futures not through traditional political means but
through judicial usurpation of policy-making authority.
2007]
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in place, will look like or how it will work in actual practice. However,
fundamental changes in government are already taking place. Due to
the nature of those changes, it is possible to say with some certainty
where they are taking us.
First, we shall begin with an overview of the historical background
for the present reform movement. Second, we shall look at some of the
specifics of court reform. Finally, we shall examine the possible impact
of these changes upon individual liberty and the survival of represen-
tative government.
B. Laying the Foundation for Change
To understand what has happened, we need to go back to 1972
when the Hawaii Supreme Court, at the behest of Chief Justice William
Richardson, convened the Hawaii Citizen's Congress on the Adminis-
tration of Justice. Its goal was to study the future of the Hawaii judicial
system. The court was concerned with the ability of the Hawaii judicial
system to cope with the potentially catastrophic political, social, eco-
nomic, and technological changes that many intellectuals believed
would come by the twenty-first century." This conference took place
during a period of widespread preoccupation with political and social
change growing out of that turbulent period in American history
which stretched from the 1950s through the 1970s. The social unrest
brought about by the civil rights movement, the counter-culture which
swept college campuses, urban riots, and the antiwar protests was
compounded by concerns about the depletion of natural resources,
material inequality, pollution of the environment, and the ever-present
threat of nuclear war. Advances in technology were rapidly changing
the way people lived and posed new threats to the ability of all people
to protect their privacy against intrusion by the government and
others. 12 A culture of conflict between the increasingly fragmented
subgroups of society, particularly in urban areas,' 3 threatened the sta-
11. See generally DANIEL BELL, THE COMING OF POST-INDUSTRIAL SOCIETY: A VENTURE
IN SOCIAL FORECASTING (1973); TOWARD THE YEAR 2000: WORK IN PROGRESS (Daniel Bell
& Stephen R. Graebard eds., 1997); ALVIN TOFFLER, FUTURE SHOCK (1970); Sohail
Inayatullah, Judicial Foresight in the Hawaii Judiciary, in FUTURES 23:8 (1991).
12. See generally VANCE PACKARD, THE NAKED SOCIETY (David McKay Co., Inc.
1964).
13. Glenn R. Winters & Robert E. Allard, Judicial Selection and Tenure in the United
States, in THE COURTS THE PUBLIC AND THE LAW EXPLOSION 146, 177 (Harry W. Jones
ed., 1965) [hereinafter THE COURTS THE PUBLIC AND THE LAW EXPLOSION].
Throughout history, cities have always been the predominant source of work
for the courts. The traditional transmitters of values and rules such as the
family, the school, and the church have never been as effective in urban as in
[Vol. 29:591
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bility-even, activists argued, the survival-of American society if gov-
ernment, and particularly the courts, did not prepare for the shock of
radical technological and social change.1
4
Though the nation remained generally peaceful, every home was
subjected to graphic images of violence on the nightly television news.
Following the assassinations of Robert Kennedy and Dr. Martin Luther
King Jr. in the spring of 1968, President Lyndon Johnson created the
National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence. The
Commission's report, Violence in America, became a nationwide best
seller.15 Its final report, To Establish Justice, To Insure Domestic Tran-
quility, was issued in December 1969, and a revised version of the orig-
inal report entitled Violence in America: Historical & Comparative
Perspectives was published ten years later. 16 While many of our
nation's problems are international in nature, the Commission con-
cluded its inquiry with no sure answers about how to deal with the
internal problem of violence. Indeed, violent crime in the United
States was 50 percent higher in 1979 than it was at the time of its
initial report to the President ten years earlier. 17 It did, however, make
an important observation: "The greatness and durability of most civili-
zations has been finally determined by how they have responded to
these challenges from within. Ours will be no exception."18
Perhaps the most important feature of this period of American
history was the widespread rejection-particularly by radical students
and intellectuals associated with the New Left-of authority of all
kinds, including the law and legal institutions. 19 The religion and laws
of "dead white men"-the foundations of Western Civilization-were
rejected outright as a sign of contempt for everything the United States
represented. Young radicals and intellectuals identified with the Ameri-
rural societies. Increased proximity of large numbers of persons breeds legal
disputes. Individual freedoms are continually restricted to accommodate the
demands created by urbanism. Public welfare is often threatened by
impersonalization and irresponsibility which characterize the urban scene.
Id.
14. Of special interest are the works of Professor James A. Dator available on the
internet at the Hawaii Research Center for Futures Studies, University of Hawaii-
Manoa, http://www.soc.hawaii.edu/future/dator/datorindex.html.
15. VIOLENCE IN AMERICA (Hugh Davis Graham & Ted Robert Gurr eds., 1969).
16. VIOLENCE IN AMERICA: HISTORICAL & COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES 9 (Hugh Davis
Graham & Ted Robert Gurr eds., 1979).
17. Id.
18. Id. at 11.
19. See generally Hannah Arendt, Civil Disobedience, in Is LAw DEAD? 212, 220
(Eugene Rostow ed., 1971) [hereinafter Is LAw DEAD?].
20071 597
7
Williams: Reinventing the Courts: The Frontiers of Judicial Activism in the
Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 2007
CAMPBELL LAW REVIEW
can Left, when not engaged in sex or incapacitated by drugs, marched
through the streets of college campuses proclaiming the death of God,
burning draft cards, bras, and the American flag. Some of the more
militant Leftists, inspired by the Vietnam War and very real injustices
in the area of racial discrimination, prepared themselves for a Bolshe-
vik-style revolution in the United States.2 °
The New Left denounced law as the tool of oppressors. As such,
they argued that law reform was futile since it only served to divert
attention from the central task of overthrowing a corrupt and unjust
social order.21 Intellectuals within the legal profession and academia,
being either sympathetic to the militants or uncertain about whether
or not they were right, decided to debate the matter. The Association of
the Bar of the City of New York published a collection of articles in
1971 entitled, Is Law Dead?22 The problem with the law, resulting in
growing civil disobedience and militancy, was one of social injustice as
Robert L. Heilbroner articulated:
I wish to pose a question that is at once central and critical, and yet
singularly elusive and perplexing. It is the question of why the United
States, which is by all conventional measures the wealthiest nation in
the world, is not at the same time the most socially advanced. To put
the question differently, I wish to ask why a nation that could... afford
to remove social and economic inequities has been among the most
laggard in doing so.
23
Inadequate housing, the neglect of poverty, the neglect of public
health, and the disproportionate criminal punishment of the least priv-
ileged were among the issues alleged to be undermining the rule of
law.
Law, of course, was not dead, but the preferred alternative was to
conclude that changing law, particularly constitutional law, was the
necessary response to the changing social milieu. 24 "It is now neces-
20. See, e.g., Peter Collier, Something Happened to Me Yesterday, in DESTRUCTIVE
GENERATION: SECOND THOUGHTS ABOUT THE '60s 277-305 (1989).
21. This period produced a number of new professional journals documenting
legal changes in response to the new social climate. One of those was the University of
Michigan Journal of Law Reform, begun in 1968 and dedicated to "social amelioration
through reform of law and legal institutions." See Francis A. Allen, On Coming of Age:
Twenty-Five Years of the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform, http://students.
law.umich.edu/mjlr/historyl.htm (last visited March 27, 2007).
22. Is LAW DEAD?, supra note 19.
23. Robert L. Heilbroner, The Roots of Social Neglect in the United States, in Is LAW
DEAD?, supra note 19, at 288-93.
24. Harold Cruse, The Historical Roots of American Social Change and Social Theory,
in Is LAW DEAD?, supra note 19, at 315, 327.
598 [Vol. 29:591
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sary," claimed Michael Harrington, "to amend the conventional wis-
dom of this united front of the revolutionaries and conservatives. It is,
to be sure, quite possible that the upheavals of these times will over-
whelm American society and that there will be no democratic transi-
tion to a new order. But if the future is to be created humanely, a
revolution must be legalized." 25 The first step toward this proposed
revolution was to discard the "simplification that a revolution is neces-
sarily violent."
26
"The one thing certain about the age in which we live," observed
Francis A. Allen, Dean and Professor of Law at the University of Michi-
gan, "is that we cannot stand still. We cannot escape or outwit the
forces of change by nonaction .... Accordingly, the only issue remain-
ing is whether or to what extent change is to be the product of thought
and deliberation. ' 27 Social problems produced by the explosion in new
technologies were accompanied by a growing social protest that "ques-
tion[ed] the efficacy of the law as an instrumentality of social justice,
and which [asserted] that the administration of law has frequently
been used as a device to frustrate the legitimate aspirations of those
seeking to participate in the benefits of American society," observed
Allen.28 Moreover, we had come to live under the threat of nuclear war
"in a world characterized by a radical disorganization of international
relations, and in which human survival is threatened by irresponsible
uses of military power."
29
The revolutionary spirit of the 1960s has carried over to the pre-
sent day. Leftist ideology gained new life in the 1980s with what Peter
Collier and David Horowitz called "a riptide of a Sixties revival."3
"The growing interest in the Sixties coincides with a renaissance of the
Constitutional law, it seems to me, can legitimize protest, but it cannot
legitimize revolution or radical social change. It cannot legitimize the kind of
social change that the black rebellion is demanding and will demand more of
in the future, because historically the black population-and, as a result, the
black movement today-is beyond constitutional purview; ultimately it must
alter and revamp the Constitution if it is ever to achieve its aims in the
context of this American nation.
Id. at 327.
25. Michael Harrington, Revolution, in Is LAw DEAD?, supra note 19, at 336.
26. Id. at 337.
27. Francis A. Allen, A Prospectus for Reform, http://students.law.umich.edu/mjlr/
historyl.htm (last visited March 27, 2007).
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Peter Collier & David Horowitz, Radical Innocence, Radical Guilt, in
DESTRUCTIVE GENERATION: SECOND THOUGHTS ABOUT THE '60s 243 (1989).
20071
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radicalism that was the decade's dominant trait and is now being used
to jump-start the Next Left," they observed.3"
C. Reforming and Regenerating Law
Reforming and regenerating law to meet changing conditions has
been and continues to be the product of considerable thought and
deliberation. Until recent decades, however, court reform was still
thought of in the constitutional context of adjudication.32
During the 1960s, activists from many disciplines-sociology,
political science, education, psychology, management, and others-
worked primarily from outside the judicial system, utilizing the results
of numerous empirical studies of human life to produce change in the
nature and purpose of law and the work of the courts in society. Every
avenue, forum, and technique available to the intellectual community
has been employed to redefine the rule of law (beginning with constitu-
tional law), adversarial proceedings, and, consequently, the role of
judges in society. The changes which have resulted are not the result
of some popular grass-roots demand, but rather the demand of rela-
tively few militants, so-called scholar/activists, and intellectuals who
were essentially in agreement with the need to overthrow the existing
foundation for law and the courts. These people chose to bring about
the same changes by deliberative processes rather than by armed
revolution. The end result, however, will be the same.
31. Id.
32. See Francis A. Allen, A Prospectus for Reform, supra note 27, http://students.
law.umich.edu/mjlr/historyl.htm (last visited March 27, 2007) (introducing the
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform).
Reflections such as these must have crossed the minds of many lawyers
during the course of the past decade. There is nothing new, however, about
the problems of accommodating law to altered circumstances. The common
law has survived the centuries because it contributed a shrewd awareness of
the changing needs of men, and because its method of adjudication
constitutes an effective mechanism for orderly change and development.
Those who practice in the common law system are routinely engaged in
processes of law reform and regeneration. The creative impulse of the
common law has not run its course, and all evidence indicates that we shall
continue to rely on the evolution of judge-made law as one important means
to insure the continued relevance of the legal system to the new conditions
that beset us.
600 [Vol. 29:591
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D. The Influence of Futurists
The corrosive era of environmental degradation, social upheaval,
and technological wizardry produced a sense of despair, especially
among intellectuals sympathetic to the growing social protests. They,
like countless millions of other Americans, witnessed the confusion
and chaos via the new medium of television. However, some intellectu-
als came to believe that they could produce, by the force of their collec-
tive intellects, long-term, technical solutions to problems facing the
world. They began discussing emerging issues, through scholarly
papers and a growing body of sociological best-sellers. From within
the intellectual community emerged a bold and aggressive group of
"social critics, scientists, philosophers, planners" and other activists
we now know as futurists. They included men and women like Arthur
C. Clark, R. Buckminster Fuller, Herman Kahn, Alvin Toffler, Daniel
Bell, Bertrand de Jouvenel, Margaret Mead, and others who concerned
themselves with the "alternatives facing man as the human race col-
lides with an onrushing future."33
The multi-disciplinary futurists could identify the root problems
facing society and government; they could lead us to envision the pre-
ferred future; they could devise solutions in the form of bold new
plans for coordinated change; and they could militate for the imple-
mentation of those plans through the auspices and power of the
state.34 Some may have been content to fantasize about the future and
write science fiction novels, but others were driven by a "passionate
wish to induce social change. '35 Many others just like them resided in
the cloistered halls of universities, post-war think tanks, and the
"lonely communes of young people searching for new insights into
tomorrow."3 6
The futurists have had a profound influence on the redefinition of
the courts. From among the many influences on the early court reform
movement, the publication in 1970 of Alvin Toffler's best-seller, Future
Shock, 37 deserves special mention. Toffler forecast catastrophic conse-
quences for society if people did not prepare for and embrace onrush-
33. ALVIN TOFFLER, THE FUTURISTS 3 (Alvin Toffler ed., Random House 1972).
34. See IRA PILCHEN AND SANDRA RATCLIFF, THE FUTURE AND THE COURTS:
CONDUCTING STATE COURT FUTURES ACTIVITIES 1 (Am. Judicature Soc'y ed., 1993) ("The
framework encouraged for these activities rests on the work of professional futurists,
who argue that we can guide and shape the future if we anticipate change and work
with it, not against it. The key is to be proactive, not reactive.").
35. THE FUTURISTS, supra note 33, at 4.
36. Id.
37. FUTURE SHOCK, supra note 11.
20071
11
Williams: Reinventing the Courts: The Frontiers of Judicial Activism in the
Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 2007
CAMPBELL LAW REVIEW
ing technological and social change coming by the new millennium.
Toffler has a gift for spotting trends, especially in technology, and of
synthesizing from other works the potential social impact of those
trends on future generations. Consequently, his book was about what
happens to people when they are overwhelmed by change and about
how people adapt-or fail to adapt-to the future. What Toffler pro-
ceeded to describe were the qualities of human life transformed by the
proliferation of personal options produced by scientific and technolog-
ical advance. The industrial society was one characterized by the pro-
gressive discovery and application of technical answers to every
question and technical solutions to every problem. For many, this was
not something to be feared, but something to be desired. Scientific
discoveries resulted in an amazing and increasingly confusing variety
of new products, devices, and options which promised to change the
way people lived. New cars, interstate highways, household appli-
ances, building materials, labor-saving devices, pharmaceuticals, syn-
thetic materials, computers, restorative biomechanical devices,
recreational and entertainment products, sophisticated weapons, and
countless other products of science offered people more choices in life
and, as Toffler believed, new freedoms. But the industrial society,
characterized by a dedication to hard work, loyalty to the company,
and a top-down hierarchy in both business and government, eventually
transitioned to what sociologist Daniel Bell called the "Post-Industrial
Society. 3
8
Given the increased choices, prosperity, and leisure of post-indus-
trial life, people would abandon the old values, institutions and
associations which had previously ordered life and a new civilization
would emerge. In place of the nuclear family, church, community and
other institutions familiar to past generations, a new, transient, ephem-
eral human existence would emerge, replacing the familiarity and per-
manence of the industrial society. The result, Toffler believed, would
be an increase in freedom, 39 freedom of the sort being demanded by
the counter culture of the 1960s.
However, it also threatened an increase in conflict from within
and without. Increased mobility meant that people would come into
contact with people who had made different choices and adopted dif-
ferent living arrangements. The family would be redefined. The church
would cease to provide guidance and order for life. Communities
38. DANIEL BELL, THE COMING OF POST-INDUSTRIAL SOCIETY: A VENTURE IN SOCIAL
FORECASTING (Basic Books 1973).
39. See Alvin Toffler, The Future of Law and Order, in JUDGING THE FUTURE 18, 29
(Clement Bezold & James Dator eds., 1981).
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would be defined less by geographic influences and begin to revolve
around common interests and lifestyles. In short, everything that peo-
ple believed about life was about to change, placing new demands on
government.
Indeed, government and law would also have to change in
response to the demand for individual freedom and alternative lifes-
tyles. People, too, had to be willing to change. Those who failed to
adapt to the new situation would have problems, if not with their
neighbors, then within their own minds as the lack of permanence
coupled with the pace and stress of post-industrial existence resulted
in mental illness and antisocial behavior. To the end that people might
save themselves and usher in the new social order, Toffler advocated
that people embrace the inexorable and inevitable changes in technol-
ogy and lifestyles he so painstakingly described. To this very day, Tof-
fler believes that "we" are in the process of creating a new way of life, a
new civilization.4" To resist, he insists, will be futile. To delay could
be deadly.
It was in response to such assertions that Chief Justice Richardson
took steps in 1972 to begin a review of the Hawaii judicial system and
the impact such changes would have on the courts. 41 Toffler, however,
was never heavily involved in the work of changing the courts. He
40. See Transcript of Tavis Smiley Show (PBS television broadcast June 16, 2006),
available at http://www.pbs.org/kcet/tavissmiley/archive/200606/20060616
transcript.html (discussing Alvin and Heidi Toffler's most recent book, REVOLUTIONARY
WEALTH: How IT WILL BE CREATED AND How IT WILL CHANGE OUR LIVES).
The other relationship of this is you can't understand economics as
economists frequently try to by just looking at economics. You've got to look
at the social problems. You've got to look at the opportunities in the social
system. You've got to look at religious and value changes in the society and
so forth. We're creating a new way of life. Big word, creating a new
civilization.
Id.
41. James A. Dator, Director of the Hawaii Research Center for Futures Studies,
Twenty Minutes Into the Future, Address at the Virginia Assembly on the Future of the
Courts (Dec. 1, 1989), http://www.soc.hawaii.edu/future/dator/courts/2MininFut.
html (last visited March 29, 2007). Professor Dator worked with the Hawaii Supreme
Court beginning in 1971 on the first court futures conference, and subsequently
served as the futurist for the Virginia Supreme Court's Commission on the Future of
the Virginia Judicial System, leading to its report in 1989. Following completion of the
Virginia Futures Commission report, Professor Dator was invited to address the
Virginia Legislature on Dec. 1, 1989, where he forecast the catastrophic consequences
which could flow from the Futures Commission's failure to be sufficiently future-
oriented. Because, during previous generations, we had used the past (i.e. history) as
our guide for the future, Dator speculated that our confinement to the past might be
engrained in our genes. Id.
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spoke at the Hawaii Citizen's Congress in 1972, and again at the Con-
ference on the Futures of the American Legal System at the Antioch
School of Law in 1977 (known as the Antioch Conference). Neverthe-
less, his influence on the court reform movement has been extraordi-
nary due to the broad influence of his many books and articles, and
the inspiration he provided to other futurists and planners who
worked directly with the courts.
The names of futurists and planners like James A. Dator, Clement
Bezold, Sohail Inayatullah, Wendy Schultz, John A. Martin, and others
appear frequently throughout the reform literature. All of them owe
much of their popularity with the judiciary to Toffler's early work and
to the new intellectual legitimacy of futures studies.42 The futurists'
predictions of potentially catastrophic technological and social change
and the need to embrace them fit perfectly into the revolutionary
milieu of American radicalism, characterized by the rejection of relig-
ious and legal authority and the demand for change.
The influence of futurists, with their emphasis on the inexorable
nature of change, on the reform movement is plainly visible in the pro-
ceedings of the Conference on the Future of the American Legal Sys-
tem held in October 1977. Dean Edgar Cahn of the Antioch School of
Law expressed the opinion that the study of law and futures studies
are "parallel interests." Dean Cahn, working with Clement Bezold of
the Institute for Alternative Futures in Alexandria, Virginia, and Profes-
sor James A. Dator, convened the Conference to bring outstanding
legal scholars and futurists together. Their goal was to study the ade-
quacy of legal education in the face of "certain austere prognostica-
tions" regarding the "poor and disenfranchised" and bring the
"approaches of futures research ... more directly to the attention of
legal scholars and practitioners to help the legal profession deal more
effectively with the probabilities and uncertainties of the future. 4 3
For Dean Cahn, lawyers had a monopoly on legal knowledge, and
law schools were simply "upgrading a medieval guild system for the
production of rights and remedies. '' 44 For him, this was "increasingly
troublesome" because a society changing as fast as Alvin Toffler
described in Future Shock made it appear increasingly difficult to deal
42. See James Dator, College of Social Sciences, University of Hawaii at Manoa,
http://www.politicalscience.hawaii.edu/Faculty/dator/dator.htm (last visited March
29, 2007). See also Hawaii Future Publications Archive, Hawaii Research Center for
Futures Studies, http://www.futures.hawaii.edu/publication-archive.php (last visited
March 29, 2007).
43. JUDGING THE FUTURE, supra note 39.
44. Id.
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with equities, expectations, and the establishment of societal norms.
Consequently, Cahn observed, "the very notion of the rule of law, of
rules of law themselves, is a static notion.... It assumes that there is a
rule. '4 5 The problem is that given the rapidity of change and the slow-
ness with which the courts "can reconstruct the past in order to deter-
mine whether, in fact, there was a violation of the law, may mean that
our whole notion of constructing a legal system around rules ... may
be obsolete."46
E. The Federal Contribution to Change
In addition to the early efforts of the Hawaii Supreme Court to
study and prepare for social change, other forces were at work during
that time, particularly at the federal level, making plans to create new
judicial systems in the states that would begin addressing the growing
civil and criminal litigation which activists perceived would escalate as
the new millennium drew near.47 Large numbers of new cases flooded
the courts. Drug-related criminal cases, personal injury suits, and
domestic disputes, among other litigation, escalated to the point that
judicial activists feared the collapse of the judicial system if structural
changes did not take place. These changes would allow the state
courts to function more efficiently and allow them to absorb a greater
share of the work being done by the federal courts.48
In time, these initially isolated activists, beginning from a variety
of positions in government and the academic community, found that
they had common goals, and began working together to change the
structure and role of the courts in society. 49 They were aided, not only
by the combined intellectual power of many state and federal supreme
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. See Maurice Rosenberg, Court Congestion: Status, Causes, and Proposed
Remedies, in THE COURTS THE PUBLIC AND THE LAW EXPLOSION, supra note 13, at 29-59.
48. ENVISIONING JUSTICE: REINVENTING THE COURTS FOR THE 21ST CENTURY
(Tradewinds Video 1992) (Kentucky Supreme Court Chief Justice Robert Stephens
stating: "Overall, the system could easily collapse under its own weight if something
isn't done.") [hereinafter ENVISIONING JUSTICE]. See generally THE JUDICIAL RESEARCH
FOUNDATION, INC., STRUGGLE FOR EQUAL JUSTICE: A REPORT ON NEGLECT AND CRISIS IN
THE LOWER COURTS (1969) [hereinafter STRUGGLE FOR EQUAL JUSTICE].
49. They viewed themselves, followingJeremy Bentham, as scientists. Justice Oliver
Wendell Holmes and Dean Roscoe Pound were especially influential in the extension
of utilitarian principles to law. See generally ALBERT W. ALSCHULER, LAW WITHOUT
VALUES: THE LIFE WORK AND LEGACY OF JUSTICE HOLMES (2000). Dean Pound animated
the current reform movement with his article, The Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction
with the Administration of Justice, 40 AM. L. REV. 729 (1906).
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courts justices, sociologists, social psychologists, political scientists,
law school professors, and professional futurists, but by hundreds of
millions of dollars in tax revenues initially provided by the federal gov-
ernment under the guise of "modernizing" the state courts.5 °
New organizations such as the Law Enforcement Assistance
Administration, the Institute for Court Management, and the National
Center for State Courts were formed during this period. These groups
provided a much-needed base of operations, complete with profes-
sional staff, funding, and the political connections necessary to make
things happen. And things did happen. Using funds provided by the
federal government, large-scale national conferences were scheduled in
the 1970s for the purpose of forming a consensus among activists
about the course and purpose of court reform.5 ' To this end, scholars
in the social sciences were brought into the process of studying and
changing the courts. 5
2
In 1984, the United States Congress created the State Justice Insti-
tute specifically for the purpose of creating "fair and effective systems
of justice" in the states.5 3 The SJI promptly adopted court futures com-
missions, similar to the Hawaii prototype, as the preferred vehicle for
50. See S. REP. No. 96-142 (May 14, 1979), as reprinted in 1979 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2471,
2479. See also H.R. Rep. No. 98-1062 (September 24, 1984), as reprinted in 1984
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5708, 5731. See also STATE JUSTICE INSTITUTE, 10 YEARS: IMPROVING THE
QUALITY OF AMERICAN JUSTICE, 1987-1997 (1997) (providing a concise report on much
of the work of the United States Government related to the reform of the state courts
since 1987) [hereinafter 10 YEARS: IMPROVING THE QUALITY OF AMERICAN JUSTICE].
51. See generally Addresses and Papers, National Conference on the Judiciary,
Justice in the States (Williamsburg, Va., March 11-14, 1971) (on file with author);
Proceedings of the Second National Conference on the Judiciary, National Center for
State Courts, State Courts: A Blueprint for the Future (Williamsburg, Va., August
1978); NATIONAL CENTER FOR STATE COURTS, STATE COURTS: OPTIONS FOR THE FUTURE
(1980) (follow-up report of the Second National Conference on the Judiciary).
52. Marc Galanter & Mark Alan Edwards, Law and Society & Law and Economics:
Common Ground, Irreconcilable Differences, New Directions: Introduction: The Path of the
Law Ands, 1997 Wis. L. REV. 375 (1997).
One consequence of that success [of the law and society movement] is that
the field of action of law and society, unlike the other law ands, is not
exclusively or even primarily in the legal academy. It is not unknown to have
active and committed law and society scholars located in half a dozen
disciplines whose work converges on a single cluster of topics .... The Law
and Society Association has provided the principle forum for this
interdisciplinary endeavor.
Id. at 381. The Law and Society Movement is primarily the study of law from the
outside rather than the inside by multiple social disciplines. See STEVEN VAGO, LAW &
SOCIETY (8th ed. 2006).
53. 42 U.S.C. § 10702(b) (2000).
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inducing change in the state courts. From 1987 to 1997, the State
Justice Institute awarded grants totaling just over one hundred million
dollars to state courts and other organizations pursuant to its mandate
to "assure each person access to a fair and effective system of jus-
tice."'54 The SJI used federal tax dollars for grants to the National
Center for State Courts, the American Judicature Society, and other
groups to support large national conferences, and to fund state court
futures commissions in a number of states, providing a template for
judicial activism in every state.55
F. The Influence of the Social Sciences
In the early days of federally-sponsored court reform carried out
with funds from the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration,
efforts were primarily geared toward the creation of a more "efficient"
judicial system-a better machine.5 6 The emphasis on efficiency,
which continues today, focused on creating top-down control of infer-
ior trial and appellate courts by the state supreme courts through the
unification of specialized trial courts and the creation of managerial
bureaucracies. In time, activists adopted much broader goals for the
courts that would allow them to focus upon the basic issues of life -
particularly on the social causes of inequality, aggression, and environ-
mental decay. 57 The conflicts which resulted in litigation were rightly
judged by reformers to be symptoms of deeper, underlying problems
which, until that time, would have been considered moral or religious
in nature. But the reformers took a different approach. They used
techniques developed in the social sciences for studying the problem
of human behavior to devise ways to manipulate and shape behavior
through the application of law to solve specific problems, thereby pro-
ducing a "preferred" future society.58
54. 10 YEARS: IMPROVING THE QUALITY OF AMERICAN JUSTICE, supra note 50, at 1.
55. Id. at 3, 31.
56. See Rosenberg, supra note 47, at 29.
57. See, e.g., Harry W. Jones, The Trial Judge- Role Analysis and Profile, in THE
COURTS THE PUBLIC AND THE LAW EXPLOSION, supra note 13, at 124. Jones states: "The
trial judge is the parish priest of our legal system." Id. at 125.
58. See, e.g., David M. Trubek, Back to the Future: The Short, Happy Life of the Law
and Society Movement, 18 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 4. (1990).
When I speak of the 'law and society idea,' I mean the reconceptualization of
law in ways that make it amenable to study by the social sciences. If we think
of law as a set of rules or principles, the social sciences have little to offer
legal studies. Accordingly, if law is to be examined by the social sciences, it
has to be redefined. We have to think of law as a social institution, as
interacting behaviors, as ritual and symbol, as a reflection of group politics,
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Reformers believed that the changes of the new millennium need
not lead to the collapse of society, but could be directed in ways that
make life better for all. The same technological advances which
threatened to tear society apart also offered-in the service of vision-
ary leaders-the hope for a new and better world. As a result, a new
wave of utopian visions and settings was created.59 When the court
reformers, using grants provided by the SJI, began hiring professional
futurists to lead the many court conferences and commissions, the
futurists brought with them utopian visions, then popular within the
intellectual community, of a preferred future society molded and
shaped by a new judicial system. 60
as a form of behavior modification, or in some other way that makes it
amenable to social scientific analysis.
Id. at 6.
59. See SEYMOUR B. SARASON, THE CREATION OF SETTINGS AND THE FUTURE SOCIETIES
(Jossey-Bass, Inc. 1972) for an excellent treatment of the creation of utopian settings.
See also Henry Winthrop, Utopian Construction and Future Forecasting: Problems,
Limitations, and Relevance, in THE SOCIOLOGY OF THE FUTURE (Wendell Bell & James A.
Mau eds., 1971). The contribution of the emerging discipline of futures studies to the
creation of utopian settings is illustrated in this review of Alvin Toffler's FUTURE SHOCK
by Rayond Fletcher, M.P., MANCHESTER GUARDIAN, reprinted on the dust jacket of the
1970 edition of FUTURE SHOCK, supra note 11:
What is happening to us, argues its author, Alvin Toffler, is that the future is
arriving too fast and its arrival is not properly coordinated. Mr. Toffler is the
most articulate member of a group of American "underground sociologists"
(as they are sometimes described) who are fashioning a new social science
geared to planning for quality in society.
60. See, e.g., Toffler, supra note 36. Proceedings of the Antioch School of Law and
Institute for Alternative Futures Conference on the Futures of the American Legal
System, Social Science Research Institute, University of Hawaii-Manoa (1981) at 33.
This conference, referred to as the Antioch Conference, was held at the Antioch School
of Law in Washington, D.C. in October 1977. See also FUTURE SHOCK, supra note 11,
at 400-02.
Such imaginative explorations of possible futures would deepen and enrich
our scientific study of probably futures. They would lay a basis for the
radical forward extension of the society's time horizon. They would help us
apply social imagination to the future of futurism itself.
Indeed, with these as a background, we must consciously begin to multiply
the scientific future-sensing organs of society. Scientific futurist institutes
must be spotted like nodes in a loose network throughout the entire
government structure in the techno-sciences, so that in every department,
local or national, some staff devotes itself systematically to scanning the
probable long-term future in its assigned field. Futurists should be attached
to every political party, university, corporation, professional association,
trade union and student organization.
Id. at 402.
608
18
Campbell Law Review, Vol. 29, Iss. 3 [2007], Art. 6
http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol29/iss3/6
2007] REINVENTING THE COURTS 609
The conflicts occasioned by societal problems were considered to
be opportunities for the courts to demonstrate their superior social
utility.61 Where informal institutions of social control, such as the
family, church, and schools had failed,62 the courts would succeed in
addressing the underlying causes of conflict which originate in the
human mind. To this end, sociologists, psychologists, political scien-
tists, the multi-disciplinary futurists, and others began to study the
ways in which society and the courts were related to, and could influ-
ence, one another to create a better future.63
The appellate decisions of state and federal courts were recog-
nized as powerful social forces for modifying what people believed
about many aspects of life.64 Accordingly, sociologists and psycholo-
gists invested considerable effort to study the effect of culture on
appellate court opinions and vice-versa.65 The decision in Brown v.
61. For an example of the nexus between the culture of conflict and the work of the
courts, see Robert M. Bell, Chief Justice, Maryland Supreme Court, State of the
Judiciary Address Before the Maryland General Assembly (January 26, 2000), available
at http://www.courts.state.md.us/soj2000.html. The view of societal problems as
"opportunities" for the courts is summed up in the 1996 State of the Judiciary Speech
to the Tennessee General Assembly by Chief Justice E. Riley Anderson:
A more troubled world is delivering more of its troubles to the courts. Even a
short list of social ills that drive cases into the courts reveals how ill-equipped
we now are to solve these problems: economic stress, educational
shortcomings, bad parenting, sociopathic children, violence, more divorce,
less religion, weaker ethics, drugs, guns, gangs.
These troubles are a burden and they are also opportunity. But the courts
need to change if we are to seize this opportunity. The judicial system must
re-orient its duties and broaden its vision.
62. Harry W. Jones, Introduction, in THE COURTS THE PUBLIC AND THE LAW
ExPLOSION, supra note 13, at 1.
There has been a massive increase in crime and other ... social instability.
Scholars ... have varying explanations, but all seem to agree that two of the
major factors are 1) the waning influence of the family, the church, and other
nonlegal agencies of social control, and 2) the vast migrations of population
from the small towns and rural areas to the great cities that have taken place
in the United States since World War II.
Id. at 2-3.
63. See generally THE LAW AND SOCIETY READER: READINGS ON THE SOCIAL STUDY OF
LAW (Stewart Macaulay, Lawrence M. Friedman & John Stookey eds., W.W. Norton &
Co. 1995).
64. Harry W. Jones, The Channeling of Social Change, 74 COLUMBIA L. REV. 1023,
1030-31 (1974). See also Robert Jerome Glennon, The Nation's Teacher: The Role of the
United States Supreme Court During Times of Crisis, 24 SEATTLE U.L. REV. 327 (2000).
65. See, e.g., Jack M. Balkin, Pre-Modernism, Modernism, and Post-Modernism: The
Proliferation of Legal Truth, 26 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 5 (2003).
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Board of Education,66 which abolished the doctrine of separate but
equal facilities for racial minorities, remains, perhaps, the best exam-
ple of the ability of appellate opinions to influence popular culture.67
But this is, at best, an incomplete picture of the courts' work. Despite
their undeniable importance, appellate court opinions are rendered in
only a small fraction of all lawsuits filed each year. Most cases end in
the trial courts; relatively few are ever appealed.68 If the courts were to
expand their influence, new methods of informing the judicial process
and of resolving disputes employing the techniques of the social sci-
ences had to be developed for specific application to the trial courts.
6 9
Changes in the role of the judiciary were essential to make this hap-
pen, and they were focused, not on the state supreme courts (though
Why is this proliferation of legal truth and legal reality important? It is
important, I think, for three reasons. First, the proliferation of legal truth
shapes, directs, and constrains how people live their lives. It produces
incentives and disincentives for people's conduct. Second, the proliferation of
legal truth shapes people's beliefs and understandings. Law has power over
people's imaginations and how they think about what is happening in the
world. Third, the proliferation of legal truth is important because law's truth
is not the only truth, and law's vision of reality is not the only reality. Law's
power to enforce its vision of the world can clash with other practices of
knowledge and with other forms of truth.
Id. at 7.
66. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
67. For a recent review of the Brown decision, see Wendell LaGrand, Brown at 50,
ABA JOURNAL, April 2004, at 38. The contribution of Brown to the transformation of
law into a sociological tool is noted in LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, AMERICAN LAW IN THE
20TH CENTURY 502 (Yale University Press 2002).
The Brown decision acted as a kind of catalyst. Sociology had historically
been skeptical about law; the "mores" -customs and norms not part of the
official structure-seemed vastly more important. The law was formal, dead,
a false front that concealed the real workings of society. Yet here was a living
example of social change, a revolution in race relations, and the law seemed
to be playing a significant role.
Id.
68. Jones, supra note 56, at 124, 131.
69. VAGO, supra note 52, at 25-27. Legal scholars and professionals accentuate
various differences, but broadly agree on a cognitive map or paradigm of legal reality,
consisting of essentially these elements:
1. Governments are the primary (if not the exclusive) locus of legal con-
trols; that part of the legal process which is government is the determina-
tive source of regulation and order in society.
2. The legal rules and institutions within a society form a system in the
sense of a naturally cohering set of interrelated parts articulated to one
another so that they form a coherent whole, animated by common proce-
dures and purposes.
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they are at the heart of the reform process), but rather on the inferior
trial courts.
70
G. The Superiority of State Courts as Agents of Change
Until the last three decades of the twentieth century, judicial activ-
ism had consisted almost exclusively of the widely publicized and
debated decisions of the United States Supreme Court, which typically
used some provision of the United States Constitution to strike down
3. The central and distinctive element of this system is a body of normative
learning (consisting, in various versions, of rules, and/or standards,
principles, policies) and of procedures for discerning, devising and
announcing them.
3A. Purposiveness: rules are (should be) designed to embody principles or
effectuate policies.
4. Legal systems are centered around and typified by courts, whose func-
tion is to announce, apply, interpret (and sometimes change) rules on
the basis of or in accordance with other elements of this normative learn-
ing.
4A. The basic, typical, decisive mode of legal action is adjudication (i.e., the
application of rules to particular controversies by courts or court-like
institutions in adversarial proceedings).
5. The rules (authoritative normative learning) represent (reflects,
expresses, embodies, refines) general (widely-shared, dominant) social
preferences (values, norms, interests).
5A. Broad participation in rule-making by adjudication (and by representa-
tive government) insures that the rules embody broad social interests.
6. Normative statements, institutions and officials are arranged in hierar-
chies, whose members have different levels of authority.
6A. "Higher" elements direct (design, evaluate) activity; "lower" ones execute
activity.
6B. Higher elements control (guide) lower ones.
7. The behavior of legal actors tends to conform to rules (with some slip-
page and friction).
7A. Officials are guided by rules.
7B. The rules control the behavior of the population.
7C. Conformity is the result of assent and the (threat of) application of gov-
ernment force.
8. If the above obtain, then:
8A. The authoritative normative learning generated at the higher reaches of
the system provides a map for understanding it; and
8B. The function of legal scholarship is to cultivate that learning by clarifica-
tion and criticism; and
8C. Legal scholarship directs itself to remedy imperfections-to bring legal
phenomena into conformity with paradigm assumptions.
Id. at 26-27.
70. Milton D. Green, The Business of the Trial Courts, in THE COURTS THE PUBLIC AND
THE LAW EXPLOSION, supra note 13, at 7, 8.
21
Williams: Reinventing the Courts: The Frontiers of Judicial Activism in the
Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 2007
CAMPBELL LAW REVIEW
laws enacted by the representative branches of government.71 Activ-
ists, however, began giving increased attention to the state courts as
they began to understand that state supreme courts, interpreting state
constitutions, could not only advance the same interests so aggres-
sively pursued in the federal courts, but in many respects provided
more fertile ground for establishing similar authority through the use
of state constitutions.72 State courts dispose of upwards of 97 percent
of all litigation involving areas of law typically considered outside the
realm of federal jurisdiction, such as family law and torts. This inter-
est in the state supreme courts acquired a sense of urgency in the
1980s when President Ronald Reagan was believed to be appointing
conservative jurists to the United States Supreme Court. As a conse-
quence, one commentator observed, the "state supreme courts appear
as . . .hospitable arenas for ... minorities, criminal defendants, and
political dissenters when one . . . [considers] the doctrines of the Bur-
ger Court and the bold measures developing in . . . state jurisdic-
tions.''73 Moreover, state courts came into existence with a body of
court-made laws, called the common law, which has been especially
useful in the area of torts and family law, and in the judicial redefini-
tion of rights.74 Finally, state supreme courts offered another major
advantage over the federal system as an instrument of change in soci-
ety. Because they issue licenses to practice law, they govern the terms
and conditions on which lawyers are admitted to practice. This led to
the imposition in the 1960s and 1970s of ethical standards governing
the conduct of lawyers. Those standards were subsequently expanded
in new ways to impose professional imperatives, and to reeducate infer-
71. See LYMAN A. GARBER, OF MEN AND NOT OF LAW: How THE COURTS ARE USURPING
THE POLITICAL FUNCTION (1966); see also ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA:
THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE LAW (1990).
72. See generally RICHARD NEELY, How COURTS GOVERN AMERICA (1981).
73. Gregory A. Caldeira, Departures in the Study of State Supreme Courts,
JUDICATURE, April 1984, at 158.
74. See generally CHARLES S. LOPEMAN, THE ACTIVIST ADVOCATE: POLICY MAKING IN
STATE SUPREME COURTS (1999). See also J. B. Ruhl, Complexity Theory as a Paradigm for
the Dynamical Law-and-Society System: A Wake-up Call for Legal Reductionism and the
Modern Administrative State, 45 DUKE LJ. 849 (1996).
The Legal Realists were on to something with their devotion to common law
systems as their laboratory. As Professor Lon Fuller put it, the common law
"mirrors the variety of human experience; it offers an honest reflection of the
complexities and perplexities of life itself."
Id. at 918.
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ior trial and appellate judges about their new role and their changing
responsibility in society. 75
But if the courts were to become proactive in dealing with the root
causes and modification of human behavior, they had to transcend
their role as final arbiters of state constitutions to become a "hands-on"
judiciary, thereby necessitating changing the trial courts. 76 In the
name of professionalism, efficiency, and saving money, most state leg-
islatures, at the urging of state supreme courts or the powerful bar
associations which support them, have passed laws or adopted consti-
tutional amendments unifying in varying degrees the inferior trial
75. Activists realized that it was not enough to simply use rules of ethics to prohibit
some kinds of conduct. If the courts were to make effective use of the lawyers and
inferior judges, there had to be standards prescribing the things that lawyers should
do. The American Bar Association has published in one volume both aspects of
professionalism. See Report of the Conference Proceedings, Conference of Chief
Justices, A National Action Plan on Lawyer Conduct and Professionalism (Rancho
Bernardo, Cal. March 1997) (the plan was adopted Jan. 21, 1999).
Professionalism is a much broader concept than legal ethics. For the
purposes of this report, professionalism includes not only civility among
members of the bench and bar, but also competence, integrity, respect for the
rule of law, participation in pro bono and community service, and conduct
by members of the legal profession that exceeds the minimum ethical
requirements. Ethics rules are what a lawyer must obey. Principles of
professionalism are what a lawyer should live by in conducting his or her
affairs ....
Id. at 18. See also Frederic B. Rodgers, Mary Frances Edwards & Chuck A. Ericksen,
The Continuing Expansion of Judicial Education, in THE IMPROVEMENTS OF THE
ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE 185, 192 (Gordon M. Griller & E. Keith Stott, Jr. eds., 7th
ed. 2001).
The most effective career judicial education includes a combination of both
the local and the national approach. Although state judicial colleges may be
better able to teach state rules, procedures and substantive law, it is through
national programs that judges may gain a broader perspective of commonly
encountered problems and the ability to develop and apply solutions to the
problems independently. . . . Their programs [NASJE, LIJE, JERITTI
emphasize training judges to become effective teachers, recognizing different
learning styles in adult learners and meeting their needs, anticipating trends
affecting state courts, reviewing stages in the creative process and
recognizing blocks to creating, and challenging judges to think and perform
"outside the box."
Id. at 192.
76. David B. Wexler & Bruce J. Winick, Putting Therapeutic Jurisprudence to Work:
The Term May Sound Academic, but it Embodies a Hands-on Approach to Solving
Problems Rather Than Simply Winning Cases, 89 A.B.A. J. 54 (2003). See generally
JAMES L. NoLAN, JR., THE THERAPEUTIC STATE: JUSTIFYING GOVERNMENT AT CENTURY'S END
(1998). See also JAMES L. NOL.AN, JR., REINVENTING JUSTICE: THE AMERICAN DRUG COURT
MOVEMENT (2001).
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courts. The effect has been to bring trial courts increasingly under the
control of the state supreme courts. 77 Moreover, the high courts have
successfully expanded the concept of "inherent authority" to increase
their power over lawyers and other judges. The authority of state
supreme courts to determine the educational qualifications for lawyers
was expanded in the 1960s and 1970s. They imposed ethical rules
which, combined with bureaucratization and mandatory judicial edu-
cation, has led to the creation of a common judicial culture which tac-
itly, if not explicitly, approves of the policies and goals adopted by
activists working with and through the state supreme courts. 78 "State
supreme courts," observed one supporter of reform, "were like heads
without bodies. '79 As a result of the reform movement, however, state
supreme courts have acquired an increasingly unified body of power-
ful trial courts, sharing values propagated by the supreme courts.
There are still some trial judges who want to resist manipulation and
control from the top, but they are diminishing as the institutional
memory fades, and the old, independent trial judges pass out of the
system. Only the "team players" are left. Consequently, the power of
state supreme courts continues to grow every year. With their signifi-
cant gains in political power, those who disagree with the growing
agenda for change have strong incentives not to do so publicly.
II. BEHAVIORISM AND THE JUDICIAL DESIGN OF CULTURE
In their quest to reinvent the courts, activists found that they had
at their disposal a powerful tool for the new trial courts to begin
77. For a favorable assessment of the court reform movement, see ROBERT W.
TOBIN, NATIONAL CENTER FOR STATE COURTS, CREATING THE JUDICIAL BRANCH: THE
UNFINISHED REFORM (1999). See also John M. Greacen, The Role of the State Court
Administrator: Ensuring a Statewide Judicial Branch of Government, in THE
IMPROVEMENT OF THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE (Gordon M. Griller & E. Keith Stott, Jr.
eds., 7th ed. 2002).
78. See NEW JERSEY ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE COURTS, REPORT OF THE SUPREME
COURT OF NEW JERSEY COMMITTEE ON EFFICIENCY II (May 1996) at 13.
The whole is more than the sum of its parts. The unification of the State's
judicial system is more than bringing together it various parts, that is,
combining the employees of twenty-one county courts into a unified Judicial
personnel system, a unified budget and a single funding source. Unification
carries the responsibility to constructively combine diverse local employee
work cultures, each of which is strongly influenced by the style and values of
its local leadership, as well as variations in funding and personnel practices.
These styles and values vary markedly, from highly participative,
collaborative cultures, to more rigid, hierarchical models.
Id. at 19.
79. TOBIN, supra note 77, at vii.
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accomplishing their tasks of changing individuals and the culture: the
application of scientific techniques to study, measure, and manipulate
human life. The greatest of these techniques is the science of behavior-
ism, the technology of human behavior8 0 It is the consolidation of all
applied techniques of the social sciences.
A. Law as Technology
Some reformers in the 1960s may still have believed in law as a
statement of principles having origins and validity outside the realm of
science. Obviously, they failed to see that the application of the social
sciences to law would ultimately subvert, and then dominate, the law
to the exclusion of religious or moral truth. For instance, Professor
Harry W. Jones, one of the early reform leaders, observed that "[legal
propositions have their origin not in empirical observations but in
authoritative pronouncements by a court or legislature." ' For Jones,
however, there was no remaining view of law as non-empirical but jus-
tifiable beliefs about transcendent truth to be protected from the inva-
sion of science or the shifting winds of social ideology. By then, law
had become only a utilitarian means of social control, a "complex and
crucially important social technology.""2 Consequently, "fundamental
improvements in the technology of law and government will come,
over the long pull," argued Jones, "only as we begin to acquire genu-
inely scientific knowledge concerning human nature and conduct."8 3
To Jones and other reformers of that day, law was an applied science
deriving increased knowledge from the social sciences in much the
same way that medicine was an applied science of the natural sciences
of chemistry and biology. Thus, Jones observed, "Similarly, until the
tardy emergence of the behavioral sciences, law was an applied science
in search of a basic science."8 4 Lawyers were, Jones believed, "the most
resourceful technicians in our society" even though they had "little sci-
entific knowledge to draw on."8s 5 However, this changed in the last
'decades of the twentieth century, as the social sciences steadily
expanded their influence on law and the judiciary to produce the con-
80. See NOAM CHOMSKY, Psychology and Ideology, in THE CHOMSKY READER 157
(1987) (providing a critical analysis of Skinner's theories).
81. HARRY W. JONES, Legal Inquiry and the Methods of Science, in LAW AND THE
SOCIAL ROLE OF SCIENCE 124 (1966) [hereinafter LAW AND THE SOCIAL ROLE OF SCIENCE].
82. Id. at 125.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 126.
85. Id. at 127.
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solidated, applied technology of social control.86 Jones may have
thought that there were limits to which the social sciences could influ-
ence the methods and purposes of law, that there might be some moral
or philosophical source of law beyond the reach of scientific inquiry,
but, if so, he was wrong.
The science of behaviorism was becoming increasingly popular
not only as a means of controlling individual behavior but as a technol-
ogy of cultural design.87 Developed by men like Ivan Pavlov, and per-
fected by John B. Watson, B. F. Skinner and others, behaviorism makes
it possible for sociologists and psychologists to study and describe
human life in mathematical ways and to suggest answers to the
problems of human behavior.88 Activists instinctively recognized the
potential (and, in all fairness, the danger) of these new techniques for
86. The various social sciences developed techniques that were adapted to the type
of work being done in those disciplines. But those techniques were previously applied
in isolation from one another. Now they have been consolidated in the hands of the
judiciary. The term technique is defined by Ellul as the "ensemble of means" used to
achieve some predetermined end, and that same usage is continued here. For a more
complete treatment of technique, see JACQUES ELLUL, THE TECHNOLOGICAL SOCIETY
(1973).
87. B. F. Skinner promoted "behavioral engineering" as a tool for cultural design to
solve the growing problems of mankind. See WALDEN Two REviSITED, preface to the
1976 edition of WALDEN Two, p. vi:
The "behavioral engineering" I had so frequently mentioned in the book
was, at the time, little more than science fiction. I had thought that an
experimental analysis of behavior could be applied to practical problems, but
I had not proved it.
But there was, I think, a better reason why more and more people began
to read the book. The world was beginning to face problems of an entirely
new order of magnitude - the exhaustion of resources, the pollution of the
environment, overpopulation, and the possibility of nuclear holocaust, to
mention only four. Physical and biological technologies could, of course,
help. We could find new resources of energy and make better use of those we
had. The world could feed itself by growing more nutritious grains and eating
grain rather than meat. More reliable methods of contraception could keep
the population within bounds. Impregnable defense could make a nuclear
war impossible. But that would happen only if human behavior changed, and
how it could be changed was still an unanswered question. How were people
to be induced to use new forms of energy, to eat grain rather than meat, and
to limit the size of their families; and how were atomic stockpiles to be kept
out of the hands of desperate leaders?
Id.
88. See F. A. HAYEK, THE COUNTER-REVOLUTION OF SCIENCE: STUDIES IN THE ABUSE OF
REASON (1952).
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shaping society.8 9 The developing social sciences used sociological
and psychological tests, opinion surveys, social experiments, personal-
ity profiles, and direct observations to collect data on people in all
kinds of settings. Using statistical methods, they could then describe
behavior in terms of variables that made it possible to suggest answers
to the problems of life. Applications to the law were obvious. For exam-
ple, a study on men involved in the robbery of convenient stores might
show that they were, in comparison to the rest of the population, more
likely to be less educated, unemployed, addicted to drugs, and suffer-
ing from some kind of mental illness or personality disorder. 90 Moreo-
ver, the study might reveal that they had a combination of problems
called co-occurring conditions. Additionally, they may have been pre-
viously involved in similar forms of criminal behavior. The social sci-
ences could suggest answers to some of the leading questions of the
day. How, for example, do we know that punishment deters future vio-
lations of the law?
Professor Jones, however, conceded to the realm of scientific
inquiry an even more critical issue: "What is the relative force of coer-
cion and internal obligations as influences on law-observing behav-
ior?"'" These and many others are inherently empirical issues, but they
have a utilitarian bias depending upon the presuppositions or goals of
those who acquire the data and apply it through the judicial system.92
The transformation of law from a system of principles having
religious or philosophical origins into a system of social control has
been noted by Lawrence M. Friedman, one of the leading historians
and advocates for sociological law. Many law schools and leading law
professors have adopted the sociological approach to law. But the "old
89. See Oscar M. Ruebhausen & Orville G. Brim, Jr., Privacy and Behavioral
Research, in LAW AND THE SOCIAL ROLE OF SCIENCE, supra note 81, at 80.
90. See, e.g., STEPHEN P. JOHNSON, COMMISSION ON THE FUTURE OF THE CALIFORNIA
COURTS, JUSTICE IN THE BALANCE 2020 145 (1993) [hereinafter JUSTICE IN THE BALANCE
2020].
While crime is no stranger in 2020, there is less of it than in the last
decade of the 20th century. Its reduction is the result of society's willingness
to confront with vigor and persistence: poverty, illiteracy, inadequate
education, inadequate mental health care, joblessness, child abuse and
neglect, the drug epidemic, the proliferation of firearms, escalating violence,
and the failure of individuals to practice and teach basic ethical, disciplined
behavior.
Id.
91. HARRY W. JONES, Legal Inquiry and the Methods of Science, in LAW AND THE
SOCIAL ROLE OF SCIENCE supra note 81, at 127 (1966).
92. See generally IRVING LOUiS HOROWITZ, THE DECOMPOSITION OF SOCIOLOGY
(1994).
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scholarly order" hangs on to some extent in the law schools, even
though it is a "bit battered and frayed about the edges. 93 Professors
still give students books full of cases to study, and students still feel
that law is about rules. But in the law schools, the "'notion of law as
rule,"' quoting John Schlegel, "'is as overwhelming as the smell of
limburger cheese."' "Not everybody," notes Friedman, "finds this the
most attractive of smells."94 The crux of this observation is that law-
as statements of principles having religious or philosophical origins-
has a foul smell; but that law which is the product of empirical study
(particularly from outside the legal system), producing a scientific sys-
tem of social control, has a sweet smell indeed. Thus, the preferred
conceptualization of law as we enter the twenty-first century is a tech-
nique-the ensemble of methods by which the discoveries of the social
sciences are applied to the study and control of human life for the
achievement of a predetermined end.95
B. Nurture and Nature as Determinants of Behavior
After decades of research, Skinner's radical behaviorism has been
determined to be an incomplete scientific explanation of human
behavior. It erroneously attributed everything about life to the influ-
ence of the environment. Now, genetic and biochemical components
are acknowledged to be powerful determinants of behavior and per-
sonality. 96 However, Skinner addressed the effect of these influences
on behavior and human freedom in a comprehensive way, making his
observations directly relevant to the court reform movement.97
93. Friedman, supra note 67, at 504.
94. Id.
95. See ELLUL, supra note 86, at 19.
96. Matt Ridley presents the debate about the relative influence of genetics or
environment as a "false dichotomy." It is true that our genes determine much of our
behavior, but, he argues, our genes are influenced by our environment- "nurture."
Our genetic makeup is subject to being altered by, and is vulnerable to our
environment. See generally MATT RIDLEY, NATURE VIA NURTURE: GENES, EXPERIENCE, &
WHAT MAKES Us HUMAN (2003).
To appreciate what has happened, you will have to abandon cherished
notions and open your mind. You will have to enter a world where your
geners are not puppet masters pulling the strings of your behavior but
puppets at the mercy of your behavior; a world where instinct is not the
opposite of learning, where environmental influences are sometimes less
reversible than genetic ones, and where nature is designed for nurture.
Id. at 4. For a book refuting the "blank slate" view of human behavior, see STEVEN
PINKER, THE BLANK SLATE: THE MODERN DENIAL OF HUMAN NATURE (2002).
97. The long-running debate between behaviorists and geneticists about whether
behavior is first the product of evolutionary processes encoded in our genes or is
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According to Skinner, the behaviors that resulted in conflict and
aggression were believed to have grown out of reinforced and internal-
ized behavior learned during more primitive times as the necessary
means of survival.98 Propensities that contributed to the survival of
our ancestors in pre-modern times are today viewed as threats to our
survival. Among our ancestors, those who proved to be most success-
ful in the fight for survival were reinforced by their ability to find and
eat as much food as possible; the ability to procreate at a time when
the human race was periodically decimated by pestilence; famine and
war; and aggressive behavior which defeated marauding men and wild
beasts. But, now, argued Skinner, "under better forms of government,
supported by ethical and moral practices which protect person and
property, the reinforcing power of successful aggression leads to per-
sonal illness, neurotic and otherwise, and to war-if not total destruc-
tion."9 9 Skinner observed that our sensitivity to these reinforcers, and
the contribution which the reinforced behaviors have made to our cur-
rent welfare "raise an important problem in the design of a culture.
How are we to keep from overeating, from overpopulating the world,
and from destroying each other? How can we make sure that these
properties of the human organism, once necessary for survival, shall
not now prove lethal?" 10
The link between food and sex as reinforcers of undesirable
behavior is, of course, an oversimplification of the matter. Skinner was
describing a time when our ancestors were believed to be more primi-
tive in their physiologic make up-little more than animals. But the
contingencies of reinforcement, which determined their behavior,
resulted in physical changes stored in their genes and passed along in
an evolutionary progression to produce modern man. To the behavi-
orists, we begin life as a complex, but empty shell waiting to be filled
by our environment with language skills, feelings, abstract reasoning,
and all of the other higher capacities once attributed to divine creation.
We come into the world with proclivities toward certain types of behav-
ior only because of biochemical reactions in our brains encoded by the
environment in our ancestors' genes which were passed along to us.
programmed into each of us by our environment is not particularly relevant here
because the ultimate implications of both views in terms of the possibilities for human
freedom and, particularly, the work of the courts are, for all practical purposes, the
same. See generally Michael J. Sandel, The Case Against Perfection, THE ATLANTIC, April
2004, at 50.
98. B. F. Skinner, Contingencies of Reinforcement in the Design of a Culture, in
SCIENCES OF MAN AND SOCIAL ETHICS 219-20 (Marvin Charles Katz ed., 1969).
99. Id. at 220.
100. Id.
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However, these destructive genetic predispositions may also be modi-
fied by the scientific application of the contingencies of reinforcement.
If we strip away all delusions about creation, and look past the lan-
guage and reasoning skills that inform human behavior, we are not
basically different, Skinner argued, from the animals from which we
evolved. While some found the description of man as an animal offen-
sive, Skinner did not. The use of the word "animal" to describe man is,
for some, a pejorative term only because man has been made "spuri-
ously honorific."'' 1 In other words, man has exalted himself. While
some support Hamlet's exclamation, "How like a god!," Ivan Pavlov
emphasized, "How like a dog!" "But that," observed Skinner, "was a
step forward. A god is the archetypal pattern of an explanatory fiction,
of a miracle-working mind, of the metaphysical. Man is much more
than a dog, but like a dog he is within range of a scientific analysis."' 2
Because we are more than dogs, our behavior and our future can
be shaped in ways not possible for other forms of life. All of the tech-
niques applicable to animals are assumed to have direct application to
man. Furthermore, our advanced physiological makeup gives us the
potential to acquire from our environment sophisticated language
skills, discriminate between subtle facial expressions, and the emotive
tones of another person's voice. Moreover, because behavior is learned
it can be changed in a classroom. Good test grades, or something as
subtle as a smile are reinforcers that can change our behavior as effec-
tively as some of the reinforcers which molded the behavior of our
more primitive ancestors. Consequently, when Skinner said that we are
much more than dogs, he was referring to the expanded potential of
behavioral techniques by which man could be modified through the
manipulation and control of all aspects of our environment.
Skinner addressed the relationship between behavior and the con-
tingencies of reinforcement: "One may deal with problems generated
by a powerful reinforcer simply by changing the contingencies of rein-
forcement. An environment may be designed in which reinforcers
which ordinarily generate unwanted behavior simply do not do so."10 3
Undesirable behavior can be weakened by making sure that it is not
reinforced. Food, sex, a friendly smile, and many other pleasant, enjoy-
able, and satisfying stimuli are some of the reinforcers which define
happiness, but we must be careful not to use them in ways that rein-
force undesirable forms of behavior. Only through the experimental
101. B. F. SKINNER, BEYOND FREEDOM AND DIGNITY 201 (1971) [hereinafter BEYOND
FREEDOM AND DIGNITY].
102. Id.
103. Id. at 223.
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analysis of behavior will it be possible to design those reinforcements
which will generate and maintain the most subtle and complex forms
of desirable behavior, and eliminate the threat to survival posed by
material excess and human aggression.
10 4
By conducting detailed studies of different aspects of life, the
problem of conflict and antisocial behavior could be reduced to
proclivities for aggression, personal ambition, dominance, jealousy
and other traits.1 05 All of these would be functions of our environ-
ment-our home life, education, employment, poverty, physical and
psychological illnesses, all kinds of political and social inequalities,
and no doubt a variety of other factors. That hypothetical study of men
involved in the robbery of convenient stores could suggest certain
answers to the problem of armed robbery. A correlation might be
shown to exist between aggression in the form of criminal behavior
and multiple forms of environmental factors: economic, social, and
physical deprivation, as well as mental illness. Moreover, a study might
also show that after previous robberies such men were reinforced in
their behavior by the approval of their peers or by the pleasure derived
from the money obtained in the robbery.
Through the science of behaviorism, and by other methods of
modification emerging from the broader field of neurotechnology, it is
possible for our thoughts and actions to be shaped by government in
subtle ways to produce forms of behavior more conducive to the sur-
vival-indeed, the perfection-of society. But the greater classrooms of
life have been the family and the community, which encourage certain
types of behavior and discourage others. Thus, it is there that the great-
est potential for behavioral modification can be found. In the past,
however, these institutions of social control operated outside the influ-
104. Id. at 230-34.
105. Notice that the undesirable personality traits to be eradicated by the behavioral
sciences predominate in the legal profession. See Susan Daicoff, Making Law
Therapeutic for Lawyers, 5 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 811 (1999).
A definable set of characteristics appears to distinguish lawyers from the
general adult population. Each of these characteristics is empirically derived.
Of these general characteristics, the attorney traits most relevant to TJ/PL are
preferences for dominance, competitiveness, primary need for achievement,
materialism, interpersonal insensitivity, preference for the Myers Briggs Type
Indicator (MBTI) decision-making style of "Thinking" over "Feeling," and
preference for a moral decision-making style consistent with a "rights"
orientation rather than an "ethic of care." These traits, among others, define
the typical lawyer. Interestingly, they fit well with traditional forms of law
practice, which usually emphasize winning, materialism, cool, impersonal
reasoning, and the elevation of clients' legal rights over other concerns.
Id. at 827-28.
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ence of law. Therefore, the argument of the reform movement has been
that new courts are needed because the family, church and community
have failed to provide necessary social control.
Consequently, the social sciences have turned to the judicial
branch of government as a delivery system for the reinforcements and
sanctions capable of modifying human behavior and engineering a
new society. For example, sociologist Donald Black has created a theo-
retical system, for "those who would act upon the world," to make
empirical evaluations about the quantity of law in relation to other
non-legal forms of social control, and for making decisions about the
direction or goals toward which law should be applied. 10 6 According to
Black, "with these propositions it is possible to calculate legal risks
and advantages from one case to another, to engineer a legal outcome
in or out of the courtroom, to reform a legal system, or even to design a
community with little or no law at all."'10 7
The social sciences-sociology, psychology, political science and
others-inform the process of behavioral control by demonstrating,
through empirical analysis, certain correlations between the envi-
roning world and multiple forms of behavior. Activists argue that the
urgent task of visionary court leaders is to make the changes necessary
for the judicial system to apply the sociological, technological, eco-
nomic, and political techniques now available to induce revolutionary
changes in society."08 Reform literature gives numerous examples of
ways in which visionary leaders of the past were able to profoundly
influence the future. The two most prominent examples of visionary
leadership used by reformers-the combination of politics and technol-
ogy capable of producing revolutionary change-are President John F.
Kennedy's 1961 challenge to put a man on the moon by the end of the
106. DONALD BLACK, THE BEHAVIOR OF LAW iX-X (1976).
107. Id.
108. ENVISIONING JUSTICE: REINVENTING THE COURTS FOR THE 21ST CENTURY, supra
note 48.
A vision is a compelling statement of a preferred future. Visions are "futures
of the heart"-they touch and move us. Visions inspire us by stating why we
do what we do, what higher contribution flows from our efforts, and what we
could strive to become ... This video defines visions as an active process that
excites people to act, to create, and to innovate. It spotlights, as examples,
visions whose results can now be seen in the world around us. The video
then describes some recent efforts in court systems visioning conducted as
part of the "Vision for the Courts: A Capacity-building Project."
Pamphlet accompanying video at 3-4.
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decade, and Dr. Martin Luther King's 1963 I Have a Dream speech
which galvanized the Civil Rights Movement.10 9
III. PLANNING FOR THE PREFERRED FUTURE
A. Court Futures Planning
Court planning was conducted on a limited basis in a few state
court systems during the 1970s and 80s." However, the work of
reinventing the state courts took a giant leap forward in 1990 when the
State Justice Institute and the American Judicature Society jointly
sponsored The National Conference on the Future and the Courts in
San Antonio, Texas. 1 ' Drawing from the earlier work of a few of the
state supreme courts, the conference attracted several hundred partici-
pants-mostly judges, court administrators, lawyers, and educators-
who were instructed by professional futurists on how to plan for and
create the "preferred" future. Part of the process involved formulating
and then selecting from carefully prepared scenarios of future socie-
ties.1 2 Delegates could choose from the "Judicial Leadership Scena-
rio," the "Generic Justice Scenario," the "Road Warrior Scenario," the
"Multi-Door Courthouse Scenario," the "Global High-Tech Scenario,"
the "Super Surveillance Scenario," and the "Green and Feminist Scena-
rio." Each of these scenarios related some future form and function of
the judiciary to a corresponding form of society. Representatives from
the various states began deciding in San Antonio what changes they
109. Id.
110. The first formal report of a state court futures commission was from the
Arizona Supreme Court, an early leader in the field of judicial visioning and
forecasting. See ARIZONA SUPREME COURT'S COMMISSION ON THE COURTS, REPORT OF THE
COMMISSION ON THE COURTS (1989).
111. JAMES A. DATOR & SHARON J. RODGERS, AM. JUDICATURE Soc'Y, ALTERNATIVE
FUTURES FOR THE STATE COURTS OF 2020 (1991) [hereinafter ALTERNATIVE FUTURES FOR
THE STATE COURTS OF 2020]. The State Justice Institute referred to The National
Conference on the Future and the Courts Conference as "[pierhaps the most seminal
event SJI supported during its first ten years." 10 YEARS: IMPROVING THE QUALITY OF
AMERICAN JUSTICE, supra note 50, at 31.
112. Conference organizers collected comments and visions from delegates to the
San Antonio Conference and combined them with ideas developed in pre-conference
meetings by the conference organizers. Scenarios were then assembled by planners
from the combined materials and distributed throughout state court systems as a
means of directing the thinking of other court planners at the state level about possible
futures. "Everything we do in this volume is with that purpose in mind: to help you
work with others to gain greater control over the future and the courts, to work with
others to create the future and the courts you prefer." ALTERNATIVE FUTURES FOR THE
STATE COURTS OF 2020, supra note 111, at 4.
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had to begin making in 1990 to bring into existence their preferred
future for the courts by the year 2020; additionally, they made plans
for even larger national conferences to expand the work of changing
the courts.
1 13
After the San Antonio conference (and other important confer-
ences as well), state supreme courts began creating commissions and
committees to engage in futures planning and strategic planning, a
related process adapted from the business community. These court
commissions and committees issued reports, including titles such as
Courts in Transition (Virginia, 1989); Reinventing Justice 2022 (Massa-
chusetts, 1992); Justice in the Balance 2020 (California, 1993); Justice
in the Next Millennium: Report of the Court Futures Vanguard (Georgia,
1993); New Dimensions for Justice (Maine, 1993); To Serve All People
(Tennessee, 1996); Without Favor, Denial or Delay: A Court System for
the 21st Century (North Carolina, 1996); Charting the Future of Iowa's
Courts (Iowa, 1996); and A Changing Landscape (Ohio, 2000). All of
these reports are utopian political manifestos, advancing sweeping pro-
posals for the eventual creation of a judicial system radically different
from the current one, and a new role for judges in society.1 14 The
many "strategic plans" also being adopted by the courts subtly outline
the political process by which current judicial needs will be met and
visions of a new judiciary will be realized.
As the twentieth century drew to a close, the work of court futures
commissions had slowed, but the process of reinventing the courts was
stronger than ever, having only been repackaged under the broader,
less descriptive term of Public Trust and Confidence in the Justice Sys-
tem. In May 1999, the National Center for State Courts, using federal
tax dollars provided by the State Justice Institute, sponsored the
National Conference on Public Trust and Confidence in the Justice Sys-
tem in Washington, D.C. Activists made plans on a national scale for
changing and expanding the work of the courts as a branch of govern-
113. See, e.g., NAT'L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON THE FUTURE
OF THE JUDICIARY IN CELEBRATION OF THE 25TH ANNIVERSARY OF THE NATIONAL CENTER
FOR STATE COURTS (1996).
114. Seymour B. Sarason provides a broader definition that permits a better
understanding of the utopian nature of court futures reports. THE CREATION OF
SETTINGS AND THE FUTURE SOCIETIES, supra note 59, at 7 ("Today, we use the adjective
utopian not only to suggest that something does not exist, but also, and more
important, that we do not know how to get to where we want to go, and it is the latter
use which implicitly recognizes that knowing the goal is only the beginning of the
journey.").
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ment and the creation of a new role for judges in society. 1 1 5 Beginning
with survey results that reflected, they argued, "strong empirical evi-
dence that the American public is highly critical of some aspects of the
justice system, 11" 6 the conference was "directed toward facilitating stra-
tegic planning at the state and local levels, and supporting [state and
local] strategies with the resources available to national organiza-
tions."'117 A National Action Plan (NAP) was subsequently adopted
based upon decisions and ideas generated by conference delegates and
planners. The NAP is a "guide for national organizations that want to
relate their strategic plans and programs to state strategies for building
public trust and confidence in the courts, and for state and local orga-
nizations seeking information on public trust and confidence activities
in other states and from the national organizations."" 8
Following the conference, representatives from the various states
returned home to begin implementing a wide variety of state pro-
grams, including to varying degrees most of the activities once a part
of the court futures movement plus a wide range of practical activities
designed to produce change." 9 Working under the banner of increas-
ing public trust and confidence in the justice system, some judges and
bar associations in all states (frequently assisted by professional futur-
ists, planners, and academics) are:
(1) conducting environmental scans to determine social, eco-
nomic, and political conditions in their communities;
(2) conducting visioning sessions and trends analysis;
(3) conducting public opinion surveys on a variety of topics, and
forming focus groups in their communities;
(4) working to increase access to justice, including the use of
court volunteers and advanced computer technologies;
115. See Transcript, National Conference on Public Trust and Confidence in the
Justice System, May 14-15, 1999, Washington, D.C. (on file with the author).
116. NAT'L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, NAT'L CONFERENCE ON PUB. TRUST AND
CONFIDENCE IN THE JUSTICE SYSTEM, NATIONAL ACTION PLAN: A GUIDE FOR STATE AND
NATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 5 (2000).
117. Id. at 1.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 4.
The NAP is a unique product in the sense that it is not a formal plan with a
hierarchy of goals, objectives, programs, and implementation steps specific to
one organization. It is, instead, a guide for national organizations that want to
relate their strategic plans and programs to state strategies for building public
trust and confidence in the courts, and for state and local organizations
seeking information on public trust and confidence activities in other states
and from the national organizations.
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(5) compiling and publishing strategic plans for courts and their
communities;
(6) establishing commissions to combat bias based on race, gen-
der, and sexual orientation;
(7) working with journalists to establish common ground with
the media;
(8) establishing speakers bureaus as part of judicial outreach
programs;
(9) working to change the way judges are selected by creating
panels of experts rather than allow contested public elections;
(10) seeking ways to insure judicial independence; and
(11) establishing new systems of innovative, problem-solving
courts utilizing scientific techniques which modify individual and
collective behavior.
The American Bar Association, which supports and tracks many
of these so-called Justice Initiatives through affiliated state and local
bar associations, reports that by the turn of the millennium literally
hundreds of these "commissions, summits, conferences and other ini-
tiatives" were being conducted each year. 120 The 2000 Summary of
State and Local Justice Initiatives, for instance, "shows 1,035 ways that
the courts and the bars continue to improve access, combat bias...
upgrade judicial selection, enhance jury duty experience, preserve
judicial independence . . . and make the courts more user-friendly."' 12 1
It is worth noting that not once in the untold thousands of pages
of materials related to these activities has any person been found to
ask the most obvious question: how is this work related to the judicial
power bestowed upon the courts by the various constitutions? Not one
time in the course of any of these thousands of activities has any deci-
sion been rendered by judges or juries in contested lawsuits between
litigants. All of these activities from the beginning of the reform move-
ment until today are, without exception, legislative or executive in
nature and are universally extraneous to the act of making a decision
in a lawsuit. In fact, had people been present to witness some of these
events, they could have seen justices of the state supreme courts, par-
ticipating trial judges, law school deans, journalists, business leaders
120. Burnham H. Greeley, Introductory Memorandum to AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION
COMMITTEE ON STATE JUSTICE INITIATIVES, SUMMARY OF STATE AND LOCAL JUSTICE
INITIATIVES (2000). The American Bar Association no longer publishes the report on
State and Local Justice Initiatives, but current information about the ABA's
participation in court reform and Justice Initiatives can be found at its Coalition for
Justice web site at www.abanet.org/justice/home.html.
121. Id.
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and others, all of them hand-picked members of the "blue-ribbon"
commissions and committees, seated in legislative committee rooms,
while listening to "testimony" from "witnesses" about the substance
and direction of court reform. The commission and committee mem-
bers working for the judiciary made decisions that had nothing what-
soever to do with the judicial power given to judges by state
constitutions. They were, in effect, making decisions about how to
change state constitutions by redefining the judicial power and pro-
cess. The commissions themselves represent a new paradigm for gov-
ernment because they function as mini-constitutional conventions
created by an existing branch of government, bypassing the constitu-
tional amendment process.
The planning process and implementation of plans is a perversion
of the former judicial power by which courts and judges wield the
power of the state. Planning for the future of the courts and society
represents the emergence of a new kind of judicial branch, and, conse-
quently, a new form of government. How are the courts doing these
things? The answer, quite simply, is that the ideas that formed the
framework for government during the Founding Era have vanished, so
that few now recognize the postmodern judiciary and its activities as
something patently unconstitutional. Are not the legislative and execu-
tive branches of government the political branches? Is the planning
process not inherently political? Is the dissemination of propaganda a
proper function of the courts? The questions themselves supply the
answers. But because the courts have been operating outside the con-
stitution for so long, the basic questions are no longer being asked. It
is simply assumed that the new paradigm is part of the judicial power.
The courts can do these things and get away with them because no one
has the insight, will or power to stop them.
The framework for the new judiciary has entered the implementa-
tion process represented by the catch-all public trust and confidence
movement. However, that framework is largely reflected in the reports
of court futures commissions formed by a majority of the state court
systems. All court futures commissions support a new role for judges
allowing them in both criminal and civil cases to use alternative, coer-
cive techniques developed in the social sciences for modifying human
behavior. Consequently, we shall examine those reports more closely
to see where the courts are taking us.
Futures commission reports are built around contrasts between
the activists' fears of social and political disintegration if people are
free to pursue their own lives, and their utopian visions of a just soci-
ety under the control of a new judiciary. "Where there is no vision, the
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people perish," observed one witness before the California Futures
Commission. 1
22
"Less certain [than a multicultural society]," observed the Califor-
nia Futures Commission,
is whether the social compact that governs the multicultural society of
2020 will be healthy or malignant-whether most Californians will
have jobs, enjoy a quality education, or inhabit an environment that
can fairly be described as hospitable. The realities of 2020 are being
shaped today, sometimes purposefully, sometimes not. The choices of
the 1990s will reverberate loudly in the third decade of the 21st
century. 12
3
The scare tactics employed by the futurists and court leaders are
essential to the creation of scenarios and visions of the future. In 1990
the Massachusetts Futures Commission began its search for the future
judicial system by creating a "Nightmare" scenario: "It is 2022. Society
is impoverished. Conflicts focus on competition for basic resources:
food, fuel, and housing. Justice norms, processes, and objectives have
broken down. . . .Reductions in mental health services, substance
abuse programs, and juvenile services contribute to the surge in crimi-
nal cases."'124 The connection between societal problems and the failed
judiciary appears at the end of the scenario when the commission con-
cludes that, "[tlrue justice is a scarce and costly commodity."' 12 5
But the many futures commission reports and strategic plans are
also replete with utopian visions offering an alternative future for those
willing to trust in the new judicial leadership. The second published
futures commission report in 1989, entitled Courts in Transition, by the
Virginia Supreme Court's Commission on the Future of Virginia's Judi-
cial System was organized around visions of the future judicial system;
pointedly, it had ten "visions" instead of ten chapters.' 2 6 The Califor-
nia Futures Commission, which worried so much about legislative
issues such as the future availability of good jobs, quality education,
and a clean environment, envisioned a brighter future for society with
122. JUSTICE IN THE BALANCE 2020, supra note 90, at 1 (quoting Dr. Mattie M.
Walker).
123. Id.
124. MASSACHUSETTS SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT COMMISSION ON THE FUTURE OF THE
COURTS, REINVENTING JUSTICE 2022: REPORT OF THE CHIEF JUSTICE'S COMMISSION ON THE
FUTURE OF THE COURTS 6 (1992) [hereinafter REINVENTING JUSTICE 2022].
125. Id.
126. COMMISSION ON THE FUTURE OF VIRGINIA'S JUDICIAL SYSTEM, COURTS IN
TRANSITION: REPORT OF THE VIRGINIA SUPREME COURT'S COMMISSION OF THE FUTURE OF
THE VIRGINIA JUDICIAL SYSTEM (1989).
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the idealized new judiciary when it outlined its "Preferred Future for
the California Courts, c. 2020":
It is 2020. Justice's greatest asset is its servants, who in every
action personify respect for public service and a commitment to the
public's interest. Judges and other dispute resolution providers are the
embodiment of excellence. They are culturally competent, representa-
tive of the genders, races, and ethnicities they serve. They are commu-
nity leaders, outspoken advocates for justice in its broadest sense.
It is 2020. In both perception and practice the California Courts
are scrupulously fair, accessible to all. Comprehensive and compre-
hending, they have the confidence of the powerless and the powerful,
the poor and the wealthy, the victim and the offender. Their commit-
ment to equal justice is absolute....
It is 2020. The courts have evolved into a truly multidimensional
justice system consisting of multioption justice centers, smaller, pub-
licly supported community dispute resolution centers, and numerous
private providers. Together they offer a wide range of appropriate dis-
pute resolution options. Resolution processes are fit to the dispute,
rather than the converse. Bench and jury trials are reserved for the
disputes that genuinely need them....
It is 2020. Justice remains loyal to its age-old principles, yet is
much changed. Its transformation is in part the result of sustained
public investment in the courts. At the same time, society is less
inclined to view the courts as the emergency room for society's most
stubborn ailments; Californians recognize the economics and benefits
of treating conflict's causes, as well as its symptoms. Children are the
beneficiaries of much of this resolve. Their health, nurture, and educa-
tion are public priorities, signifying society's determination to care for
the future by caring for those who will inherit it.
It is 2020. Californians are committed to conflict reduction and
crime prevention. Courses in conflict resolution and the role of the
public justice system are taught in every school at every level. As a
result, the average Californian understands disputes and how to
resolve them-quickly, affordably, and fairly. Thought more accessible,
comprehensive, and effective than their forebears [sic], 21st century
"courts" actually process a smaller volume of disputes. The public
views them not as the dispute resolvers of last resort, but as the appro-
priate recourse when constructive self-help is not enough.127
B. Judicial Values
At the heart of these visions are values. Agreement on values is the
first step in the creation of new settings whether they are new schools,
127. JUSTICE IN THE BALANCE 2020, supra note 90.
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new civic or professional organizations, new governments, or even new
societies.'1 2  Court futures reports contain numerous statements of
vague values such as tolerance, inclusion, equality, access to justice,
public trust and confidence in the justice system, alternative tech-
niques of dispute resolution, treatment, family and community sup-
port, victims' rights, and judicial independence, among others. 129
Statements of values are important because societal design represents
a moral decision about which forms of behavior, out of many possible
forms of behavior, are most desirable, and the study of preferred
behaviors and future societies is, consequently, framed in terms of val-
ues. 130 In fact, a vision of a future society is dependent upon and
derived from a vision of values. But these values (sometimes overlap-
ping with "goals" or "missions") are deliberately vague, providing the
greatest possible flexibility to the reformers when specific proposals
need to be justified as being consistent with the values guiding the
judiciary. These judicial values provide the basis for more concrete
proposals having specific application to the actual work of the judici-
ary. The leading court futurist, for example, has his political science
students design forms of government based upon different religious
beliefs.1 3 1
By the Twentieth Century, the synthesis between Christianity and
Western Civilization had come to an end, and sociologists and psy-
chologists-the scientists-began a systematic search for a set of values
128. THE CREATION OF SETTINGS AND THE FUTURE SOCIETIES, supra note 59, at 5-6.
129. Other, vaguer core judicial values are frequently cited. See Greg Berman and
John Feinblatt, Problem-Solving Courts: A Brief Primer, 23 LAw & POL'Y 125, 134
(2001) ("Core judicial values-certainty, reliability, impartiality, and fairness-have
safeguarded over many generations, largely through a reliance on tradition and
precedent. As a result, efforts to introduce new ways of doing justice are always
subjected to careful scrutiny.").
130. See, e.g., ROBERT L. HUMPHREY, VALUES FOR A NEW MILLENNIUM (1992).
Humphrey illustrates the "scientific" approach to the discovery of universal values:
The purpose of this work is to describe a new, scientific approach for
solving human relations, or social problems, especially for reducing global
violence. This methodology was research-developed and is research-guided.
That is, the problem-solving method was, and the educational materials are,
developed empirically from social-scientific research and experimentation,
especially through programs designed to change attitudes among groups in
conflict. These changed attitudes do not simply stop violence, as you will see,
they eliminate the causes of violence by creating situations that conform to
human nature.
Id. at 23.
131. James A. Dator, Syllabus for Political Science 673 (on file with author), See
http://www.politicalscience.hawaii.edu/Faculty/dator/dator.htm (last visited June 4,
2007) for biography and course listing.
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common to all people and all religions. Books such as Science and
Human Values (1956),132 Scientific Progress and Human Values
(1967), 1 3 3 and Values and the Future (1969)13 ' represent an effort to
find replacements for the large-scale social forces which once guided
society and formed the intellectual basis for constitutional govern-
ment.' 35 With the adoption of new values have come new assumptions
about the purposes of government. Consequently, the government is
transitioning to new forms and process, based, as some have predicted,
132. J. BRONOWSKI, SCIENCE AND HUMAN VALUES (1956).
133. SCIENTIFIC PROGRESS AND HUMAN VALUES: PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONFERENCE
CELEBRATING THE 75TH ANNIVERSARY OF THE CALIFORNIA INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY IN
PASADENA, CALIFORNIA, OCTOBER 25-27, 1966 (Edward & Elizabeth Hutchings eds.,
1967).
134. VALUES AND THE FUTURE (Kurt Baier & Nicholas Rescher eds., 1969).
135. See BELL, supra note 38, at 377, 386, 433.
In the nature of human consciousness, a scheme of moral equity is the
necessary basis for any social order; for legitimacy to exist, power must be
justified. In the end, it is moral ideas-the conception of what is desirable-
that shapes history through human aspirations. Western liberal society was
"designed" by Locke, Adam Smith, and Bentham on the premise of individual
freedoms and the satisfaction of private utilities; these were the axioms
whose consequences were to be realized through the market and later
through the democratic political system. But that doctrine is crumbling, and
the political system is now being geared to the realization not of individual
ends but of group and communal needs. Socialism has had political appeal
for a century now not so much because of its moral depiction -of what the
future society would be like, but because of material disparities within
disadvantaged classes, the hatred of bourgeois society by many intellectuals,
and the eschatological vision of a "cunning" of history. But the normative
ethic was only implicit; it was never spelled out and justified. The claim for
"equality of result" is a socialist ethic (as equality of opportunity is the liberal
ethic), and as a moral basis for society it can finally succeed in obtaining
men's allegiance not by material reward but by philosophical justification. An
effort in politics has to be confirmed in philosophy. And an attempt to
provide that confirmation is now underway.
Id. at 433.
Inevitably, the politicization of decision-making-in the economy and in
the culture-invites more and more group conflict. The crucial problem for
the communal society is whether there is a common framework of values that
can guide the setting of political policy. The one major impulse at the
moment is that of redress-providing for the disadvantaged and seeking some
redistribution of the income shares in the society. To some extent, this may
satisfy one criterion of justice-as fairness. But it does not create any positive
ideal of the kind of individual a society wishes to have .... Politically, there
may be a communal society coming into being, but is there a communal
ethic? And is one possible?
Id. at 483.
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upon the emergence of a technologically-competent elite. In hindsight,
the words of sociologist Daniel Bell seem all the more prophetic: "The
lack of a rooted moral belief system is the cultural contradiction of the
society, the deepest challenge to its survival.
136
The invention and statement of universal judicial values has pro-
ceeded at a rapid pace in recent decades because of the moral vacuum
produced by the demise of the Christian consensus. Moreover, the
social sciences have been able to frame the values or goals of the future
society toward which the force of law should be directed. 137 This is
especially apparent in many court futures commission reports which
merge the concepts of "visions," "goals," and "values." To avoid possi-
ble failure by making specific predictions of future judicial accom-
plishments, futures commissions most frequently discuss visions of
utopian values or goals which will guide the formation and function of
the new judiciary. "The risks of future scenarios and future issues are
too great," observed the Tennessee Futures Commission, "so the com-
mission's work has turned to a deeper route-to the very goals of the
judicial system .... Specific goals may be moving targets, but an aware-
ness of the values that determine those goals gives a guidance of its
own."1 3 8 "Our vision of the future, therefore, is framed in ideals,"
noted the Tennessee Commission, and "[t]hese visions.., are the guid-
ing lights of the recommendations that derive from them.... ."I" There
followed ten visions for the future judiciary that included the elimina-
tion of biases within the judiciary, the achievement of judicial effi-
ciency, the solution of problems by innovative and informal processes,
judicial independence, and one particularly telling vision: "The judi-
136. Id. at 480.
137. As the synthesis between Christianity and Western Civilization came to an end,
sociologists began searching for a set of values common to all people and all religions
on which to base society and government. See generally VALUES AND THE FUTURE: THE
IMPACT OF TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE ON AMERICAN VALUES (Kurt Baier & Nicholas
Rescher eds., 1969); see also David Barnhizer, The Virtue of Ordered Conflict: A Defense
of the Adversary System, 79 NEB. L. REV. 657 (2000).
Interests groups not part of the dominant system were excluded from
participating in the processes of power and governance other than in
subservient roles .... An inevitable consequence of this greater inclusiveness
is that we have entered a period of profound disquiet in which new voices
have arisen from all directions to demand shares of social goods they feel
they have been wrongly denied or to which they feel entitled."
Id. at 658.
138. TENNESSEE SUPREME COURT'S COMMISSION ON THE FUTURE OF THE TENNESSEE
JUDICIAL SYSTEM, To SERVE ALL PEOPLE: A REPORT 1 (1996) [hereinafter To SERVE ALL
PEOPLE].
139. Id. at 8.
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cial system will be proactive.... In both training and vision, its person-
nel will reach beyond the traditional bounds of the law."14
Because law applies universally and is such a powerful force in
society, creating new judicial values as a basis for law is tantamount to
creating new values for society, and, in the process, changing society
altogether. The vision of the "preferred" future judiciary is inextricably
tied, in the minds of the activists, to the future of society. "This com-
mission," observed the Massachusetts Futures Commission "was
charged with creating a vision of a better future for justice and propos-
ing ways to achieve it. Having done so we readily acknowledge that the
future of the courts is intimately and inescapably tied to the future of
society. " 1
4 1
Uniformly, court literature treats judicial values as if they
represent the neutral position. The justices of the state supreme courts
who propagate the new values, often adapted from statements of ethics
promulgated by the ABA or, in the present case, by court commissions,
become the paragons and oracles of righteousness. Moral truth, we are
to believe, emanates from justices of the state supreme courts. Disa-
greement with the values adopted by justices and their commissions
becomes the very definition of bias and deviancy. Social control is
achieved through statements of values and the object of social control
is the elimination or correction of deviancy. High court statements of
values and ethical norms strike directly at the heart of freedom of con-
science, and are intended to change what people -especially other
judges and lawyers-believe about morality and ethics. Judges, for
example, are prohibited by Supreme Court rules from expressing any
bias based upon race, gender or sexual orientation. Statements of val-
ues and ethical norms essentially require judges who acquire truth
about life from a source of authority higher than the state supreme
courts to either change their beliefs to conform to judicial values or
recuse themselves from the judicial process. In this way, the values
driving the decision-making process are institutionalized, and the out-
come of future disputes is predetermined. Likewise, the shape of the
future society is impacted by the force of law in the form of court deci-
sions which strike down and remake substantive law to comport with
statements of court values and ethical norms, having previously elimi-
nated judges who, because of their opposing belief system, would have
refused to do so.
140. Id.
141. REINVENTING JuSTICE 2022, supra note 124, at 1.
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Assuming, as we may safely do, that justices of state supreme
courts are good citizens, we must necessarily deny that they are mor-
ally superior to any other person or group of persons. Judges hold an
office and perform a function of government, and are entitled to
respect because of the office they hold. But they exalt themselves by
assuming to provide individuals and the community with things availa-
ble through other sources. And their greatest offense is to assume that
they can propagate moral values, the most basic need of individual or
collective life. They have assumed the role, in the words of Professor
Arthur Allen Leff, of "evaluative Godlets. '" '142
Admittedly, judicial cultures vary in strength and uniformity from
state to state, but they are growing as trial judges accept supreme court
values and visions, and assume, because they see other judges doing
so, a proactive position. Evidence of this can be found on the web sites
of local trial courts containing announcements of new community ini-
tiatives or a therapeutic approach to their work.
This relationship between the visioning process engaged in by the
judiciary (at the heart of which are values) and cultural transformation
was alluded to by one of the principal participants in the early court
visioning exercises: "The thing that really touched me the most was
that there wasn't a person there who wasn't involved. And that's what
I'm talking about. That's what vision is about. It's involvement .... And
it's thinking together about how we can have a better culture ... not
just a better justice system, but a better culture." '143 To this end, other
participants envisioned that "[jiudges would be trained in human
behavior more than the law," and that "[c]ourts are going to take a
more active role in the community, and try to change the surrounding
community, rather than just react to it."' 1 4 4 These concepts, emphasiz-
ing the creation of a new judicial system, and the implementation of a
sociological, psychological approach to behavioral modification and
cultural design, were contained in the training materials used by futur-
ists and court leaders to inculcate the same type of beliefs in the mem-
bers of their "blue ribbon" commissions. In the search for something
new and better, futurists advocated the abandonment of everything
participants had previously believed about the judiciary and its role in
government and society to provoke new concepts of judicial govern-
ance. The training materials and the presentations made by futurists
142. Arthur Leff, Unspeakable Ethics, Unnatural Law, 1979 DUKE L.J. 1229, 1241
(1979).
143. ENVISIONING JUSTICE: REINVENTING THE COURTS FOR THE 2 1ST CENTURY, supra
note 48 (quoting Bill Lockhart, Court Administrator, Sixth Circuit, Pinellas Co., Fla.).
144. Id. (quoting unidentified participants).
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and planners are consequently reflected in the many state reports,
speeches, scholarly literature, and working documents coming from
within the state judiciaries.
C. Planning for the Preferred Future
What, however, is the practical effect of court commissions and
committees today, or, for that matter, tomorrow, or the day after that?
To answer that question, we need a clear understanding of what these
commissions and their reports actually represent. Speaking in 1990 at
the National Conference on the Future and the Courts, one judge who
had been a member of the Virginia Futures Commission outlined the
basic task for those attending the conference and for members of
future state commissions: "As participants at this Conference on the
Future and the Courts, you and I have the delightful opportunity to
begin to think about these things [where we should go and how we
should get there] and, perhaps, to suggest our journey and our destina-
tion."'145 It is impossible to predict the future, he was careful to explain,
but it is possible to engage in a process by which court planners
attempt to "identify the forces of change, predict how society will
evolve from those forces, and suggest how courts might be designed
and function to best serve the public."146 By identifying social, techno-
logical, economic, environmental, and political trends, judges, with the
help of futurists, can "create and choose at least the vision of the future
we prefer and begin to work toward it."'1 47 Through trends analysis and
the creation of alternative scenarios the courts can "evolve strategies or
the plans and tactics to achieve these visions."'148 What the activists are
saying is that it is possible through visioning and the creation of scena-
rios of alternative futures to decide not only which future out of a
number of possibilities is most desirable, but also to decide what
changes in substantive and procedural laws and policies must be made
today in order to achieve the ideal or preferred future. Since the situa-
tion is in a constant state of flux, the courts must be "responsive" by
constantly monitoring changes, not just in their communities, but in
all aspects of individual and collective life. The courts must be con-
stantly changing and adapting to the technological, economic, social
145. John F. Daffron, Jr., Judge, Twelfth Judicial District, Chesterfield, Va., and Vice
Chairman, State Justice Institute, Address at the Future and the Courts Conference,
Future Thinking and the Process of Preparing for Change, in ALTERNATIVE FUTURES FOR
THE STATE COURTS OF 2020, supra note 111, at 109, 110.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id.
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and political environment in order to adapt present-day laws and poli-
cies to meet unexpected shifts that threaten to derail the trip to the
preferred future. To do this the courts must be policy makers and legis-
lators today-not thirty years from now, but today. Talk about the
future is primarily an excuse for enacting the changes they want to
make today.
Envisioning the future and all related techniques are mere excuses
for activism in the form of legislation, court decisions advancing new
social policies, and a new role for the courts in government and soci-
ety. When activists speak of their obligation to the future, they are
arguing for changes that need to take place now. Judges, as a class,
asserts Professor James A. Dator, "are more likely to be aware of cut-
ting edge matters-new technologies, new social movements-well
ahead of the average legislator or voter.' 1 49 "The truth of the matter,"
Dator argues, "is that no one else in our society has the ability or the
will to make ... socially-significant decisions from the perspectives of
general morality and philosophy that our judges have.' 5 0 Those deci-
sions are the ones that judges and activists working with them are
making today, not just in the form of court decisions, but through
their commissions and committees. Following Dator's work with the
Virginia judiciary in the late 1980s, he was invited to address a joint
session of the Virginia Legislature where he said of the Virginia report,
Courts in Transition, that it "addresses certain problems in the present
by utilizing the language of the future. Admittedly, this is one of the
most common uses of futures discourse: it enables us to criticize or
reform the present by pretending to talk about the future .... But this
still leaves the future begging for attention. 15
1
For judges to acknowledge and plan for future needs, they must
continue the transition from the role of restrained, impartial decision-
makers in individual lawsuits to the role, not just of policy-makers for
the present, but as planners for the preferred future society. Court
activists like to quote the late Peter Drucker who said, "The best way to
149. James A. Dator, The Dancing Judicial Zen Masters: How Many Judges Does it Take
to See the Future?, http://www.futures.hawaii.edu/dator/courts/dancing.pdf (last
visited June 4, 2007).
150. James A. Dator, Dowager Revisited, http://www.futures.hawaii.edu/dator/
courts/Dowager.pdf (last visited June 4, 2007).
151. James A. Dator, Professor of Political Science, University of Hawaii, Speech to
the Virginia Assembly on the Future of the Courts at the University of Virginia: Twenty
Minutes Into the Future (December 1, 1989), available at www.soc.hawaii.edu/future/
dator/courts/20MininFut.html.
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predict the future is to create it."'1 2 Judges as planners and legislators
are, consequently, changing their position in government by adopting
a visionary, future-oriented approach that is antithetical to constitu-
tional government.
The constitutional doctrine of justiciability, by which the judici-
ary restrained itself from encroaching upon the constitutional author-
ity of the other two branches of government, is essentially dead. A
controversy is appropriate for judicial inquiry if it does not exclusively
or predominantly inVolve political questions the determination of
which are a prerogative of the legislative or executive branches of gov-
ernment.153 Plainly, all of the issues and deliberations we have been
discussing are completely political, and bypass constitutional entities
and processes for the purpose of producing structural and societal
changes thought best by the judges and others working with them.
And it cannot be said too often that the state supreme courts are driv-
ing all of this. None of these activities would be possible without the
support of at least a majority of supreme court justices in each state.
By promoting fundamental changes in the judiciary, these visions,
values, and scenarios all point toward the perfection of human life
through the perfection of the institution by which all people will come
to relate to one another: the judiciary.1 5 1
Confronted by these emotionally-compelling visions of the future,
thousands of intelligent people, acting at the behest of the judges, have
made the leap from the real world into an imaginary world that does
not now and never will exist. The training manuals prepared by the
futurists and planners contain detailed instructions for judicial leaders
on how to create "buy in" to the forecasting and planning process.155
This process begins with the selection of the right kind of people to
serve on the commissions and committees. Then, it extends to the
selling of the new visions on a piecemeal basis to trial judges, legisla-
152. THE COMMISSION OF THE FUTURE OF THE PENNSYLVANIA JUSTICE SYSTEM, THE
INITIAL REPORT OF THE PENNSYLVANIA FUTURES COMMISSION ON JUSTICE IN THE TWENTY-
FIRST CENTURY 13 (2000) [hereinafter THE INITIAL REPORT OF THE PENNSYLVANIA FUTURES
COMMISSION].
153. 20 AM. JUR. 2D Courts § 46 (1995).
154. For a review of one paradigm of the perfected state, see Drucilla L. Cornell, In
Union: A Critical Review of Toward a Perfected State, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 1089 (1987)
(reviewing PAUL WEISS, TOWARD A PERFECTED STATE (1986)).
155. JOHN A. MARTIN, ET AL., STRATEGIC PLANNING IN THE COURTS: IMPLEMENTATION
GUIDE 50 (1995); Craig Boersema, Court Fut-tre Research: The First Step in Long-Range
Strategic Planning, STATE COURT JOURNAL, Winter 1993, at 3, 6; CENTER FOR PUBLIC
POLICY STUDIES (Denver, Co.), STRATEGIC PLANNING: MENTORING GUIDELINES 32-33
(2000).
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tors, governors, business and civic groups, the media, and to some citi-
zens. And, as increasing numbers of people put their faith and trust in
the judiciary, the courts successfully create political constituencies
which promote the courts in new and innovative ways. 156
These activities exemplify the many facets of modern propa-
ganda.' 57 The conferences, committee meetings, press releases, news-
letters, continuing education, judicial outreach, and many other
relatively new court activities are all different forms of propaganda
now supported by the postmodern judiciary. 58 One of the principal
results of the national conferences and the involvement of professional
planners has been the compilation of training manuals and videos for
use by activists interested in promoting related programs at the state
and local levels. 159 All of these methods have the effect of creating fear,
exposing previously unknown enemies, and spreading judicial activ-
ism as broadly as possible across the judiciary, the popular branches
of government, and the public.' 60 Moreover, propaganda creates
greater uniformity of beliefs (judicial culture) within the judiciary.
Likewise, it marginalizes potential opponents from the ranks of trial
judges and court clerks who are depicted as "vested interests" opposed
to a more efficient and just state. 16 1
156. See STATE JUSTICE INSTITUTE, NATIONAL COURTS AND COMMUNITY ADVISORY
COMMITTEE, CITIZENS AND THEIR COURTS: BUILDING A PUBLIC CONSTITUENCY 2 (1995)
[hereinafter CITIZENS AND THEIR COURTS]. This booklet is the product of a joint
committee of the Conference of Chief Justices and the Conference of State Court
Administrators using funds provided by the State Justice Institute. It was designed to
show state courts how to create political constituencies like those enjoyed by the
popular branches of government.
157. For a wide array of activities intended to change or solidify beliefs and move
people to action, see RICHARD FRUIN, JUDICIAL OUTREACH ON A SHOESTRING: A WORKING
MANUAL (American Bar Ass'n. 1999).
158. See generally JACQUES ELLUL, PROPAGANDA: THE FORMATION OF MEN'S ATTITUDES
(1968).
159. WENDY L. SCHULTZ, ET AL., REINVENTING COURTS FOR THE 21ST CENTURY:
DESIGNING A VISION PROCESS (1993) [hereinafter REINVENTING COURTS FOR THE 21ST
CENTURY]; ENVISIONING JUSTICE: REINVENTING THE COURTS FOR THE 2 1 ST CENTURY, supra
note 48. These materials were prepared in advance of another large, national
conference in 1993 at the Opryland Hotel in Nashville, Tennessee, to introduce futures
planning to delegates from states not represented at the 1990 conference in San
Antonio, Texas.
160. See generally ELLUL, supra note 158.
161. Propaganda marginalizes opponents within the judiciary by labeling them as
"vested interests." See Rebecca Ferrar, Resistance Could Sink Remodeling of Courts:
Vested Interests Against Reform, Commissioners Say, THE KNOXVILLE NEWS SENTINEL, June
10, 1996, at A4.
638 [Vol. 29:591
48
Campbell Law Review, Vol. 29, Iss. 3 [2007], Art. 6
http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol29/iss3/6
REINVENTING THE COURTS
D. Therapeutic Jurisprudence
As the process of envisioning the future judiciary was underway,
academics began writing scholarly articles outlining a new therapeutic
role for the courts and a problem-solving approach to dispute resolu-
tion. 162 With the coining of the term "therapeutic jurisprudence" in
1987, an avalanche of scholarly literature has been produced, promot-
ing a new therapeutic role for the courts. 163 These changes in role and
function are of constitutional dimensions,1 64 for they effectively aban-
don in both civil and criminal proceedings the constitutional process
of adjudication to become, for lack of a better expression, the locus of
the "healing arts."
Moreover, the courts are assuming a political posture reserved in
the various constitutions for the executive and legislative branches of
government. Corrections has always been an executive branch func-
tion. Moreover, the rehabilitative goal of punishment that began in the
162. The origin of the term "therapeutic jurisprudence" is attributed to David
Wexler, a professor of law at the University of Arizona who used the term in a paper
first delivered in 1987. The origin and expansion of the term within the study and
application of law to drug treatment courts is discussed in an article by Peggy Fulton
Hora, et al., Therapeutic Jurisprudence and the Drug Treatment Court Movement:
Revolutionizing the Criminal Justice System's Response to Drug Abuse Crime in America,
74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 439, 442 (1999). See also Morris B. Hoffman, Therapeutic
Jurisprudence, Neo-Rehabilitaionism, and Judicial Collectivism: The Least Dangerous
Branch Becomes Most Dangerous, 29 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 2063, 2063 n.1 (2002).
163. The International Network on Therapeutic Jurisprudence at the University of
Arizona's James E. Rogers College of Law maintains an exhaustive list of articles
related to therapeutic jurisprudence. See Archive of Articles on Therapeutic
Jurisprudence, http://www.law.arizona.edu/depts/upr-intj/bibliography/viewall.cfm
(last visited May 8, 2007); see also LAw IN A THERAPEUTIC KEY: DEVELOPMENTS IN
THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE (David B. Wexler & Bruce J. Winick eds., 1996); JUDGING
IN A THERAPEUTIC KEY: THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE AND THE COURTS (Bruce J. Winick &
David B. Wexler eds., 2003).
164. The most basic statements of fixed principles of law are contained in the
federal and state constitutions. Consequently, the court futures movement is
fundamentally concerned about changing constitutional forms of government. See
Joseph F. Coates, The Future of Law: A Diagnosis and Prescription, in JUDGING THE
FUTURE, supra note 39, at 42.
The most significant remedies must flow out of dealing with the basic
situation: the most basic instrument of our legal system, the Constitution, is
obsolete. We need a system which reflects the natural social, economic, and
institutional units of our society. A new constitution would do many things.
Perhaps conspicuous among these basic changes would be eliminating about
four-fifths of the units of government .... You cannot govern any complex
system with that many non-integrated controls.
Id. at 54.
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late nineteenth century with the effort to rehabilitate juvenile offenders
was lodged in the executive branch and was a complete failure. There is
absolutely no reason to believe that rehabilitation, even if it is the desir-
able goal of corrections, should become a judicial function. Further-
more, there is no reason to believe that the judiciary will succeed
where the executive branch has failed.
Alternative, interdisciplinary methods of resolving disputes by
sociological and psychological methods, using the "coercive" power of
the courts, are being developed which introduce an "ethic of care" into
court processes and focus on the law's impact on the emotional life
and psychological well-being of litigants, family members, witnesses,
jurors, and others.165 No longer are lawyers and litigants to be con-
cerned about winning or losing; the goal is to create a "win-win-win"
solution for the well-being of the parties and the community.
New ways of initiating and expanding the work of judges are
being developed to thrust them into the private lives of individuals and
communities. In 1998, Chief Justice David Brock of New Hampshire
noted the "remarkable transformation-a sea change-in the role
expected of our judges and the courts." "The judge of thirty years ago,"
observed Justice Brock, "was reluctant to emerge from his chambers to
involve himself in the family and social problems confronting the peo-
ple in their daily lives." Today, however, judges find themselves, quot-
ing Chief Justice Ellen Peters of Connecticut, "'engaged not only in
adjudicating court cases but in providing ancillary social services to
families, the elderly, to victims, to all those who need structural assis-
tance in coping with social demands."' 1 6
6
The new role of the courts to which Justice Brock referred mounts
a broad attack on the adversarial process itself, the rule of law, and the
work of lawyers and judges who presently function in a decision-mak-
165. The "ethic of care" said to be part of therapeutic jurisprudence is a key
component of the Public Trust and Confidence agenda. See Roger K. Warren, Public
Trust and Procedural Justice, 37 COURT REVIEW, Fall 2000, at 13, 15; see also Susan
Daicoff, Making Law Therapeutic for Lawyers, 5 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 811, 813
(1999).
TJ explores the therapeutic or counter-therapeutic consequences of the law
on the individuals involved, including the clients, the clients' family members
and other associates, the lawyers, the judges, and perhaps even the
community. TJ recognizes that the law is a social force with negative and
positive emotional consequences for all the people involved in a particular
legal matter.
Id. at 813.
166. Chief Justice David Brock, New Hampshire Supreme Court, Address at the
William H. Rehnquist Award Dinner, Washington, D.C. (1998).
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ing capacity. In the past, judges did not claim to be ending conflict,
but only making decisions. Let us, however, assume that ending con-
flict was their reason for existence. It can only be said that they did so
through the resolution of disputed issues of fact and the application of
fixed principles of law to those facts. Judges "restrained" themselves in
the sense that they presupposed a passive role in government that pre-
vented them from interjecting themselves or their personal opinions
into the private affairs of others. All pretense of restraint has now been
abandoned, and judges are openly and boldly advancing on the popu-
lar branches of government, and on the citizens they purport to serve.
Today, reformers argue that the constitutional system solves very
little, if anything. Indeed, the adversarial system of adjudication only
contributes to further argument and conflict. 16 7 The underlying
mental or emotional problems now believed to be responsible for con-
flict remain long after the lawsuit is over. If people are to be healed
both "physically and psychologically" by their participation in the dis-
pute resolution process, adversarial proceedings must give way to alter-
native methods of resolving disputes.168 Consequently, the present
constitutional system, which has served since the Founding Era, is
gradually coming to an end. It is being replaced by a powerful, judicial
elite utilizing new techniques that claim the power to transform people
and conflict by transforming the individual mind. Entering the twenty-
first century, the techniques of the social sciences are, in the hands of
the judges, called "therapeutic jurisprudence," and the courts which
employ those techniques for the transformation of people and conflict
are known as "problem-solving courts." 169
The most visible aspect of the new judicial setting has been the
creation of thousands of therapeutic, problem-solving courts all across
167. See DEBORAH TANNEN, THE ARGUMENT CULTURE: MOVING FROM DEBATE TO
DIALOGUE (1998); David B. Wexler, The Argument Culture and the Courts, COURT
REVIEW, Summer 1998, at 4, available at http://aja.ncsc.dni.us/courtrv/cr35-2/CR35-
2Wexler.pdf (last visited May 8, 2007); ANNE STRICK, INJUSTICE FOR ALL: How OUR
ADVERSARY SYSTEM OF LAW VICTIMIZES US AND SUBVERTS JUSTICE 124 (1977).
168. David B. Wexler, Some Thoughts and Observations on the Teaching of Therapeutic
Jurisprudence, 35 REV. DER. P.R. 273 (1996) ("Professor Slobogin said it well when he
defined therapeutic jurisprudence as the use of social science to study the extent to
which a legal rule or practice promotes the psychological or physical well-being of the
people it affects .... Legal rules, legal procedures, and the roles of legal actors (such as
lawyers and judges) constitute social forces that, like it or not, often produce
therapeutic or anti-therapeutic consequences.").
169. See Symposium, Problem Solving Courts: From Adversarial Litigation to
Innovative Jurisprudence: Eleventh Annual Symposium on Contemporary Urban
Challenges, 29 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1755 (2002).
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the United States. These courts employ alternative techniques by
which behavior can be modified and material wealth and moral
authority redistributed. The new, "innovative" courts include Drug
Courts, Family Courts, Community Courts, Teen Courts, Mental
Health Courts, Domestic Violence Courts, Gun Courts, and the new
Reentry Courts among others. But activists know that the creation of
these specialty courts is expensive. They cannot be sustained over the
long term. Consequently, the goal is to extend therapeutic techniques
to the entire judicial system based upon the belief that the role of
judges has changed from that of a dispassionate, disinterested magis-
trate to the role of a sensitive, caring counselor. 170 For the good of the
individuals involved in conflict and the entire community, courts will
work to modify individual behavior by controlling the human
environment.
Reformers claim, however, that the traditional dispute resolution
system will remain intact. People will use the new dispute resolution
system, based upon advanced information technology, as easily as they
now use ATM machines. The new, problem-solving system of courts
applying therapeutic techniques will act as a kind of filter through
which disputes will pass before they get to the traditional dispute reso-
lution system, if at all. The progressive, reinforcing, and aversive
aspects of the new judicial system are nicely expressed in this vision of
the future system: "Citizen education is a necessary prelude to dispute
resolution which begins at home, in the neighborhood or work place
and, if not then successful, moves into the courtroom."17 ' Using Pro-
fessor Black's terminology, citizen education and alternative methods
of dispute resolution are "less law" than a formal trial, 172 and the goal
170. David B. Rottman, Does Effective Therapeutic Jurisprudence Require Specialized
Courts and Do Specialized Courts Imply Specialist Judges, 37 COURT REVIEW, Spring
2000, at 22. In July 2004, the Conference of Chief Justices and the Conference of State
Court Administrators adopted a joint resolution reaffirming their commitment to
apply therapeutic principles to "traditional" courts. Each state is encouraged to
develop individual plans to expand problem-solving techniques, and to develop at least
one "demonstration" jurisdiction in each state to serve as a "laboratory" to apply
problem-solving techniques within "traditional courts." Chief Justices, Court
Administrators Reaffirm Commitment to Problem-Solving Courts, 7 CENTER COURT, Fall
2004, at 2. Moreover, speakers at conferences routinely advocate the extension of
therapeutic techniques to all courts.
171. THE INITIAL REPORT OF THE PENNSYLVANIA FUTURES COMMISSION, supra note 152,
at 24.
172. THE BEHAVIOR OF LAW, supra note 106, at 3.
Law itself is social control, but many other kinds of social control also appear
in social life, in families, friendships, neighborhoods, villages, tribes,
occupations, organizations, and groups of all kinds. Thus, the proposition
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of court reform has been to create a system where "less law" is imple-
mented in the process of resolving disputes. But all techniques which
may be considered "less law" are annexed in some way to the formal
judicial system through the expanded use of volunteers, mediators,
experts and others employing alternatives to the process of adjudica-
tion. Unfortunately for us, however, law, whether denominated "more
law" or "less law," is becoming universally, intimately and frighten-
ingly personal. Law implicitly becomes synonymous with a veiled judi-
ciary, requiring "citizen education" which "begins at home, in the
neighborhood or work place."173 This vision for the courts adopts dis-
pute resolution that becomes the essence of collective life, producing,
through the coercive work of the courts, new, peaceful communities
characterized by material and moral equality, inclusiveness, tolerance,
mental health, and other judicial values.
E. The Judicial Skinner Box
It is not true, however, that the "traditional" judicial system will
remain the same. Indeed, it has already been irrevocably changed, and
the way to explain that change is to go back to the study and modifica-
tion of human behavior. Skinner and the behaviorists who followed
used white rats placed in Skinner Boxes where they were taught to per-
form certain routines by a series of reinforcements contingent upon
particular forms of behavior. If the rat successfully performed its rou-
tine, it was rewarded, and continued to be rewarded as long as it per-
formed the routine imposed by the psychologists. If the rat failed to
perform the desired routine, a wave of electric current, passing
through metal rods in the floor of the box, shocked the rat.'74
The traditional court system has become a part of the therapeutic
setting, and serves as the gateway-the usher-to the Skinner Box and
the metal rods which made up the floor of the box in which the rat was
placed. The traditional judicial system with its stiff criminal sentences
and its sizable money judgments serves as an inducement for people to
states that the quantity of law increases as the quantity of social control of
these other kinds decreases, and vice versa. So formulated, it applies
wherever and whenever it is possible to measure the quantity of each. It
applies to everything from the evolution of social life across the world to an
encounter between two people on the street.
Id. at 6.
173. THE INITIAL REPORT OF THE PENNSYLVANIA FUTURES COMMISSION, supra note 152,
at 24.
174. The author was employed in 1967 building the electrical equipment required
for experiments on white rats in the Psychology Department's Operant Laboratory at
the University of Tennessee.
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accept therapeutic modification rather than risk potentially oppressive
judgments. But failure to perform the therapeutic routine, failure to
accept the new outlook on life, a demand for a result based upon fixed
rules of law-all of these things-can lead to being thrown back into
the traditional court system, or, even worse, subjected to more severe
sanctions in problem-solving courts.1 7 5 For example, defendants (now
referred to as "clients") in the drug courts, who are caught using drugs
through random drug screens, may be punished by "shock incarcera-
tion," and this may happen multiple times for some defendants before
they finally emerge from the therapeutic system cured of the problem
of drug addiction.
Some form of aversive conditioning is present in almost all thera-
peutic settings, but it is often very subtle and difficult to recognize.
Peer pressure, reeducation, shaming, and community service are tech-
niques employed in problem-solving courts and in collaborative law
and restorative justice settings to punish clients and encourage con-
formity to judicial standards of behavior. But the drug court best illus-
trates the application of the science of behaviorism because the
principal sanction, "shock incarceration," is the punishment most eas-
ily identified as the equivalent of the electric shock applied to Skin-
ner's rats. Presented with the risks of "going to court" litigants sign
waivers of rights and enter the therapeutic system. Incarceration is
"shock incarceration" in the sense that it can happen in an instant at
the discretion of the judge. A "client" can be free one minute and on
his way to jail the next, based upon the results of a drug screen or
other deviant behavior reported electronically to the court by treat-
ment team members or the community of court volunteers. The judge's
computer becomes a witness against the client.
Based upon experiments with rats, drug court judges are warned
about the habituating effect of punishment on their clients. The behav-
ior of mice trained to press a bar to obtain food can be subsequently
changed by "shocking the mouse each time it presses the lever, and
precisely how much the bar-pressing rate will decline is directly pro-
175. See JAMES L. NOLAN, JR., REINVENTING JUSTICE: THE AMERICAN DRUG COURT
MOVEMENT 52-57 (2001); see also James L. Nolan, Jr., Redefining Criminal Courts:
Problem-solving and the Meaning of Justice, 40 AMER. CRIM. L. REV. 1541 (2003); Patricia
Lee Refo, The Vanishing Trial, 30 A.B.A. J. SEC. LITIG. 1, 3 (2004), available at http://
www.abanet.org/litigation/journal/opening-statements/04winter-openingstatement.
pdf (last visited May 8, 2007) ("For whatever reason, some judges are simply anti-trial.
Judith Resnick of Yale documented judges who view trials as "failures" that occur only
when lawyers have not done their job and obtained a negotiated resolution. These
judges view themselves as case-resolvers-the faster the better. They have their ways of
exacting a toll on those who want to hold out for a jury trial.").
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portional to the strength of the electric shock. . . . At some level of
intensity, the bar pressing ceases altogether after only one or two tri-
als."'1 76 The danger for drug courts, however, is that
[slubjected to punishment at low to moderate intensities, both animals
and human beings can become [accustomed] to being punished,
resulting in their being able to withstand unusually high levels of pun-
ishment .... By analogy, recidivist offenders could become habituated
to threats from the criminal justice system, and cease to be deterred by
even long periods of incarceration.1 7
7
Consequently, drug court judges must take an experimental, sci-
entific, and personalized approach to the use of shock incarceration as
a means of modifying undesirable behavior and forming new
behaviors:
The findings on habituation have important implications for the
use of graduated sanctions in drug courts. Virtually all probationary
and drug court programs impose graduated sanctions . . . and the
implications of habituation must be taken into account when develop-
ing a graduated sanction plan that can last the life of a treatment pro-
gram. Every time we meet an infraction with a light sanction, we run
the risk of habituating the offender to the next level of sanction. This is
not to say that graduated sanctions are contraindicated. Rather, it sug-
gests that building up the intensity of sanctions slowly could be
counterproductive; generally speaking, early sanctions should exceed a
meaningful threshold of intensity. For the first infraction or two, a
stern warning and a fairly moderate sanction might be in order (e.g., a
requirement to spend several hours or several days observing court ses-
sions). In the very early stages of treatment, the most pressing issue
may be to demonstrate that infractions can be detected and will be
acted upon.1 7
8
Skinner never favored aversive conditioning, however. Instead, he
favored subtle rewards as reinforcers of desired behavior. He enjoyed
telling a story that illustrates the subtle ability of behavioral techniques
employed by groups of people to shape the behavior of an individual:
There's a story about a professor who criticized me publicly on televi-
sion and his students decided to shape his behavior. And so they
agreed in advance that they wouldn't smile or nod unless he was stand-
ing on one corner of the platform. And pretty soon he was standing
there. And then they arranged that they would not smile or nod unless
176. Douglas B. Marlowe & Kimberly C. Kirby, Effective Use of Sanctions in Drug
Courts: Lessons From Behavioral Research, NATIONAL DRUG COURT INSTITUTE REVIEW
(National Drug Court Institute), Summer 1999, at iii.
177. Id.
178. Id. at viii.
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he was facing the blackboard. And they told me that by the end of the
hour he was lecturing facing the blackboard and talking over his
shoulder.
179
Skinner was describing a technique called "shaping" which pro-
duces behavior that does not previously exist, much as animal trainers
teach lions and dolphins to jump through hoops. But where the
desired behavior already exists, even in limited circumstances, the task
of producing the preferred behavior and eliminating undesirable
behavior is just a matter of differential reinforcement. Judges, court
therapists, mediators, volunteers, and all other members of the
expanding court team who employ the friendly smile as part of the
new judicial process are merely technicians employing a superior tech-
nology for changing individual and collective behavior.
Remember, however, that humans have cognitive skills far more
complex than those of animals. Behavior is learned and can be modi-
fied in a classroom setting, and the community is becoming a kind of
classroom environment for the courts. Consequently, the client is sanc-
tioned with more in mind than the client's immediate reformation.
Sanctions in the therapeutic setting, whether they are in the form of
shock incarceration or work assignments painting over graffiti or
sweeping broken glass off the streets, are "therapeutically observed"' 8 °
by other people, including to some extent law-abiding members of the
community. The punishment inflicted upon clients of therapeutic
courts is not merely a lesson about behavior to be avoided, but a rea-
son to support or join the courts' work in the community. This effec-
tively makes two-legged white rats of clients and observers of the new
therapeutic judicial system.
F. The Sovereignty of the Individual Mind
The manipulative, controlling techniques of the therapeutic judici-
ary stand in sharp contrast to the moral and intellectual autonomy of
the individual which prevailed during the Founding Era. In his essay,
On Liberty, John Stuart Mill observed that there needed to be some
"fitting adjustment between individual independence and social con-
trol." 8 ' He conceded that some "rules of conduct" imposed by law
were necessary, but that it was also necessary to "limit the legitimate
179. Ken Hutchins, Don H. Hockenbury and Sandra E. Hockenbury, Psychology:
The Human Experience, Telecourse Segment 7, Operant and Classical Conditioning,
Coast Learning Systems, Fountain Valley, CA (2002).
180. See, e.g., Jerry L. Colclazier, Therapeutic Jurisprudence: The Nuts and Bolts of
Drug Courts in Oklahoma, 71 OKLAHOMA BAR J. 1985, 1986 (2000).
181. JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 7 (1956).
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interference of collective opinion with individual independence."1 2
Mill understood, as we all do, that absolute freedom is impossible. Peo-
ple cannot be completely free to engage in any type of conduct because
that could result in harm to others; ultimately, one person's ability to
make unfettered choices could mean the loss of another person's life,
freedom, or property. Murder, theft, rape, and a whole host of other
forms of violence and disorder could be expected in a world where evil
was not restrained to some extent by the force of law. The problem, as
Mill saw it, was "how to make the fitting adjustment between individ-
ual independence and social control.' 8 3 While he acknowledged the
continuing debate about where to draw the line on the application of
law, he concluded that "over himself, over his own body and mind, the
individual is sovereign." 184
This belief in the sovereignty of the individual over his own body
and mind pervaded the political thought and discourse of the Found-
ing Era, and was at the heart of the concept of liberty. A person was
believed to be entitled to shield the inner-workings of his own mind-
those processes which form the basis of character, personality, and
creativity-from public scrutiny. There are some things a person can
choose to reveal about himself through the content of his voluntary
conversations with others, and, indirectly, by his conduct. But many
other beliefs, feelings, and propensities, comprising the "true self," are
kept hidden, and it is these secret things of the mind that were consid-
ered to be off-limits to the law. The dark tendencies of the mind are
kept hidden because they present an intolerable contradiction between
the person we want others to know and the secret thoughts which, if
left unchecked, would be destructive to the individual and others.
What is more, we keep hidden from public view our beliefs about who
we are in relation to other people and to the state as well as the unique
creative processes of our mind which form the basis for intellectual
property and imbue life with meaning. It is at this level that the ulti-
mate battle for "control" is taking place, and the battleground is no
longer conceded to the individual conscience.
Until modern times there was a limited threat to a person's ability
to possess his body and mind free from intrusion by others. During
the Founding Era, the potential of government to invade the home and
private affairs of the individual consisted of British troops breaking in
the door. By the 1960s, however, technological advances consisting of
everything from electronic eavesdropping, to mind-altering drugs, to
182. Id. at 8.
183. Id. at 7.
184. Id. at 7-8.
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psychological testing opened up a vast array of new tools to invade not
only the home but the mind. 18 5 When Mill made his observations
about the ultimate limits of law and government, these techniques did
not exist. Consequently, the mind was protected by an almost univer-
sal understanding that the activity taking place there was uniquely per-
sonal and religious in nature, and subject to the control of the
individual conscience. Furthermore, it was protected by constitutional
prohibitions against cruel and unusual punishment and unreasonable
searches and seizures by which government might coerce people to
reveal personal thoughts and beliefs, and by the technical inability to
gain access to it.
All of that has now changed. The change has come not from scien-
tists trying to collect data for an experiment, nor from police in the
service of the executive branch, but rather from a judicial system trans-
forming itself into an institution concerned first and foremost with the
thoughts and impulses residing in the mind of every individual. 186
The judicial system now being created takes a sociological and
psychological route to solving problems in both criminal and civil set-
tings. In the view of reformers, dispute resolution based upon fixed
principles of law is at best incomplete and at worst destructive
(antitherapeutic) to the people involved. Thus, the new system recasts
the judicial power as a means of changing how people think and
feel. 1 8 7 As the courts functioned in the past, they were unconcerned
185. Oscar M. Ruebhausen & Orville G. Brimm, Jr., Privacy and Behavioral Research,
in LAW AND THE SOCIAL ROLE OF SCIENCE, supra note 81, at 87.
186. See, e.g., Symposium, Empirical Legal Realism: A New Social Scientific
Assessment of Law and Human Behavior, 97 Nw. U. L. REv. 1075 (2003) (combining
insights from psychology, sociology, cognitive science, and empirical research to
examine cognitive processes to determine whether human decision-making is rational
and utility-maximizing as the law and economics tradition insists, or is often flawed
and irrational so as to require a different approach to law).
187. See, e.g., Richard C. Reuben, The Lawyer Turns Peacemaker: With mediation
emerging as the most popular form of alternative dispute resolution, the quest for common
ground could force attorneys to reinterpret everything they do in the future, 82 A.B.A.J. 54
(1996).
Some experts believe mediation should facilitate the parties' own resolution
of the problem by digging deep into the interests and feelings underlying the
surface dispute. Mediators who take this more therapeutic approach would in
a divorce mediation, for example, try to work through the parties' feelings of
anger or resentment or rejection that led to the breakdown of the marriage.
Then they can let that cleansing process pave the way for mutually acceptable
terms of property settlement and child custody-and maybe even
reconciliation.
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about the secret thoughts of any person until some overt violation of
the law occurred. A man could secretly desire to be a world-class bank
robber. He could drive by the bank daily, looking carefully and long-
ingly at the security system and the cash-filled vault. But as long as he
engaged in no conspiracy nor made any attempt to rob the bank, he
was considered a citizen in good standing. It was only after the com-
mission of a prohibited act that the courts became interested in intent,
and then only for the purpose of determining whether or not the per-
petrator was acting with the requisite evil intent, the mens rea, or was
part of an innocent mistake. A person may walk out of the door with
the bank's money, but be found to have done so in the most innocent
and unintentional manner. The mens rea, in itself, was insufficient to
support state scrutiny or sanctions. In contrast, the therapeutic judi-
cial system is concerned about the cognitive forms of human behavior
because they precede the overt forms of behavior with which courts
must deal, and originate from the same environmental contingen-
cies."' "It is always the environment which builds the behavior with
which problems are solved, even when the problems are to be found in
the private world inside the skin," observed Skinner.'8 9 This is a secu-
lar version of the old Biblical maxim: "As a man thinketh so is he." But
the private thoughts and beliefs that were once strictly between an
individual and God are now considered to be the proper subject for
judicial inquiry.
G. Conflict as a Vehicle for Change
Court scenarios, such as the anti-utopian excerpts set out above,
depict the basic future conflicts as being either conflicts of interests or
conflicts of values.' 9 ° The future conflicts of interests may arise over
many things, but basically these are conflicts that arise out of competi-
188. See Thomas D. Barton, Therapeutic Jurisprudence Preventive Law and Creative
Problem Solving: An Essay on Harnessing Emotion and Human Connection, 5 PSYCHOL.
PUB. POL'Y & L. 921 (1999) (contrasting the "traditional," "judging" style of dispute
resolution with therapeutic jurisprudence and problem solving).
In psychological therapy seeking an accommodative solution, no one is
declared a winner or loser.
From a psychologist's standpoint, a problem is considered resolved if the
client satisfactorily reorients to the problem-emotionally, behaviorally, or
cognitively.
Id. at 929.
189. BEYOND FREEDOM AND DIGNITY, supra note 101, at 195.
190. For a discussion of conflict theory, see generally A. JAVIER TREVINO, THE
SOCIOLOGY OF LAw 351 (1996).
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tion for scarce resources, the most basic of which are food, clothing,
housing, fuel, and the like. Stated another way, conflicts of interests
are conflicts over money. Conflicts of values are those implied in the
"multicultural" or "mosaic" future society envisioned by the courts in
which people differ over other peoples' religious, cultural, and political
beliefs and behaviors. These latter conflicts differ from conflicts of
interests in that they are not the result of competition for scarce mate-
rial resources, but of the fact that people routinely deny the validity of
beliefs and values held by others, thereby inflicting mental or emo-
tional harm to the self esteem and moral authority of others. Conflicts
of values represent a competition of ideas about the meaning and pur-
pose of life itself. These views of conflict and the courts' new role in
resolving conflict are derived from nineteenth-century theories
advanced by Karl Marx and others who looked favorably on the exis-
tence of conflict as an opportunity to bring about needed social
changes.' 9 ' Conflict becomes a political struggle (now being fought
out in the courts) as competing groups vie for sufficient political
power to overcome opposing groups for control of wealth and moral
authority.1 92 The argument for a new role for the courts is implied by
the juxtaposition of scenarios depicting conflicts over material wealth
and moral values, and the suggestion that these conflicts will persist
only because the courts will have somehow failed to prevent them.
Court reform manuals and state reports use various conflicts to
illustrate differences in possible futures for society. In the Generic Jus-
tice Scenario presented to those who attended The Future and the
Courts Conference in 1990, "[i]ntergenerational rivalries combined
with interracial rivalries to create political wars for resources.' ' 93
Moreover, ". . .groups of the poor took over certain cities .... Other
cities were gentrified with unemployed and poor people . . . banned
from the city from sundown to sunrise. The practice of having profes-
sional sports teams represent different cities was abandoned because
of riots, threats to... players, and the fact that. . .certain races were
banned or 'discouraged' from certain cities."' 14 In the Road Warrior
Scenario, America had ignored the environmental warnings of the
1970s and Mother Nature came back to "demand her share" in the
1990s when the Greenhouse Effect caught up with us, resulting in cat-
astrophic natural disasters and destruction of civilization as we know
it. Resources were simply no longer available, and death was the result:
191. Id. at 371.
192. Id.
193. ALTERNATIVE FUTURES FOR THE STATE COURTS OF 2020, supra note 111, at 16.
194. Id. at 17.
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Government funding didn't cover the loss of revenues and the poor
found themselves in ever greater competition for scarce resources. Old
people were encouraged to "step aside" to make way for the young and
where this wasn't effective, variously coercive levels of "euthanasia"
were practiced. The other effect of zero population growth was more
subtle but undercut the very foundation of America as the land of
opportunity. 1
9 5
These are only a few examples of imaginative futures for society
contained in forty-two, single-spaced pages of scenarios prepared by
futurists for court reformers who envision multiple, extreme forms of
conflict and then begin making plans for a judicial system that pre-
vents them.
The benefit of constructing scenarios depicting alternative futures
defined by conflicts of interests or values is not that they are factual or
that any one scenario represents "the" preferred future. Rather, con-
trasts between good and bad, desirable and undesirable, can be found
throughout all scenarios, and the goal for court planners is to identify
from among alternative futures those conditions or events that are
desirable as opposed to undesirable, thus guiding them in the process
of planning toward the desirable components of a preferred future. Is it
not clear that the real decision-makers in this process are those who
created the scenarios? Given the choice between a world in conflict
and a world at peace, would there be any who would select conflict
over peace? Having court planners, under the direction of professional
futurists, envision and then select desirable components from multiple
possible futures does not just guide them toward a preferred future; it
drives them toward that future. After the planning process is com-
pleted, few of the original state visionaries ever go on to achieve any-
thing contained in the report. Their reports give the appearance of
legitimacy to changes in court form and function which the judges will
work to achieve, often through others. By constructing alternative
futures that contrast materially equal, peaceful and prosperous socie-
ties with societies characterized by chaos and hardship, visionaries
make the transition from the antiquated, constitutional judicial system
to a new system of behavioral control capable of achieving the desired
individuals and communities. Judicial scenarios depicting conflicts
among competing classes and special interests is an imaginative, work-
ing example of the Hegelian dialectic employed so effectively by Karl
Marx as the working principle of Communism. Criticisms and visions
work together like a giant wrecking-ball to tear down the constitutional
judicial system and clear the landscape for a new system of govern-
195. Id. at 21.
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ance. Moreover, the hypothetical fact situations generally avoid the
opprobrious, abstract language of Marx while guiding thought
processes by the use of vignettes or fact scenarios people can imagine
from experience. Scenarios have the effect of disguising the dialectical
approach to social transformation so that participants in court com-
missions are more concerned about preventing future catastrophes
than advancing socialism.
Furthermore, scenarios portray conflict as more than a mere class
struggle. They are designed to appeal not only to the poor, but to a
broad range of subgroups: feminists, the poor, racial minorities, the
elderly, homosexuals, environmentalists, children, victims of crime,
and a host of other subgroups that form potential constituencies for
the courts and advocates for the effort to reinvent the judicial system.
Scenarios are designed to appeal to people whose lives are defined by
their membership in an identifiable class or subgroup, and whose con-
cept of justice is equality of outcomes.
The common thread running throughout the scenarios of alterna-
tive futures is that the free market, limited government resources, and
representative government produce inadequate or flawed planning for
the future and socially unjust outcomes for disadvantaged individuals
and subgroups.
This type of appeal is a common feature of the American Left.
Because American capitalism failed to validate socialist theory, social-
ism, while popular among intellectuals, failed to take hold here as it
had in Russia and other parts of the world. The American Left believe
that something is fundamentally wrong with our society, and that the
chief way of righting it lies in mobilizing the power of all the disadvan-
taged groups behind a drive for radical change-change, as Nathan
Glazer put it, "going to the roots."' 96 Real problems helped fuel the
radical agenda. Racial inequality, the Vietnam War, urban poverty, and
other problems animated the American Left. However, the simple anal-
ysis of the Old Left, noted Glazer, "that capitalism or imperialism is at
the root of the matter... was not very satisfactory ... because it was too
easy to point to the example of [other] capitalist countries ... to prove
that no necessary causal relation exists between oppression and the
institutions of capitalism."' 97 As a result, the New Left of the 1960s
began to decide that the "problem lies not in the institutions of capital-
196. THE NEw LEFT AND ITS LIMITS, COMMENTARY, XLVI (1968), reprinted in IDEAS IN
AMERICA: SOURCE READINGS IN THE INTELLECTUAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 536,
537 (Gerald N. Grob & Robert N. Beck eds., 1970).
197. Id. at 538.
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ism as such but rather in all types of fixed and formal institutions. ' 198
Fixed institutions in America represented the application of a predomi-
nately Christian worldview that left people free to express moral
precepts in multiple ways. But nowhere was that freedom more palpa-
ble than in the legislative process by which the moral views of the
majority were translated into legislative enactments. Thus, the system
of government, which applied fixed principles of law produced by
elected representatives and derived from a constitutional base, became
a principal target of political change by the American Left.
Because the growing middle class could not be depended upon to
lead a Marxist revolution based upon economic considerations, Marx-
ism was translated from economic terms into cultural terms. The new
Marxists, gathered at what became known as the Frankfurt School,
fled Germany before the outbreak of World War II and many came to
the United States. An Americanized variety of Marxism, articulated
most prominently by Herbert Marcuse, produced what we know today
as multiculturalism or cultural Marxism.' 99 Multiculturalism appeals
to subgroups of victims that may not be disadvantaged economically,
but are disadvantaged in terms of values reflected in religious beliefs,
legislative enactments, and governmental processes. Marcuse and
other Marxists turned to a coalition of feminists, students, blacks,
intellectuals and homosexuals to lead a modified, non-violent revolu-
tion targeting all existing institutions. The family, church and govern-
ment were relentlessly criticized for the purpose of destroying them.
This movement was most noticeable on college campuses in the 1960s,
but has carried over within intellectual circles to the present day.
As strange as it may seem, Marcuse attacked the concept of West-
ern tolerance as a tool of oppression, leading him to propose a new
concept of tolerance suitable for the purpose of advancing Marxist
doctrine. 20 0 For Marcuse, tolerance served only to preserve the status
quo by which a majority ruled over an oppressed cultural minority. He
believed that no institution, authority, or government existed that
would translate liberating tolerance into practice.20 The status quo
was said to be preserved by violence and suppression that was promul-
gated, practiced, and defended by democratic and authoritarian gov-
198. Id.
199. See generally PAUL EDWARD GOTTFRIED, THE STRANGE DEATH OF MARXISM: THE
EUROPEAN LEFT IN THE NEW MILLENNIUM (2005).
200. Herbert Marcuse, Repressive Tolerance and Postscript 1968, in WOLFF, MOORE, &
MARCUSE, A CRITIQUE OF PURE TOLERANCE (1969), reprinted in IDEAS IN AMERICA, supra
note 196, at 517.
201. Id.
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ernments alike through the police, the courts and other sources of
authority. 20 2 Even passive or non-partisan tolerance was condemned
because it "refrain[ed] from taking sides, but in doing so it actually
protect[ed] the already established machinery of discrimination. "203
Freedom of speech, for example, "was granted even to the radical ene-
mies of society, provided they did not make the transition from word
to deed, from speech to action. '20 4 In other words, freedom of the sort
guaranteed by the Constitution was considered to be a means of vent-
ing cultural pressures, of pacifying people who were actually enslaved
by the majority in control of government.
In a society where powers were unequal, tolerance of the sort con-
demned by Marcuse not only perpetuated inequality but allowed it to
increase over time. The laborer's interest conflicts with that of manage-
ment; the consumer's interests conflict with those of the producer; and
the intellectual whose vocation conflicts with that of his employer are
all doomed to a future of oppression and inequality. Because institu-
tionalized tolerance is designed to maintain the status quo they "find
themselves submitting to a system against which they are power-
less ... 205 Consequently, constitutional rights and processes had to
be abandoned in favor of the pragmatic need to help victims of dis-
crimination and inequality. "The small and powerless minorities
which struggle against the false consciousness and its beneficiaries
must be helped: their continued existence is more important than the
preservation of abused rights and liberties which grant constitutional
powers to those who oppress these minorities. 20 6
In order for a state of harmony to exist between various individual
liberties it was not enough to find a compromise between competing
ideas or between freedom and law of the kind articulated by Mill.
Rather, it required "creating the society in which man is no longer
enslaved by institutions which vitiate self-determination from the
beginning. ' 20 7 "In other words, [because of tolerance] freedom is still
to be created even for the freest of the existing societies. ' 20  Conse-
quently, Marcuse argued, a new kind of tolerance is required, one that
cannot be indiscriminate and equal with respect to the contents of
expression, neither in word or in deed; it cannot protect false words
202. Id. at 518-19.
203. Id. at 519.
204. Id.
205. Id. at 522.
206. Id. at 529.
207. Id. at 519-20.
208. Id. at 520.
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and wrong deeds which demonstrate that they contradict and counter-
act the possibilities of liberation. Such indiscriminate tolerance is justi-
fied in harmless debates, in conversation, in academic discussion; it is
indispensable in the scientific enterprise, in private religion. But soci-
ety can not be indiscriminate where the pacification of existence,
where freedom and happiness themselves are at stake: here, certain
things cannot be said, certain ideas cannot be expressed, certain poli-
cies cannot be proposed, certain behavior cannot be permitted without
making tolerance an instrument for the continuation of servitude.
20 9
Consequently, "[1liberating tolerance . . would mean intolerance
against movements from the Right, and tolerance of movements from
the Left."'2 10 Marcuse, through the twisted, convoluted logic of Marx-
ism, literally redefined intolerance as tolerance.
Conflicts between disadvantaged subgroups and the larger society
are contained throughout the scenarios created by and for court plan-
ners. Value statements and ethical rules promulgated by state supreme
courts through their various commissions and committees are
expressly intended to suppress statements by members of the judiciary
that reflect the pure tolerance denounced by Marcuse, and reflect,
instead, the "liberating tolerance" advocated by him as a means of
advancing a Marxist revolution through legal and cultural means.
Supreme Court ethical rules prohibit, for example, any expression of
bias based upon race, gender, or sexual orientation. Similar ethical
statements appear throughout futures commission reports. For exam-
ple, the Tennessee Futures Commission noted:
Our vision of the future, therefore, is framed in ideals. We do not pre-
cisely predict, for instance, that by the year 2026 all biases will be elim-
inated. We do have a vision of such a system, and we believe that
progress toward the vision is essential, for the judicial system itself will
be called upon to mediate all sorts of new disputes that fall along fac-
tional lines. 
2 1
'
Obviously, mediating new disputes that fall along factional lines will
require some discrimination between competing interests, but in many
cultural disputes the decision about where the courts will draw lines
are predetermined by the courts in the form of value statements.
Moreover, statements of values or the prohibition of expressions
of bias are not intended to produce a fair trial at the hands of poten-
tially abusive judges. Every day judges provide fair trials to all kinds of
people they personally disagree with - adulterers, drunk drivers, van-
209. Id.
210. Id. at 529.
211. To SERVE ALL PEOPLE, supra note 138, at 8.
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dals, thieves, murderers and others. For example, if two people are dis-
puting over the title to a piece of land the fact that one of them is black
or a homosexual is irrelevant to the outcome, and any attempt by the
other party to make that fact an issue in the case would be suppressed
immediately by the judge as an improper attempt to influence the out-
come of the trial. Rather, such ethical statements are intended to affect
the substantive outcomes of future lawsuits by inducing a belief that
laws affecting particular subgroups are themselves unfair, and that
only an unbiased judge will overturn them. Given recent trends the
most immediate expressions of this may come in the form of state
court decisions advancing affirmative action, protecting abortion,
approving homosexual adoptions, and ordering state legislatures to
permit same-sex marriages. Utilizing similar legal theories, lawsuits
may be expected to strike down laws prohibiting polygamy, incest, and
other sexual offenses.
A judge who provides a fair trial procedurally but applies the law
as given to him by the legislature is exercising an example of classical
tolerance, while a judge who strikes down legislation in favor of the
disadvantaged victims of society is exercising an example of what Mar-
cuse called liberating tolerance. Of the two judges, only the latter is
unbiased. Thus, statements of values predetermine the outcome of law-
suits and, consequently, the form of the future society.
In the service of the new judicial system, conflict serves to
advance, not the interests of individuals or constituent subgroups, but
the power of the judiciary over all people. But in the case of the Ameri-
can judiciary it does so in a new way-not by the overt oppression so
visible in former totalitarian regimes-but, instead, by subtle, manipu-
lative techniques of social control applied by a technologically-compe-
tent, authoritarian elite that seems to be not merely acceptable but
pragmatically necessary.
Conflict theory presents conflict as a crisis in human interaction
brought about by competition for material resources or moral author-
ity. The science of human behavior is used to change the interaction
between individuals and between individuals and the state by thera-
peutically changing the way people think and feel. Conflict often
causes people to feel confused, fearful, and unsure about their situa-
tion in life. The new system is focused on the inner-workings of the
minds of those involved in conflict, and fixed principles of law are
only a utilitarian means of giving the courts the power to address their
[Vol. 29:591656
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social and psychological needs.212 The new system, utilizing new tech-
niques, uses the existence of conflict or antisocial behavior as a start-
ing point for the courts to begin their work of inducing the parties to
grow calmer, stronger, more confident, and better able to handle life's
problems. They voluntarily choose to become more open, attentive,
and responsive to the situation of others. By doing so, they expand
their perspective to include an appreciation for the needs of other peo-
ple, and this constitutes, to the reformers, a resolution of the underly-
ing problem of conflict.213 If at the end of the crisis people exit the
system with a new frame of mind, the process of healing is
complete.214
H. New Transformational Options
New options are being made available to the courts in a broad
range of physical environments with the penitentiary at one extreme
and the home at the other. In between are the treatment center, the
halfway house, house arrest, and, as we shall see, the entire commu-
nity.215 While in these various locations the courts will employ a vari-
212. For an example of how this might work in a domestic case, see Beth M.
Erickson, Therapeutic Mediation: A Saner Way of Disputing, 14 AM. ACAD. MATRIMONIAL
LAW 233 (1997).
Conflict can be seen as natural because when people live side by side in their
most intimate contexts, it is inevitable for irritants to develop between them.
In order for those vexations that swirl like gnats around them not to develop
into major problems, people need to have strategies for resolving them before
those aggravations become like killer bees.
Id. at 235.
213. Transformational dispute resolution is part of a larger trend away from the
dominant Western "individualistic" worldview, which holds as its highest values
individual autonomy and fulfillment, toward a "relational" worldview, which holds as
its highest value the integration of individual autonomy and concern for others. See
Patricia L. Franz, Comment, Habits of a Highly Effective Transformative Mediation
Program, 13 OHIO ST. J. ON DisP. RESOL. 1039, 1042 (1998) ("Bush and Folger
approach mediation with the premise that conflicts need not be viewed as problems
but can (and should be) viewed as opportunities for personal moral growth or
transformation. This moral transformation is an internal move from an individualistic
orientation to a balanced concern for self and others.").
214. ROBERT A. BARUCH BUSH & JOSEPH P. FOLGER, THE PROMISE OF MEDIATION:
RESPONDING TO CONFLICT THROUGH EMPOWERMENT AND RECOGNITION XV (1994) ("As
practitioners and scholars, we have come to believe that mediation's greatest value lies
in its potential not only to find solutions to people's problems but change people
themselves for the better, in the very midst of conflict.").
215. See Front Cover Illustration, 41 THE JUDGES' JOURNAL, Winter 2002 (problem-
solving courts issue). This issue is especially helpful in understanding the revolution
taking place in the judiciary, because of the cover illustration-the picture is worth a
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ety of techniques to modify behavior, including sociological surveys,
psychological tests, reeducation, mediation, peer pressure, drug tests,
incarceration, community service (work therapy), medication, fre-
quent reports to court, frequent praise, and just the caring, reinforcing
smile of the court team. The expanded science of behaviorism, now
including techniques from the broader field of neurotechnology, pro-
vides a wide array of new therapeutic techniques to trial courts by
which a personalized combination of rewards and punishments,
together with other therapeutic techniques such as reeducation and
medication, are "scientifically" applied to bring about the desired mod-
ifications in the thoughts and actions of people who come under court
supervision.2 16 This is already happening in places like Mental Health
Courts, Drug Courts, Family Courts, and other places where therapy is
the principal work of the judiciary, but it has also spread to general
jurisdiction courts which are relying heavily on mediation, reeduca-
tion and other techniques of social transformation. Some courts are
even adopting New Age forms of alternative medicine such as medita-
tion and acupuncture as part of the court setting.
Each of the new "options" available to the courts represents a
court-ordered change in the environment of an individual correspond-
ing to the nature of the problem being dealt with in a particular case.
Behavior modification may take a rational approach to particular
problems. Husbands and wives in the throes of a divorce, for example,
are now required, as part of the court process in many states, to be
reeducated regarding their changed situation in life and the way they
should relate to their former spouse, their children, the courts,
extended families, and other forms of interpersonal relationships.217
thousand words. Three judges are depicted, each holding a tool-a paint brush, a
wrench, and a drill. These tools do not mean that judges are going to begin
constructing homes, but, rather, represent the techniques-the tools-of the social
sciences by which judges will begin rebuilding peoples' lives. In the foreground of the
illustration are the homes where people live and in the background are the buildings
where people work. Wherever people can be found the courts will be there offering-
no, demanding-that they heal people "physically and psychologically."
216. For an interesting article on the techniques of neurotechnology, see The Future
of Mind Control, THE ECONOMIST, May 25, 2002, at 77. The process of combining
rewards and punishments as a part of the therapeutic work of the courts is illustrated
by the work of Drug Courts. See, e.g., MICHAEL REMPEL, ET AL., CENTER FOR COURT
INNOVATION, THE NEW YORK STATE ADULT DRUG COURT EVALUATION, EXECUTIVE
SUMMARY 1.
217. Most states have adopted Parenting Acts which require re-education of
divorcing spouses. But this concept has potentially broader applications because:
"[b]y any of these measures, the negligent-based tort system is deficient in meeting the
generally accepted goals of compensating the innocent and punishing the
[Vol. 29:591658
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These are people who already know how do read, write and do basic
math. Divorce and the accompanying battles over child custody and
support place burdens on the state. Because divorce continues to be
promoted as the solution for spouses with problems, technical meth-
ods had to be developed that ameliorate the burden on the courts
where these problems are dealt with, while maintaining the moral
authority of all parties, and, more importantly, the relevancy of the
judicial branch. Consequently, the interpersonal skills parents are
being taught in parenting seminars have more to do with preserving
the power of the state than anything else.
There are, however, more subtle methods available in settings to
shape or reinforce desired behavior. Known by such terms as Trans-
formative Mediation, Restorative Justice and Collaborative Law, the
courts are using mediation and community-based settings to induce
the secular equivalent of repentance by bringing community offenders
face to face with their victims, relatives, and representatives of the com-
munity, now also a victim." 8 Gathered around a table, the offender
can see the pain he has caused his victim, the shame he has brought on
his family, and the outrage and loss of the community which has had
its feeling of peace and security shattered.2 19 On the other hand, the
victim, family, and community can see and appreciate the sociological
wrongdoers.... On the other hand, it is not as important to "punish" the wrongdoer
as it is to "educate" him-to prevent the recurrence of the accident." Selwyn Enzer,
Justice Without Fault:A Futures-Research Approach to Tort Reform, in JUDGING THE
FUTURE, supra note 39, at 63, 67.
218. See generally John Braithwaite, Restorative Justice: Assessing Optimistic and
Pessimistic Accounts, 25 CRIME & JUST. 1 (1999); Mark William Bakker, Repairing the
Breach and Reconciling the Discordant: Mediation in the Criminal Justice System, 72 N. C.
L. REV. 1479 (1994) (dealing with restorative justice in the criminal setting).
219. See Robert F. Schopp, Therapeutic Jurisprudence Forum: Integrating Restorative
Justice and Therapeutic Jurisprudence, 67 REv. JUR. U.P.R. 665 (1998).
The community conference proposal based in RJ [Restorative Justice]
reveals a more substantive normative commitment in that it endorses RJ as
the proper goal of the dispositional process in at least some criminal cases. RJ
emphasizes: reparation for the emotional and material loss of the victim; the
reintegration of the offender into the community and restoration of the
tranquility of the community. Methodologically, the RJ conferences directly
involve the offender, the victim, and community members in meetings in
which the participants negotiate a mutually acceptable reparation plan
through which the offender makes reparation for the material and emotional
injuries to the victim and the community and re-enters that community. The
interaction at the conference emphasizes the emotional process, especially a
core sequence involving the expression of shame and remorse by the offender
followed by forgiveness by the victim.
Id. at 666-67.
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and psychological problems of the offender who may have grown up in
a broken home, suffered the abuse of bullies in school, lost his job, or
some other unfortunate turn of events, all of which are intended to
produce a sense of grace and forgiveness, and, more importantly, a
sense of calm and peace to all concerned.220
The judges became a source of values for society through appel-
late court decisions and court commissions, and, now, by the work of
the trial courts, they apply their healing hands directly to individuals
and their communities. 221 One judge popular with the court reform
crowd made the direct connection between the values and political
power of the judiciary to maintain social order where there would oth-
erwise be, at the very least, increased conflict if not complete break-
down. The things we learned in church, he argued, are no longer the
220. See Martha Minow, Between Vengeance and Forgiveness: Feminist Responses to
Violent Injustice, 32 NEw ENG. L. REv. 967 (1998).
One reason to pursue these aspirations is pragmatic and psychological.
Retributive approaches may reinforce anger and a sense of victimhood;
reparative approaches instead can help victims move beyond anger and
beyond a sense of powerlessness. Reparative or restorative justice can secure
public acknowledgement and condemnation of the wrong, although through
mechanisms that differ from prosecution, conviction, and punishment of
wrongdoers. Restorative justice can also afford victims the position of relative
power represented by the capacity to forgive-whether or not the individual
victims proceed then to forgive particular perpetrators. Where victims do
forgive, it is as much for their own healing and embrace of a future without
rage as it is for the benefit of the offender.
Id. at 969.
221. When the reform movement was gaining momentum in the 1960s, the focus
was still on the need for structural reform; there were indications among reformers,
even then, that the judiciary should assume a greater responsibility for the welfare of
private citizens. This sentiment was expressed at the Judicial Conference on Most
Critical Problems of the Lower Court System held in Rancho Tranquillo on August 18-
20, 1966. See STRUGGLE FOR EQUAL JUSTICE, supra note 48.
The weight of a great, personal responsibility descended upon these
individually lonely men budges]. They had demonstrated a concern for their
fellow man, especially the disadvantaged and the maladjusted. They had
shown an appreciation of the dignity of the individual. There could be no
question of their determination to uphold the rights of society to protection
and security. They were enlisted in the battle to deter crime and disrespect
for law and order.
But now it seemed that they must shoulder, as individual judges,
responsibility in their own communities and states to obtain the corrective
measures, the additional support, manpower and facilities necessary to
provide in their own courtrooms equal justice, fairly and timely
administered.
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answers to the problems we face as a nation, and the judges must
begin communicating with the public about the values they hold. "The
one remaining force providing the glue holding us together as a people
is the judiciary," he said. "Whether we can remain a country under law
depends on how well we do our job as judges. 222
Consequently, claims being made upon the courts are much more
profound than simply expanding the possible scope of civil and crimi-
nal liability. Though the law and adversarial litigation remain neces-
sary as a vehicle for making social policy and promoting behavioral
modification, the goal, where possible, is to move adversarial proceed-
ings into the background as more subtle methods of manipulation are
employed.223 Mediation is a good, and, perhaps, the best example of
this. 22 4 From a superficial perspective, mediation appears to be a tech-
nique by which the parties are "empowered" to work out their own
solution to their problems.225 But looming in the background, waiting
222. Robert K. Pirraglia, Rhode Island District Court Judge, Lecture at the
Tennessee Judicial Conference: Courts Under Attack (April 15, 1998).
223. See Janeen Kerper, Legal Education: Creative Problem Solving vs. The Case
Method: A Marvelous Adventure in Which Winnie-the-Pooh Meets Mrs. Palsgraf, 34 CAL.
W. L. REV. 351, 354 (illustrating the contrast in the methods and purposes of the
"traditional" system and the "problem-solving" system).
It is important to note that creative problem solving does not jettison the
adversary method. On the contrary, the adversary process is viewed as one
important way in which individual and societal problems may be addressed.
The difference is that creative problem solving seeks to rearrange priorities.
Where collaboration is feasible, the adversary process is seen as the least
desirable of a range of possible solutions. Where collaboration is not feasible
(e.g., where the conflict is the product of a gross imbalance of power or where
the conflict seeks to vindicate important civil or public rights) litigation may
be the best solution.
Id. at 354.
224. See, e.g., James F. Henry, Some Reflections on ADR, 2000 J. Disp. RESOL. 63
(2000). Alternative Dispute Resolution, now called by some Appropriate Dispute
Resolution, or Culturally Appropriate Dispute Resolution, was originally focused on
developing alternatives to the high costs of litigation. It assumes that parties are going
to negotiate based upon their "interests" rather than the law. Mediation purports to
shift the focus of dispute resolution from legal principles or legal rights to problem
solving.
225. Jeffrey W. Stempel, Therapeutic Jurisprudence/Preventive Law and the
Lawyering Process: Theralaw and the Law-Business Paradigm Debate, 5 PSYCH. PUB. POL'Y
& L. 849 (1999). ADR, consisting primarily of mediation, began as a means of
resolving disputes "in a process that was faster, cheaper, more streamlined, and less
layperson-oriented than traditional trials." Mediation "and its cousins" have now
"come to mean an effort to address disputes and problems in a nonadversarial or less
adversarial manner in a process that seeks to empower the participants and lead to
participant satisfaction and self-actualization of a sort." Id. at 854-55.
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for the uncooperative, principled litigant, are the "traditional" courts
which will provide a solution if the parties do not provide their own.
But even this is illusory, for the parties ultimately cannot provide their
own solution when working within a framework annexed to the state.
The expanding theories of liability guide the mediation process, and
increasingly these theories allow recovery for perceived mental and
emotional grievances, injuries or injustices arising out of disputes in
the home, workplace or the greater community. Much of the law being
developed goes directly to relationships between husbands and wives,
children and parents, employers and employees, landlords and tenants,
the rich and the poor, and so on, and is creating all kinds of new law-
suits for homosexuals, minorities, children, people with disabilities,
and other minorities-in short, "victims" of all kinds. As legislatures
pass new laws, and as the judicial process continues to expand theo-
ries of liability, every person is becoming a guarantor of the health and
happiness of every other person.2 26 Consequently, when people get
sued, they wisely desire to mediate a settlement just as quickly as pos-
sible to buy their peace at the least possible price. The parties, through
mediation, may reach an agreement and be happy for it, but it is only
in the context of the coercive power of the judicial system that this
happens. Mediation, as court scenarios correctly point out, takes place
in the "shadow" of the formal legal system which guides the end
toward which mediation is directed.
There is an interesting way to illustrate this. In the report of the
Massachusetts Futures Commission entitled, Reinventing Justice
2022,227 the Commission constructed a scenario in which robots were
granted the same rights as human beings by a decision of the Massa-
chusetts Supreme Judicial Court in the year 2010. Because of its supe-
rior intelligence, one robot developed revolutionary software that it
used to enhance its own capabilities, and held the potential to improve
other androids. The robot patented the software, but its employer
claimed exclusive rights to the program. "My employer's motive in fil-
ing an action against me is largely pecuniary," observed the robot. 'The
company is more aware than I of the commercial potential for my new
226. The expansion of civil liability is used as an argument for supporting the
therapeutic, problem-solving settings, including prevention. See Edward A. Dauer,
Preventive Law Before and After Therapeutic jurisprudence, 5 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L.
800, 802 (1999) ("However, the courts are open to anyone with almost any complaint.
Civil liability is enormously flexible, and even when there isn't a cause of action called
'intentionally failing to get along,' there are always causes of action for something close
enough.").
227. REINVENTING JUSTICE 2022, supra note 124, at 24.
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program. It may also be the case, however, that the company resents
my successful self-improvement, my new abilities, my increased
"humanity." Whatever the motive, the company seeks exclusive rights
to the program. It might have sued me outright, but for its desire for
confidentiality,' the robot speculated.228 When the robot refused to
relinquish its rights to the patent the employer pressed the "JUSTICE"
key on his personal communications unit, and the "intake counselor"
sent the case to a "screening counselor." Although the "screening coun-
selor" recommended adjudication, the parties, desiring privacy, opted
for mediation where their respective "interests" could be considered for
the purpose of reaching a just settlement. As a result, the parties "fash-
ioned an agreement in which I [the robot] retain ownership of the pro-
gram; my employer will obtain its exclusive use for five years in
exchange for a modest royalty. Both of us are satisfied with the solu-
tion and promise to mend our heretofore good relations. '"229
This exercise, as fantastic as it may seem, is among a number of
possible areas for future judicial activism. In addition to robots, other
reform literature suggests that giving trees standing to bring suit
would also produce socially desirable outcomes. 2 30 In this case, how-
ever, the robot is not a human being but personal property, and like
trees and animals has no rights whatsoever. Except for the fact that the
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court had decreed that it should have
human rights, it would have been in no position to make a claim to
anything. The robot and all of its labor would have belonged to its
owner, the employer. Consequently, when the court declared it to be
the moral and legal equivalent of a human being, it acquired the power
of the state to force upon the employer certain outcomes. Just exactly
what those outcomes would be was subsequently determined not
through court decree, but through negotiation. That, however, would
never have happened had the employer not known that it was no
longer dealing with a piece of equipment, bearing testimony to the
intelligence and inventiveness of the humans who created it, but was
going up against an object that the Court had said was human. Conse-
quently, the greedy, grasping, envious employer was forced to negoti-
ate with the morally superior, but disadvantaged robot for whatever
the employer could gain through negotiation. Had it not been for the
kindness and generosity of the robot, the case might have gone to trial
and the employer lost the case entirely.
228. Id.
229. Id. at 10.
230. SCHULTZ, supra note 159, at 130.
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This is precisely how the law works in mediation. As the courts
expand rights and create new theories of liability, the outcome of
mediation is directed in not-so-subtle ways predetermined to meet the
interests of the parties who shape socially desirable outcomes through
negotiation, and increasingly trust the justice system. In the fictional
case from Massachusetts, the original decision, giving human rights to
robots, is accepted like so many other appellate decisions as part of the
moral fabric of society and is never again seriously questioned regard-
less of however absurd and lawless it may be.
Mediation may be, as Professor Black would say, "less law" than a
formal trial, but it is still law in the new procedural sense, and reme-
dies are available through mediated agreements that are never available
in contested litigation. Lawyers favor mediation, for example, in part
because they can sometimes negotiate the payment of their attorney
fees by the other party, a result not ordinarily available to courts ren-
dering formal decisions. Not only does money flow in mediation, but
it flows in new ways.
When mediation began gaining popularity in the 1970s, it was
viewed as a way of moving more cases out of the judicial system with-
out the time and expense of a trial. But by the 1990s the remedial
aspects of mediation and of other forms of Alternative Dispute Resolu-
tion had gained favor for transformative reasons, while retaining the
mantle of efficiency and cost-effectiveness. 23 ' The Commission on the
Future of the Maryland Courts touched on this change in its Final
Report. In Maryland, as in most other states, less than ten percent
(usually five to seven percent) of all cases ever go to trial. The vast
majority continue to be voluntarily dismissed or settled by the lawyers
representing the parties. But mediation became popular as judges
gradually gained the ability, over philosophical and constitutional
objections against closing the courts, to force litigants to submit to
mediation for the purpose of reducing even further the number of
cases actually going to trial. This was done in the name of efficiency
and saving money. A growing body of supposedly "neutral" mediators
was gradually brought under the judicial umbrella as state supreme
courts assumed the power to regulate and professionalize mediators.
Efficiency and cost-effectiveness continues to be used to justify
these actions. But it was not enough that even a small additional per-
cent of cases were actually settled through mediation; they were stay-
ing in the judicial system too long. "Even though the probability is that
231. See generally Mark W. Armstrong, Therapeutic Justice: Defining a Controversial
Yet Transformative Concept, in THE IMPROVEMENTS OF THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE,
supra note 75, at 451, 454-56.
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less than seven percent will require trial, no one knows which cases
will fall into that seven percent; they are all in competition for scarce
trial dates, making it difficult for busy courts to set reliable trial dates,"
said the Maryland Futures Commission.2 32 The efficiency argument
was expanded to include other reasons for reformers to begin using
ADR as substitutes for rules of law. Initially, as we have seen, "court-
annexed ADR" was viewed principally as a diversion device to assist
the court. Gradually, however, observed the Maryland Futures Com-
mission, the
courts have begun to appreciate the fact that they do more than simply
divert cases from court dockets: they produce a better solution for the
parties, either because the solution comes quicker and with far less
expense or because it is qualitatively better in terms of actually resolv-
ing the underlying dispute. Studies made of these programs around the
country document that, when the program is properly run, not only
does it achieve its purpose of settling cases earlier in the process, but
that litigant and attorney satisfaction is high. Cases are indeed resolved
earlier and with less cost, and, more importantly, they are resolved
without the animosity that litigation so often produces. Agreements
reached through ADR also tend to hold up better, in terms of compli-
ance, than do judgments imposed by courts and disgruntled
litigants.233
The "transformational" qualities of ADR becaime preferred by reform-
ers within the judiciary, not as a means of finding truth or applying
fixed principles of law, but as a technique for modifying the feelings
and emotions of the parties and their lawyers. The emotional quality of
ADR trumps the constitutional process of finding facts (which, being
entirely subjective, no longer exist) and the rule of law as long as the
parties feel good and their "interests" are being met. Mediation is bet-
ter because it meets the psychological and sociological needs of the
litigants; the need for government and society to vindicate rules of law
which restrain the state and protect individual rights is no longer para-
mount. The underlying problem is not a violation of rules of law, but
of psychological illness, ignorance, economic inequality, or intolerance
toward the feelings and needs of others. Transformative ADR "person-
alizes" the effects of the judicial process, and, having done so, alters
the base of government. The focus shifts from the application of uni-
form procedures and rules of law to the feelings and emotions of spe-
cific individuals.
232. COMMISSION ON THE FUTURE OF MARYLAND COURTS, FINAL REPORT 47 (1996).
233. Id.
20071 665
75
Williams: Reinventing the Courts: The Frontiers of Judicial Activism in the
Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 2007
CAMPBELL LAW REVIEW
This is desirable for the courts because the purpose of changing
the feelings of the parties is not actually about them, but about chang-
ing how they feel about the courts, and specifically, about the judges.
If people feel good about their experience with the new process, they
are more likely to look favorably on the judges, increasing what activ-
ists now call Public Trust and Confidence in the Justice System. The
overall power of the judiciary is expanded in this way.
Mandatory, professionalized mediation also exposes another fal-
lacy of the reform movement-the argument that the constitutional sys-
tem based upon process and fixed rules of law is too mechanical.
Alternative methods of resolving disputes have led to the creation of a
new kind of machine, one that employs mind-changing techniques on
individuals rather than adhere to rules of law by which people simi-
larly situated are to be treated alike. The judicial process is no longer
engaged in the search for truth; the application of what now passes for
law does not reflect precepts of right and wrong. The judicial process
has become, instead, a technique of the social sciences which requires,
as do all techniques, the increased centralization of power in the hands
of even fewer people for the purpose of changing and standardizing
how people think and feel. Standardization should not be thought of
as fixed rules of law, but as the production of tranquil, productive citi-
zens who look favorably on the courts.
In Maryland, for example, the courts have the ability to impose
mediation in many cases. But mediation is not available everywhere in
Maryland (as in other states) except upon payment of a fee, and in
other cases and other areas of the state "ADR resources have not been
organized, recruited, or trained and are therefore not readily availa-
ble."'2 3 4 Consequently, the Futures Commission found that "standardi-
zation will be required in terms of the design of the program and the
recruiting, training, and monitoring of the personnel needed to provide
the service. '2 35 New rules and new funding will be required to imple-
ment uniform ADR, which occurs as a direct consequence of the fact
that it is now part of the judicial branch of government. The judicial
system is a part of government, and it is available to all people, which
means that the mediator and mediation process must be available, like
the judge rendering an opinion, to all people. Thus, the power of the
courts continues to expand, and is increasingly centralized and stan-
dardized in new ways, becoming a new kind of machine producing a
new product. This is the implication of the Futures Commission's
234. Id. at 48.
235. Id.
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statement that the parties' satisfaction is increased if the mediation
process is "properly run," a reference to the techniques of centralized
management and training of mediators and others. If mediation is
properly managed, if mediators and others are properly trained and
monitored, if mediation is standardized and universally available
(most likely at state expense), it will be "properly run," the "satisfac-
tion" of the parties will be maximized, and the "underlying dispute"
will be resolved.
In alternative settings, the judge is not directly imposing a solu-
tion on the parties, but the effect is to increase overall importance of
the courts, through those working with them, in relation to the individ-
ual and popular branches of government. The fact that more people-
mediators, community volunteers and experts-become a part of the
process does not mean that more power is being shared by the courts
with more people, but that more people are increasingly under the
influence and ultimate control of the judges who sanction, train, and
prescribe the ethical rules by which they all intervene in the lives of
others. This occurs without anyone ever taking notice that it is happen-
ing. The courts complain about the lack of access to mediation
because they are seeking to bring, not fewer people, but even more
people into the new judicial system where public trust and confidence
in the justice system is to be maximized.
If lawyers are involved in the therapeutic setting, they are not there
as advocates, but can be found working with, not against, the prosecut-
ing attorney to determine the best course of treatment for the
offender.2
36
What is even more troubling is the move to expand within the
judicial function the range of human behavior which does not run
afoul of the law but which may nevertheless be in need of court modi-
fication to prevent future criminal or antisocial behavior. We see this
especially in the growing judicial involvement with children where
judges, typically working through the administrative staff of state
236. See Bruce J. Winick, David B. Wexler & Edward A. Dauer, A New Model for the
Practice of Law, 5 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 795 (1999).
The integration of the two perspectives [Therapeutic Jurisprudence (TJ)
and Preventive Law (PL)I thus has the potential for greatly enhancing each of
them. PL gives to TJ a grounding in legal practice, a set of law office
procedures-the legal checkup and the like-to enable lawyers and clients to
apply the law therapeutically. In turn, TJ gives to PL a human face and
legitimizes (indeed, expects) the lawyer's explicit and systematic attention to
the potential positive or negative psychological fallout of the law and of
proposed legal measures.
Id. at 796.
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supreme courts, are engaged in training public school teachers in what
is called Law Related Education. Judges are being successfully recon-
ceived as educators.237 After they have been trained by court staff,
teachers then instruct their children about the courts, dispute resolu-
tion, and about how the courts protect their rights. Many supreme
court web sites contain law related educational materials available for
downloading. 238 But there are other changes that directly involve stu-
dents with the courts: "'The big change is the way we're trying to
involve the community," said the municipal district's Presiding Judge
Sheila M. Murphy. "We're asking the schools to cooperate. That
includes having schools fax information to court if students are
absent," Murphy said.239
The techniques applied in all of these physical environments are
most often designed to modify the feelings and emotions of court cli-
ents. Exceptions to environmental modifications would be the drugs
administered to clients of Mental Health Courts or Drug Courts.
For low-level offenders-especially in urban areas-therapeutic,
problem-solving courts are becoming a "gateway" to a comprehensive
array of social services provided on-site, at the courthouse. Commu-
nity courts may be equipped with professional staff, court volunteers,
and associated organizations to respond to widespread substance
abuse, prostitution, shoplifting, disorderly conduct, homelessness,
mental and physical health problems, educational and vocational defi-
ciencies, family problems, lack of access to entitlements, and other
problems. For many, the criminal justice system constitutes their pri-
mary connection with the world of structured services.2 40 Problem-
solving courts are becoming a clearinghouse for social services in their
communities, as they connect people with lifestyle problems to local
government services and the support of a wide range of community
organizations and volunteers. What is more, "partnerships" between
the agencies of government and the community, particularly involving
illegal drugs, have become increasingly popular as "agencies recognize
the limits of their ability to engineer complex social changes," and find
working arrangements with the community to be the best way to
237. See John J. Sweeney, Richard Fruin & Rebecca J. Fanning, Courts Connecting
with Their Communities: Judicial Outreach Comes of Age, in THE IMPROVEMENTS TO THE
ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE 401, 403-04 (7th ed. 2001).
238. Detailed curricula for law-related education can be found on the web sites of
many of the state supreme courts.
239. Brendan M. Stephens, Communities Take Larger Role in Youth Justice, CHICAGO
DAILY LAW BULLETIN, August 29, 1996, at 3.
240. MICHELE SVIRIDOFF, ET AL., DISPENSING JUSTICE LOCALLY: THE IMPLEMENTATION
AND EFFECTS OF THE MIDTOWN COMMUNITY COURT 86 (1997).
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achieve targeted outcomes. 24 1 Such relationships have a "results-ori-
ented focus" by which community volunteers, civic groups, or treat-
ment providers are able to contribute to and, hence, to measure
outcomes through the collection and analysis of data in specific
cases.
2 42
A growing number of instructional materials are being used to
expand the concept of courts as providers of therapeutic social ser-
vices. One popular book noted that problem-solving courts are said to
be more frequently encountering individuals with a host of medical,
psychological, and social problems, and need attention from the
courts. 2 43 Generally, these individuals have fallen through the tradi-
tional net of service providers, or remain in need of services despite
continued contact with community service agencies: "Traditional
court processes were designed to make specific decisions; they were
not designed to address the underlying social and psychological
problems that lead these cases to court. Consequently, courts are craft-
ing legally relevant but ineffective decisions. Although individual cases
are disposed, they are not resolved because the underlying problems
are not addressed. ' 244 Consequently, problem-solving courts link peo-
ple with lifestyle problems to medical, social service and treatment
providers operating in an auxiliary fashion. Such providers, having
expanded power over more people, actually provide supplementary
power to the courts.
Courts are increasingly relying on the work of experts - psycholo-
gists, educators, corrections officers, court volunteers, social workers,
pharmacologists, computer technicians, and others who are becoming
part of the new court setting.24 5 The "team" approach to behavior
modification allows judges to harness the community and all of the
techniques of the social sciences for the purpose of studying and
changing human behavior.
What is more, the reinvention of the judiciary marks the emer-
gence of the ultimate technocrat. The structural reforms begun in the
1960s not only changed court structures by unifying inferior courts
under the increasing control of the state supreme courts, but added a
241. OFFICE OF NATIONAL DRUG CONTROL POLICY, NATIONAL DRUG CONTROL
STRATEGY: 2000 ANNUAL REPORT 44, 46 (2000).
242. Id. at 46-47.
243. PAMELA CASEY & WILLIAM E. HEWlTT, NATIONAL CENTER FOR STATE COURTS,
COURT RESPONSES TO INDIVIDUALS IN NEED OF SERVICES: PROMISING COMPONENTS OF A
SERVICE COORDINATION STRATEGY FOR COURTS 7 (2001).
244. Id. at 9.
245. See Susan K. Knipps & Greg Berman, New York's Problem-Solving Courts Provide
Meaningful Alternatives to Traditional Remedies, 72 N. Y. ST. B.A. J. 8, 8-9 (2000).
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steadily-growing, parallel system of court administrators, 24 6 and it is in
this corps of administrators that people with degrees in sociology,
political science, computer technology, court management, public rela-
tions, and others have found a home in the judiciary.247 Lawyers in
their new sociological role will most likely have a place there too, not
as employees, nor as advocates but as facilitators guiding victims and
clients alike through the new judicial process of individual and group
modification.248
Working through the administrative offices of the courts, some or
all of these people can, on behalf of the judges, interact with other
activists to schedule conferences, distribute materials, schedule judges
to speak at schools or civic groups, conduct public opinion surveys,
schedule visioning and planning sessions, form community focus
groups, apply for grants, and, most importantly, schedule and monitor
the therapeutic modification of the courts' clients.249
The treatment community is becoming part of the court setting
but will not actually become employees of the courts, even though a
246. Milton D. Green, The Business of the Trial Courts, in THE COURTS THE PUBLIC AND
THE LAW EXPLOSION, supra note 13, at 7, 27.
247. For a favorable review of modern court management, see DAVID C. STEELMAN,
CASEFLOW MANAGEMENT: THE HEART OF COURT MANAGEMENT IN THE NEW MILLENNIUM
(2000). In 1990, the National Association for Court Management initiated a study to
evaluate its goals, priorities, and services. From that work have come ten "core
competencies" for court managers. These core competencies include leadership
("Leadership is the energy behind every court system and court accomplishment."),
visioning and strategic planning ("Visions are holistic, inspirational future
snapshots."), court and community collaboration ("Understandable courts, skillful
community outreach, and informed public information improve court performance
and enhance public trust and confidence."), essential components ("Increasingly,
information is provided to the court by programs annexed to the court or the case
rather than by the parties to the litigation."), education, training and development
("Education, Training, and Development programs are aimed at judges, court staff-
especially those in and aspiring to leadership position-as well as others on whom the
court depends, both inside and outside the courts."). See NACM Profl. Dev. Advisory
Comm'n., Core Competency Curriculum Guidelines: History Overview and Future Uses,
18 COURT MANAGER, Fall 2003, at 6.
248. Many states now have administrative offices that work with the trial courts.
The affiliation between the local trial courts and their administrators, and those at the
state level varies from state to state. Also, the lawyers will "help citizens move through
the system." THE INITIAL REPORT OF THE PENNSYLVANIA FUTURES COMMISSION, supra note
152, at 24.
249. The Virginia Supreme Court, one of the early leaders in the court futures
movement, publishes a newsletter entitled, FUTURE VIEW: A NEWSLETTER OF TRENDS AND
ISSUES. This is one of the best examples of the continuing contribution to modern
sociological reform of the judicial system being made by state supreme court
administrative offices.
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court and part or all of that court's treatment team may be physically
located in the same place. The treatment community and the courts
will become mutually dependent upon each other-the treatment prov-
iders for patients and money, and the courts for the power and control
they derive from the political symbiosis. The flow of money is the key:
"Drug courts and treatment programs have a symbiotic relationship:
These days, with so much treatment funding flowing through the crim-
inal-justice system, it's fair to say that neither can long survive without
the other.'250 But the courts also offer another powerful inducement
for others to become involved in the work of the courts: immunity.
Because the courts are a branch of the sovereign state, judges are
immune from legal actions against them. As psychologists, educators,
mediators, court volunteers and others become part of the interdisci-
plinary work of the new judiciary they are receiving the same immu-
nity enjoyed by the state, for they become a part of the courts, and,
therefore, an arm of the state.
2 5 1
The new therapeutic courts equip the growing court bureaucracy
of judges and in-house administrators with the techniques of educa-
tors, psychologists, corrections officers, counselors and others in the
treatment community. All of these people, infused by the visions and
values of the judiciary, work together to modify behavior and achieve
social justice, but like the sound of many instruments they are orches-
trated by the judges.
I. The Ultimate Technocrats
As technology has advanced, so has the power of the judiciary.
While the reform literature continues to refer to lawyers and the need
to reeducate them in the social sciences,252 there is some question, as
250. Bob Curley, Drug Courts, Treatment Programs Seek Trust, Understanding, JOIN
TOGETHER, Sept. 5, 2003, http://www.jointogether.org/sa/news/features/print/0,
1856,566634,00.html.
251. See Nat Stern, Toward a Coherent Approach to Tort Immunity in Judicially
Mandated Family Court Services, 92 Ky. LJ. 373 (2003-04); Cassondra E. Joseph, The
Scope of Mediator Immunity: When Mediators Can Invoke Absolute Immunity, 12 OHIO
ST. J. ON Disp. RESOL. 629 (1997).
252. Wexler, supra note 168, at 287. Wexler advocates interdisciplinary courses on
therapeutic jurisprudence:
In fact, if therapeutic jurisprudence is to reach its objectives of
transcending academic lecture halls and influencing law reform and clinical
practice, we must constantly chip away at existing professional
provincialism, which often leads each profession to regard the other with
suspiciousness and . . antipathy. If today's law students are exposed to the
discipline of psychology ... [its] counterparts, . . . and the mental health
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we shall see later, whether they will be needed at all. The "traditional"
trial is becoming obsolete. 25 3 Reformers envision, and plans are now
underway, to create a virtual dispute resolution system using artificial
intelligence that will effectively eliminate lawyers.25 4 Activists under-
stand that the new court technology will be a seamless information
system, "married" to the information systems of the treatment commu-
nity to collect, analyze, and share vast amounts of personal data on
particular individuals and subgroups within society, all without the
need for lawyers.255 This is still some years away, but many lawyers
now practicing their profession will live to see these changes come to
pass. Developments in the field of artificial intelligence and
nanotechnology are the magic keys which will give people access
twenty-four hours a day to a "judge or other arbiter" to settle disputes
in the home, the workplace, the ball field, or any other place where
people may be. Plans are now being formulated to create systems of
artificial intelligence that use computer-generated, question-and-
answer templates that will permit individuals to access the new dispute
resolution system without the assistance of lawyers. This system, hav-
ing eliminated the gatekeeping role of lawyers, will allow people to
have answers to the problems of life at any time and from any location.
The Pennsylvania Futures Commission observed: "The vision of 2020
brings that access into the home with a judge or other arbiter being
professions there is every reason to believe that, as they take their places as
prominent practitioners, judges, legislators, and policymakers, they may be
receptive to thinking about the ideas . . . of ... therapeutic jurisprudence
scholars. In many ways, therefore, the best path to sensible law reform ...
may lie in exposing students . . .to effective interdisciplinary teaching.
Id.
253. See Paul D. Carrington, Virtual Civil Litigation: A Visit to John Bunyan's Celestial
City, in THE IMPROVEMENTS OF THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, supra note 75, at 477,
478, 486.
254. See RICHARD ZORZA, THE- SELF-HELP FRIENDLY COURTS: DESIGNED FROM THE
GROUND UP TO WORK FOR PEOPLE WITHOUT LAWYERS (2002); see generally PAMELA N.
GRAY, ARTIFICIAL LEGAL INTELLIGENCE (1997); see David Horrigan, Operating in Virtual
Reality, 9 L. & TECH. NEWS, May 2002, at 21 (reporting the first mock trial conducted
in virtual reality).
255. BUREAU OF JUSTICE ASSISTANCE, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, REPORT OF THE NATIONAL
TASK FORCE ON COURT AUTOMATION AND INTEGRATION 26, 38 (1999). See also THOMAS
MOYER & JACK HOLT, JR., THE CENTER FOR SUBSTANCE ABUSE, Judicial Coordination
With the Treatment Community, available at http://www.treatment.org/communique/
comm93/moyer.html (last visited May 8, 2007).
[Vol. 29:591672
82
Campbell Law Review, Vol. 29, Iss. 3 [2007], Art. 6
http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol29/iss3/6
REINVENTING THE COURTS
available through transmitted images-immediately and inter-
actively."
25 6
There are many questions not answered by state reports. From the
advancing nature of technology, one would expect that some human
involvement in the virtual dispute resolution system may be necessary
at first, either from lawyers or court employees; however, increasingly
complex mathematical techniques will replace much of the human
component that remains as computers will be able to mimic human
reasoning. Moreover, computer generated outcomes may begin as
merely advisory in nature, and finally evolve into binding solutions to
increasingly intimate, personal problems. Husbands and wives having
an argument in the privacy of their bedroom will be able to engage the
virtual dispute resolution system on their computer, and one of them
will find an ally there.
Bureaucratization coupled with the tools of modern science pro-
duces an unbeatable combination that makes the new judiciary
extraordinarily powerful and resistant to change. The people and the
representative branches of state government are now unable to change
the judiciary by changing the judges. The therapeutic approach -
including visioning, propagating values, trends analysis, strategic plan-
ning, and the therapeutic modification of people and communities-
has been bureaucratized. 25 7 The answer to behaviorism's problem of
"uncoordinated change" can be found in the form of court technocrats
on the bench or working in the back offices of the courthouse. By
merging many new experts and volunteers into the judicial setting,
coupled with advanced information technology, the power of the judi-
ciary relative to the executive and legislative branches as well as ordi-
nary citizens is being greatly enhanced.
Giving judges the techniques of modern science is like giving per-
formance-enhancing drugs to professional athletes. Their power is
already great, and will become greater still. But in the name of effi-
ciency and saving money, the techniques of the social sciences and
sophisticated information technology will be granted to the judges,
and the people will be happy because of it.
256. THE INITIAL REPORT OF THE PENNSYLVANIA FUTURES COMMISSION, supra note 152,
at 24. The Pennsylvania Futures Commission now functions as a non-profit
corporation but was created and did its initial work under the auspices of the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court.
257. The administrative offices of the courts present a "secure niche" where the
visioning process can reside. See SCHULTZ, supra note 159, at 59.
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IV. COURTS AND THEIR COMMUNITIES
The reader may consider all of this an impossible task for the judi-
ciary, and no threat to individual liberty or to representative govern-
ment. Except for the broad effect of propaganda, the courts cannot
apply sufficient rewards and punishments to shape new behaviors one
person at a time; the effort and expense of medicating, reeducating,
and physically altering large numbers of people would be a practical
impossibility. Even allowing for the expanded use of house arrest,
reeducation, and the physical partitioning of society through the use of
the Personal Location Device, Global Positioning Satellites, and Reen-
try Courts, the task of modifying people one at a time seems beyond
the reach of the reformers.
A. The Community as a Skinner Box
The community, however, is the human equivalent of the Skinner
Box, delivering both rewards and punishments to individuals and
groups. If the courts can find some way to realign the attitude of the
greater court community toward new judicial values and community
initiatives, then they have the potential to engineer the behavior of the
entire community in a way that puts pressure on specific individuals
in lieu of, or in addition to the application of force by a judge. In other
words, if the judges can capture the hearts and minds of community
leaders, then the courts have the potential to shape the behavior of
everyone in the community, and no longer have to act on isolated indi-
viduals involved in litigation.
In 2000, the Conference of Chief Justices and the Conference of
State Court Administrators adopted a joint resolution supporting the
therapeutic work of the courts, and in 2001, the governing body of the
American Bar Association also passed a similar resolution that "over
the long haul, just might have far more profound implications for the
American legal system" than the more widely publicized amendments
to the rules of ethics governing lawyers. Other powerful organizations
such as the American Judicature Society, the State Justice Institute, and
the National Center for State Courts are also working to bring about
the transformation of the judiciary.2 5 8 In July 2004, the Conference of
258. The Therapeutic Justice Task Force came about in 1999 as a result of the
Position Paper on Therapeutic Courts prepared by the COSCA Policy Committee. The
joint resolution was prepared by a Task Force on Therapeutic Justice of the Conference
of Chief Justices in Rapid City, South Dakota. See National Center for State Courts,
Therapeutic Justice Task Force Established, CENTER COURT, Fall/Winter 1999, at 5; see
also Conference of Chief Justices & Conference of State Court Administrators, CCJ
Resolution 22, COSCA Resolution IV, available at http://cosca.ncsc.dni.us/Resolutions/
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Chief Justices and the Conference of State Court Administrators
adopted a resolution calling for the creation of at least one demonstra-
tion project in each state to serve as judicial "laboratory" for the appli-
cation of therapeutic principles in "traditional" courts. 25 9 In other
words, the therapeutic, problem-solving approach is about to become
universal, with its transformative potential available to judges in gen-
eral jurisdiction courts. Decisions have been made by people with the
political power to bring their plans to fruition, as we have already wit-
nessed in the changes presently taking place.
Most importantly, the courts have created initiatives to expand
their sphere of influence in the community. The courts' extraordinary
interest in the "community" is due to the concept of community, which
is groups of individuals associated by common interests or by geo-
graphic location outside the existing justice system.2 60 Actions which
take place within the existing community can have a profound influ-
ence upon the behavior of individuals. Problems within the family can
result in problems in school, at work, or in other areas of life; health
problems, such as obesity and anorexia may be attributed to the over-
all health of the family. This has led court futures commissions and
planners to begin focusing court reform efforts on the events taking
place within the greater community. As the Pennsylvania Futures Com-
mission advocated: "Indeed, the task group consistently emphasized
that a more peaceful future is reliant on actions outside of existing
criminal justice practices," and, similarly, dispute resolution in 2020
"begins at home."' 261 Court reform must include an understanding of
and involvement with the "human environment" which exists outside
CourtAdmin/resolutionproblemsolvingcts.html (last visited May 19, 2007)
(containing a Joint Resolution in Favor of Problem Solving Courts); see Greg Berman
& John Feinblatt, Beyond Process and Precedent: The Rise of Problem Solving Courts, 41
THE JUDGES' JOURNAL, Winter 2002, at 5 (containing a discussion of the ABA's
resolution and the effort to change the role of the courts).
259. See Conference of Chief Justices & Conference of State Court Administrators,
supra note 258.
260. See JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF CAL. ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE COURTS, SPECIAL TASK
FORCE ON COURT/COMMUNITY OUTREACH, DIALOGUE: COURTS REACHING OUT TO THEIR
COMMUNITIES, A HANDBOOK FOR CREATING AND ENHANCING COURT AND COMMUNITY
COLLABORATION § 1-3 (1999) [hereinafter SPECIAL TASK FORCE ON COURT/COMMUNITY
OUTREACH].
261. THE INITIAL REPORT OF THE PENNSYLVANIA FUTURES COMMISSION, supra note 152,
at 24. See Felice Kirby, Michael Clark, & Tim Wall, Needed: A Community Experiment
in Problem-Oriented Justice, 20 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 431 (1993). The authors advocate a
community-oriented justice system: "The discovery is being made that courts need not,
should not and ultimately cannot be laboratories of justice, removed from popular
concerns. They should take into account neighborhood viewpoints and socioeconomic
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the traditional court setting. New initiatives called "Judicial Outreach"
and "Court and Community Collaboration" essentially merge the ther-
apeutic judiciary with the extended community, and the community is
the human equivalent of the Skinner Box, the human environment.
Court and community collaboration is moving judges out into the
community, and bringing the community into the courts. 26 2
It is important for the courts to become a part of the community
rather than separated from it because the very concept of community,
as known in the past, includes some and excludes others. As one sup-
porter of reform put it: 'But the still greater danger is that no matter
how many "communities" any individual is allowed to belong to, every
such community identification has to have an outside in order to
define the inside, and so any use of the term must exclude and not
always harmlessly.'2 63 Egalitarian theories of justice do not permit any
undeserved exclusions or inequalities. Nor do activists intend to leave
communities alone to provide "social control" for themselves apart
from the formal legal system.264 Consequently, the judges are becom-
ing the common denominator of a new large-scale concept of utopian
community. They possess the moral authority to propagate the values
for the entire community, redistribute wealth and political power, pro-
vide common meaning to life for individuals and subgroups in the
realities, just as cops on the beat learn to deal with crime in the context of
communities." Id. at 432-33.
262. A massive how-to manual was prepared by the California Judicial Council
using a grant provided by the State Justice Institute. See SPECIAL TASK FORCE ON
COURT/COMMUNITY OUTREACH, supra note 258.
263. Robert Weisberg, The Practice of Restorative Justice: Restoring Justice and the
Danger of Community, 2003 UTAH L. REV. 343, 348 (2003).
264. See Zachary Rothenberg, The Symbiotic Circle of Community: A Comparative
Investigation of Deviance Control in Intentional Communities, 35 U. WEST. L.A. L. REV.
62 (2003). Rothenberg sums up his conclusions about the need for formal
intervention within intentional communities to protect members:
We have seen how ... these communities forge unique identities, attract
membership, and control deviance within their communities, they also can
potentially jeopardize the individual rights and integrity of their members.
Where there are strong affective, moral, and instrumental barriers, and where
members are not sufficiently able either to monitor their own rights or to
secure external assistance in seeking redress, there is great reason for
concern. Thus it is our responsibility, formally as government and
informally as a nationwide community bound by a collective ideology and
national conception of rights, to balance communities' needs for autonomy
and independence with community members' individual rights.
Id. at 127.
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community, and the political power to enforce their values against all
segments of the community.265
B. Community-Focused Court Planning
The imposing, how-to manual published by the California Judicial
Council entitled, Dialogue: Courts Reaching Out to Their Communi-
ties, 26 6 is a product of the SJI-funded Community-Focused Develop-
ment Initiative, and a guide for community-focused court planning. It
contains specific instructions for courts across the nation to expand
the judicial power through the personal involvement of judges or court
staff in the community. Judicial activists see the courts as "reviving
sense of community" in order to "address the feeling of alienation, dis-
enfranchisement, disconnection, and isolation experienced by many
people in society. '2 6 7 They are developing communities and constitu-
encies by "empowering individuals and organizations," "building com-
munity as an interconnected whole," "maximizing results by
coordinating individual efforts," and "recognizing and calling on lead-
ership from all parts of the community. '' 268 The egalitarian and author-
itarian nature of the judicial agenda is expressed throughout the
manual. For instance, "[a]ll success in improving the quality of life
rests on the principal of empowering individuals and organizations
and developing their sense of ownership and responsibility for the
community. The community will not thrive unless its citizens feel they
own it. ' '2 6 9 Moreover, "[piroblems must be seen as an interconnected
whole that can be addressed only as a whole, with an emphasis on
community building. Successful community building connects local
initiatives and power to centralized structures at the metropolitan,
regional, and national levels."27° Courts become the indispensable
component of the new utopian community, combining the necessary
hierarchy of authority with the new therapeutic values and techniques
of the judiciary. One of the primary benefits of court and community
collaboration is that it "[c]reates a unique vehicle for addressing local
problems, combining the teeth of court sanctions with the power of
265. See, e.g. DAVID ROTrMAN, HILLERY S. EFKEMAN & PAMELA CASEY, NATIONAL
CENTER FOR STATE COURTS, A GUIDE TO COURT AND COMMUNITY COLLABORATION (1998);
see also MARGOT C. LINDSAY, THE CENTER FOR COMMUNITY CONNECTIONS, CREATING THE
COMMUNITY CONNECTION-AND A CONSTITUENCY IN THE PROCESS (2002).
266. SPECIAL TASK FORCE ON COURT/COMMUNITY OUTREACH, supra note 260, at §1-3.
267. Id.
268. Id. at § 1-4.
269. Id.
270. Id.
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community networks to forge more effective forms of treatment and
social service delivery. "271
The concepts contained in the manual may have some language
derived by planners working through conferences conducted by the
California Judicial Council. Some of the content, however, was pre-
pared by staff members working for the National Center for State
Courts. In 1998, during the planning stage for the Community-
Focused Development Initiative, David B. Rottman, Pamela Casey, and
Hillery Efkeman, employees of the National Center for State Courts,
wrote a discussion paper entitled, "Court and Community Collabora-
tion: Ends and Means, "272 elaborating on the conceptual framework
for community-focused court planning. The authors deemed the entry
of the courts into the community setting as necessary for the attain-
ment of "therapeutic outcomes for individuals and communities. 273
By expanding options and directing attention to those procedures and
options that result in positive, therapeutic impact on communities,
courts can reconstitute communities through the threat of force
directed at deviant behavior by individuals or groups within the com-
munity, or by inadequate government services: "Communities gain a
unique vehicle for addressing local problems, combining the teeth of
court sanctions with the power of community networks and knowl-
edge."'274 Community coalitions gain a "unique partner" to compre-
hensively improve local conditions through collaboration with the
courts. "Community-initiated and community-based treatment and
social service programs benefit from collaboration with the court. The
courts can combine the incentive of rehabilitation with the threat of
sanctions for non-participation or non-compliance. 275 Consequently,
the combination of the power of the courts and the communities
allows them to achieve the mission of court and community collabora-
tion which is to "improve the administration of justice so as to produce
better outcomes, results, and impacts for individual[s], communities,
271. Id. at § 1-5.
272. DAVID B. ROTTMAN, PAMELA CASEY & HILLERY EFKERMAN, CALIFORNIA COURT AND
COMMUNITY COLLABORATION PROJECT, COURT AND COMMUNITY COLLABORATION: ENDS
AND MEANS (1998), available at http://www.courtinfo.ca.gov/programs/community/
endsmeans.htm (last visited May 19, 2007) (containing excerpts of the original
document prepared by the authors).
273. Id.
274. Id.
275. Id.
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and society at large. 276 Courts, it is said, cannot deliver effective jus-
tice working alone.277
C. Creating Community
The concepts of courts and their communities are becoming
synonymous as the transition to the therapeutic paradigm takes hold.
If community can be broadly defined as "common ground," then the
judiciary's imaginative use of community propaganda and coercive
techniques of alternative dispute resolution which feign "dialogue" to
produce areas of agreement between parties or groups in conflict is
tantamount to the creation of community.278
There are two aspects to this. Court and community collaboration
brings judges and community groups together through open invita-
tions from the local judge and court staff attending meetings for the
purpose of obtaining feedback from the community, subsequently
published in detailed strategic court plans for each community. Such
plans are based, in part, upon the needs and concerns expressed to the
judges and court staff in the meetings, provided that those concerns
are consistent with the overall state plan for the judiciary. This process
is most advanced in California where dozens of detailed plans have
been prepared by local courts for their communities, but it is rapidly
spreading to other states. Quality varies considerably; some court
plans are thin and unprofessional in appearance, but others are beauti-
fully bound volumes containing the latest demographic and sociologi-
cal information on the community.
Courts, however, also establish community through the therapeu-
tic work of judges in individual cases. By the expanding use of thera-
peutic techniques applied to individual litigants in the course of what
is universally called Alternative Dispute Resolution (which takes place
in the "shadow" of the courts), the implied threat of the trial court,
with its complex processes and potentially catastrophic outcomes, sub-
tly coerces "common ground" or "agreement" between litigants and, in
the process, creates "community." Transformational mediation, collab-
orative divorce and similar techniques annexed to the judiciary all
strive to create common ground for a fragmented society, because
276. Id.
277. Id.
278. Consider this statement as a technique of coercing agreement on the pretext of
healing the parties: "In essence, transformative mediators try, gently but firmly, to
help the principals in a dispute responsibly exercise their decision-making authority."
John Lande, How Will Lawyering and Mediation Practices Transform Each Other?, 24
FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 839, 860 (1997).
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agreements produced by therapeutic techniques are ideologically pre-
determined to represent an equality of outcomes, or what is called a
"win-win-win" solution for both parties and the broader community.
Courts are obviously changing, and dramatically so, but they will
not be going away. The judiciary's brand of violence, the "teeth" within
the community, is necessary for success in the area of social transfor-
mation. But thanks to the courts, the result is the prospect of a com-
mon future which is more peaceful and just for all people and
subgroups, and, consequently, more to the liking of everybody. Thus,
we see literature promoting more efficient "traditional" courts, and a
parallel stream of literature promoting alternative, culturally-appropri-
ate, and "peacemaking" methods of dispute resolution.2 79
Court propaganda markets the "court and community" initiative
as a "partnership" to restore the human side of the judicial system lost
in the earlier quest for judicial efficiency. The courts and their commu-
nities will "work collaboratively to solve some of the critical issues fac-
ing their respective jurisdictions. "2' 0 But the so-called partnership
proposed by the judiciary is only an illusion. The other institutions of
the community-the family, church, schools, civic groups, recreational
and professional organizations, and special interests-still exist, but
they increasingly revolve around and are subsumed into the therapeu-
tic judiciary.
Court and community collaboration is a radical departure from
the judicial power bestowed upon the courts by state constitutions.
The work of the courts in the new setting continues to revolve around
the work of judges. They gain substantial power by creating partner-
ships and working arrangement with individuals and groups in the
community. Since it is not based upon any legal foundation, court and
community collaboration can only be understood as an exercise in the
growing political power of the courts. They engage in such activities
without anyone ever asking them to identify or explain the authority by
which they do so. Why do they do it? They do it for one reason-
because they can-because there is no one who can or will stop them.
More importantly, however, they do it as means of achieving the prede-
termined end of expanding the power of the judiciary as it relates to
the other branches of government. It induces people to rely on the
279. Considerable space is dedicated in scholarly literature to alternative processes
for "peacemaking," drawing from examples of primitive cultures to new problem-
solving courts. See, e.g., David B. Rottman & Pamela Casey, Therapeutic Jurisprudence
Forum: A Response to Scheff: Don't Write-off the Courts, 67 REV. JUR. U.P.R_ 653 (1998).
280. Hillery S. Efkeman & David B. Rottman, Community-Focused Courts: Progress
on a Development Initiative, STATE COURT JOURNAL, Winter 1996-97, at 10.
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courts to meet their needs, at least in conjunction with, if not in lieu of
their elected representatives. The Judicial Leadership Scenario, the
most popular scenario presented to delegates at The Future and the
Courts Conference in 1990, contains a lengthy description of the
change of judicial function within the community thirty years into the
future. For example:
The courts increasingly were the place where Americans turned for
leadership and direction. And the courts responded. The trend toward
judicial activism (whether in support of "liberal," "conservative," or
ideologically neutral positions) which was apparent at the federal level
from the 1950s onward came to characterize more and more state judi-
ciaries from the 1980s to the present.... The courts became active and
accepted leadership because they were able and willing to do so.
Decades of court reform paid off and the professionalization of the
judiciary set the stage for this new leadership. By removing the courts
from the vicissitudes of political fighting, funding, and favoritism,
without removing them from democratic accountability, and by giving
judges a secure but responsible tenure of office, judges were able to do
what neither elected politicians nor faceless bureaucrats could do as
well: to render judgment-to make the hard decisions, to exercise lead-
ership, and yet to create inspiring visions of preferred futures beyond
the important, but distracting, problems of the present.28'
Court and Community Collaboration and the related activity of
Judicial Outreach are both designed to change the judiciary's position
in government as reflected in the Judicial Leadership scenario. Both
initiatives are purely, overtly, and hopelessly political. Both directly
contradict every claim being made today by the judiciary and legal
organizations which insist that politics has no place in the judiciary.
D. Judicial Outreach as Propaganda
Court and Community Collaboration and Judicial Outreach epito-
mize propaganda. They were developed out of identifiable actions by
high-ranking members of the judiciary and court administrators who
set out to change the courts' power and position in government by
creating supportive political constituencies. Federal tax dollars pro-
vided by the State Justice Institute to the Conference of Chief Justices,
the Conference of State Court Administrators and the National Center
for State Courts were used to publish a how-to booklet in 1995 detail-
ing methods for the courts to begin building political constituencies.
In 1993 the CCJ and COSCA formed the National Courts and Commu-
nity Advisory Committee chaired by former Chief Justice Lyle Reid of
281. ALTERNATIVE FUTURES FOR THE STATE COURTS OF 2020, supra note 110, at 8.
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Tennessee and Mary Campbell McQueen, Administrative Director of
the Courts of the State of Washington to "suggest practical ways courts
could reach out to citizens for help and support." That Committee pub-
lished the booklet entitled, Citizens and their Courts: Building a Public
Constituency.282 "The purpose of fostering a court constituency,"
observed the Committee, "is to develop groups of individuals who are
both knowledgeable about the court's purpose and function and com-
mitted to ensuring that courts receive the support they need to carry
out their vital, constitutional role."' 28 3 "Unlike the other two branches
of government, the judiciary has no general public constituency,"
argued the Committee.284 Consequently, "[fror the dual reasons of
public confidence and court needs, the building of such a constituency
is critical to the court's survival. ' 28 5 Moreover, "[t]he most effective
way to create such a constituency is to invite citizens to become
directly involved in court processes, as volunteers or advisors. Once
the citizens understand the role played by the courts, they are able to
speak on behalf of the court's interest. ' 28 6 The Committee went on to
examine four examples, including the Tennessee Futures Commission,
of interactive approaches by the courts toward the community, sug-
gesting ways in which all states could create supportive commissions,
committees, and volunteers to work with and for the courts.
Furthering the goal of creating political constituents for the
courts, the American Bar Association published a popular instruc-
tional manual entitled, Judicial Outreach on a Shoestring: A Working
Manual.287 This manual provides examples of a wide range of commu-
nity activities available to judges. "This book is about judicial outreach
programs. That term, as used herein, refers to planned efforts under-
taken by judges to inform the broader community about the work of
the courts in our society," notes the author, Richard Fruin, former
chair of the ABA's judicial division.288 In some respects judicial out-
reach is not unlike the outreach ministry of evangelical churches,
except it attempts to achieve undisclosed results through indirect
means. Judges are encouraged to arrange speaking engagements or
other forms of community interaction in a variety of settings with a
282. CITIZENS AND THEIR COURTS, supra note 156, at 1.
283. Id. at 4.
284. Id.
285. Id.
286. Id.
287. RICHARD FRUIN, AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, JUDICIAL OUTREACH ON A
SHOESTRING: A WORKING MANUAL (1999).
288. Id. at xvii.
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variety of people. A recent feature of judicial outreach is the creation of
formal speaker's bureaus accessible through court web sites, making
judges available to speak on a variety of topics. 2 9
There are ulterior motives at work in such activities. Judges may
speak on discrimination in the workplace, judicial protection of rights,
drunk driving or many other currently-popular topics. But the hidden
goal is not to have listeners remember any of the specifics of the issues
being addressed by the judge, but rather to have them leave the session
with a changed view toward the judge in particular and the judicial
branch as a whole. It is the duplicitous nature of judicial outreach
which makes it a form of technique we know as propaganda. Obvi-
ously, many judges have addressed many groups over the centuries,
but there is no deception involved when judges accept invitations to
speak on whatever topic they choose, and especially about the law. But
Judicial Outreach is altogether different. It is technique, an organized
attempt to change the attitude of individuals and the community
toward the judiciary through misdirection. Judges use facts about
whatever topic they are speaking on, but they use those facts to achieve
an undisclosed objective-the modification of the beliefs and opinions
of the public about the judiciary.
Court and community collaboration and all of its offshoots,
including community focused court planning, judicial outreach, and
other types of judicial activity are cunning efforts to build a political
base for court activities. They have no legal basis whatsoever, and, con-
sequently, must be supported in another way. Because the law no
longer supports them, judges must turn to the people for the political
power they need. In so doing, they redefine the constitutional judicial
power to include patently political activity designed to affect a realign-
ment of government-a realignment that puts the courts in a position
of leadership sometime in the twenty-first century. Their own plans
tell us so.
E. Preventing Antisocial Behavior
The courts, activists argue, should become proactive. If they con-
tinue to wait as they have in the past until a lawsuit is filed, they will
have waited too late. People who enjoyed the popular motion picture,
Minority Report, will be pleased to know that the same techniques
which allow the judiciary to delve into the mental processes resulting
289. See, e.g., King County Superior Court, Speaker's Bureau, http://www.metrokc.
gov/kcsc/speakersbureau.htm (last visited April 6, 2007); Nineteenth Judicial Circuit
of Lake County, Illinois, Judicial Speakers Bureau, http://www.19thcircuitcourt.state.
il.us/bkshelf/speakers/speak toc.htm (last visited April 6, 2007).
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in conflict also offer courts the ability to predict which people in soci-
ety are likely to become involved in antisocial behavior and conflict.
Consequently, the courts can begin to prevent conflicts and thereby
prevent the lawsuits which follow. 290 There will be, however, no need
for grotesque precognitives whose brains were hard-wired to police
computers to capture the scenes of future crimes. Rather, the heroes of
the Preventive Law Movement are neatly-dressed professionals inter-
preting statistical data on individuals and subgroups. They reach out
to their communities in multiple, transformative ways. Presently, pre-
ventive law consists of the belief among activists that therapeutic judi-
cial processes solve the underlying social and psychological problems
causing conflict, and stop the "revolving door" by which the same peo-
ple enter the "traditional" system repeatedly.
But court futures commissions foresee other methods of preven-
tive law. By taking a statistically-based approach, courts will be able to
identify people who are at-risk for antisocial behavior through the col-
lection and analysis of sociological and psychological data. After iden-
tification, courts can begin to address individual and community
needs, thwarting future involvement in civil conflict or crime. 291
The courts' self-proclaimed mandate to advance social justice and
heal people physically and psychologically requires that judges no
longer wait for lawsuits to be filed or quit working once a judgment
has been entered. The courts must be involved in society at the stage
290. Participants in the futures planning process are guided by futurists and court
leaders toward certain beliefs about the changing role of the new judicial system, part
of which involves litigation prevention strategies for the courts. See ENVISIONING
JUSTICE, supra note 48.
5. Litigation Prevention Strategies from the Courts
Definition:
Traditionally, courts have looked only at determining guilt or innocence in
actual cases and controversies brought before them. However, over the years,
whether from a liberal, conservative, or other ideology, courts have felt the
need to look into the causes of crime or controversy, and ways to reduce or
eliminate crime or controversy from ever happening. ...
Possibilities for Courts:
Assume that increased follow-through on cases leads to increased use of
judicial authority to oversee or enforce the regulations on many social issues.
Examples include housing programs for the homeless, job training for welfare
fraud cases, and nonpunitive rehabilitation programs for drug users. Some
courts prosecute state legislatures or executive agencies for not following
through with court-ordered changes. Judicial doctrine shifts, giving more
weight to community "rights."
Id. at 107.
291. See, e.g., To SERVE ALL PEOPLE, supra note 138, at 52.
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when potential conflicts are first developing and continue working
through the therapeutic efforts of social workers, psychologists,
churches, civic groups, and the police long after a final decision has
been rendered. Social justice requires contirual monitoring of individ-
uals and subgroups, making periodic adjustments so that undeserved
inequalities and mental problems do not exist. Periodic community
meetings, environmental scans, trends analysis, and demographic
profiles are some of the ways courts now monitor local and national
changes in an effort to anticipate and plan for approaching problems.
These materials may be brief and focused on a single court community
or consist of large volumes of information with the latest events and
trends for judicial leaders everywhere to consider. Also, continuing
education programs are focusing in part of future legal issues permit-
ting groups of judges at the national, state, and local levels to antici-
pate and plan for the appropriate judicial response.
The community is the environment of every person from birth
until death. As envisioned by the Pennsylvania Futures Commission
the role of the community in the expanded justice system will bring in
the "whole community," and is all-encompassing since it has both pre-
ventive and restorative features applicable to all of life. Therefore, state-
ments that "emphasis on prevention and rehabilitation will exist side-
by-side with greater attention given to community safety, considera-
tion for victims and intervention at the earliest possible time," describe
a system which will "apply a series of interventions with prison as only
one part of a continuum of approaches developed to deal with socially
harmful behavior." '292 But the series of interventions that form a con-
tinuum of approaches is undefined in the sense that no particular
forms, processes, or limits are specified by the Commission. This is a
system that will steadily expand to respond from cradle to grave to
sociological needs or to deviations in behavior which judges define as
normal. Justice as so conceived has ceased to be about the discovery
and recognition of wrongdoing or fault, a view premised on the moral
responsibility of each individual, and has become a life-long battle
against the interpersonal forces of ignorance, illness, and inequality.
The conversion of law into therapy portends the indefinite expansion
of application. As psychologist Thomas Szasz observed:
The difficulties and problems of living are considered psychiatric dis-
eases, and everyone (but the diagnosticians) is considered mentally ill.
Indeed, it is no exaggeration to say that life itself is now viewed as an
illness that begins with conception and ends with death, requiring...
292. THE INITIAL REPORT OF THE PENNSYLVANIA FUTURES COMMISSION, supra note 152,
at 31.
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the skillful assistance of physicians and mental health
professionals.
2 93
The "risk factors" that may contribute to antisocial behavior may
be identified by the courts using sociological and psychological meth-
ods at any point in a person's life. Statistical methods may show, for
example, that children of divorced parents involved in juvenile difficul-
ties are "at risk" for more serious forms of future behavior.2 9 4 Because
of the possible statistical correlations between a multitude of environ-
mental factors and antisocial behavior, there are literally no limits for
the series of interventions potentially available to therapeutic courts,
all for the good of the individual and the community. The Pennsylvania
Futures Commission recommended the implementation of "more
sophisticated methods of assessing risk and protective factors," and the
development and integration into the justice system of a "wide range of
programs dealing with antisocial behavior, including victim-offender
mediation, pretrial diversion, referral for treatment, community ser-
vice centers and day treatment centers." The Commission thought its
vision to be a significant improvement over the present system: "The
vision is simple yet profound. Justice in the year 2020 will serve to
protect the community by engaging in prevention and rehabilitation
activities as well as punishment. "295 Behaviorism manipulates the
human environment by propagating values (supposedly the product of
science), through a continuum of rewards and punishments, or by
other modifications such as medication for mental illness or drug
addiction, all for the prevention and correction of aberrant behavior.
F. The Therapeutic State
To the intellectuals who began the drive to create a new form of
government in the 1960s, this reorientation represents not the Welfare
State, but the "Service State" which accepts "human conservation as
the basic democratic task" by embracing social services of all kinds
"plus the improved care and support of the indigent, the handicapped,
the impaired, and all others incapable of fending for themselves in our
money economy. '2 96 Human conservation depends upon the redistri-
bution of wealth and power by the state, and the courts have become a
293. THOMAS S. SZASz, IDEOLOGY AND INSANITY: ESSAYS ON THE PSYCHIATRIC
DEHUMANIZATION OF MAN 4 (1970).
294. To SERVE ALL PEOPLE, supra note 138, at 52.
295. THE INITIAL REPORT OF THE PENNSYLVANIA FUTURES COMMISSION, supra note 152,
at 32.
296. Lawrence K. Frank, The Need for a New Political Theory, in TOWARD THE YEAR
2000, supra note 11. These subgroups are those which have succeeded in labeling
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means by which individuals engage directly in the redistribution of
material wealth and political power.297
Rules of law are not necessarily important to the outcome in ther-
apeutic settings, but are primarily important as a means of giving
courts "coercive" power over people who come under court supervi-
sion. This does not mean that laws or courts will be going away. To the
contrary, laws will continue to proliferate, but their main effect will be
to expand the number of possible ways in which courts, using thera-
peutic options, gain the ability to create people of good character
where other informal institutions have failed. The result has not been
the creation of the Service State, but what Thomas Szasz called "The
Therapeutic State. 298 Court therapy is the domain of court techno-
crats and experts who progressively apply technique to all aspects of
life.299 In retrospect, this turn in the judiciary may not seem surprising
since psychology, like law and religion, is concerned with the way peo-
ple live.3° ° Intellectuals effectively excluded religion from the law in the
nineteenth century. But even the positivist concept of law as rule was
offensive to the counter culture, leaving only the false appeal to science
as a justification for law. The claim of obedience to empirical facts is
deception. The postmodern judiciary is acting in the name of science
to achieve arbitrary, ideological outcomes in the form of changed
lifestyles.
This is extraordinarily dangerous. 30 ' The understanding of the
judicial role that has prevailed since the Founding Era is overthrown
by judicial activism. The contrast between the federal judiciary and the
popular branches of government described by Alexander Hamilton
reflects a belief in the separation of powers also applicable to state
governments:
[T]he judiciary, from the nature of its functions, will always be the
least dangerous to the political rights of the Constitution; because it
themselves (or being labeled) as victims. They form "natural constituencies" for the
courts.
297. See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (Belknap Press 1999) (1971).
298. Szasz was primarily concerned about the ideology underlying the profession of
psychology, and the manifestations of that ideology on the treatment of people with
mental illnesses. But his observations are also relevant to the therapeutic work of the
courts. See SzAsz, supra note 293; see also THOMAS SzASz, THE THERAPEUTIC STATE:
PSYCHIATRY IN THE MIRROR OF CURRENT EVENTS (1984).
299. See JACQUES ELLUL, THE TECHNOLOGICAL SOCIETY (1973).
300. SzASz, supra note 293, at 21.
301. See Morris B. Hoffman, Therapeutic Jurisprudence, Neo-Rehabilitation, and
Judicial Collectivism: The Least Dangerous Branch becomes Most Dangerous, 29 FORDHAM
URB. L.J. 2063 (2002).
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will be least in a capacity to annoy or injure them. The Executive not
only dispenses the honours, but holds the sword of the community.
The legislature not only commands the purse, but prescribes the rules
by which the duties and rights of every citizen are to be regulated. The
judiciary, on the contrary, has no influence over either the sword or
the purse; no direction either of the strength or of the wealth of the
society; and can take no active resolution whatever. It may truly be said
to have neither FORCE nor WILL, but merely judgment; and must ulti-
mately depend upon the aid of the executive arm even for the efficacy
of its judgments.3 "2
Clearly, the courts have acquired a force and will of their own, and are
increasingly able to direct both the strength and wealth of society in
ways that they desire. In part, the judiciary's power stems from the
respect it acquired in the early years of the nation's history as inter-
preter of the law, and its perceived political impartiality, both of which
have been betrayed by unrestrained activism. It is precisely for this rea-
son that the various techniques of social control we now know as ther-
apeutic jurisprudence are described by activists as "vectors," a term
borrowed from the laws of physics applicable to objects in motion hav-
ing both force and direction.3 °3 A vector is more than an abstract con-
cept; it is a particular action that leads to concrete reality, a synthesis
of belief and application. Like the movement and interaction of pool
balls on the table, each therapeutic technique has a weight, velocity
and direction that causes other interactions in society. Ultimately,
however, they can all be traced back to the judge holding the queue
stick. But it is not the same stick once held by judges; rather, it is a
new, multidimensional stick incorporating into one set of hands the
techniques of sociology, psychology, economics, education and other
disciplines capable of controlling people in profound ways. The previ-
ously fragmented techniques of the social sciences-techniques which,
standing alone, had the ability to control people-are gaining new
strength insofar as they are being fashioned by the judiciary into what
is now called "law." As Jacques Ellul so accurately observed, "Applica-
tion of law no longer arises from popular adhesion to it but from the
complex of mechanisms which, by means of artifice and reason, adjust
behavior to rule." This can be applied in a "perfectly mechanical" way:
302. THE FEDERALIST No. 78 (Alexander Hamilton).
303. See Susan Daicoff, Law as a Healing Profession: The "Comprehensive Law
Movement," 6 PEPP. Disp. RESOL. LJ. 1 (2006) (discussing the converging vectors of the
Comprehensive Law Movement).
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"It does not call for a philosopher or a man with a sense of justice.
What is needed is a good technician. "304
By focusing on the underlying sociological and psychological
causes of conflict rather than on rules of law and by treating the law as
an instrument for directing change in society, the courts are position-
ing themselves as the final arbiters, not of the Constitution nor of law
generally, but of which people and subgroups in society will wax and
wane at any point in history. The process is being executed in ways
that make everybody feel good. As courts modify individuals and sub-
groups, the composition and values of the community change. In this
respect, courts have a number of advantages over the other branches of
government: (1) they are the constitutional repository of the vaguely
defined judicial power which permits the courts to redefine the judi-
cial power; (2) they are the point at which state power is applied to the
individual; (3) judges typically serve much longer terms than mem-
bers of the executive and legislative branches, insulating them in most
instances from adverse public opinion; (4) the courts are essentially
unchecked by the popular branches of government; and (5) conflict in
some form is universal and inexhaustible.
V. THE VANISHING TRIAL: ENHANCING ACCESS TO JUSTICE OR
FACILITATING JUDGES' ACCESS TO PEOPLE?
Many people, especially those who see the need for some kind of
court reform but do not distinguish these reforms from those needed
to diminish judicial influence, will consider deconstructing the old
judicial system and eliminating lawyers to be a good thing. After all,
lawyers are widely believed to be at the heart of the problems
presented by the postmodern judiciary.30 5 They are often criticized for
initiating vexatious lawsuits resulting in controversial court deci-
sions.3 °6 Without intending to imply the absence of problems with
304. ELLUL, supra note 299, at 294.
305. See, e.g., CATHERINE CRIER, THE CASE AGAINST LAWYERS (2002). Crier
successfully illustrates many of the problems, but also takes the pragmatic approach to
their solution while neglecting the weighty reasons or retaining the traditional
advocate's role.
306. Judge W. Neal Thomas III, No Need for Reform, CHArANOOGA TIMES FREE PRESS,
Nov. 23, 2000, at H1.
For at least the past decade, the American judicial system has been
roundly criticized ... The arguments to support that criticism are myths.
Let me start with the myth that lawyers are responsible for the woes of
this world. Lawyers don't make the law. Legislators and judges make the law.
Juries apply the law to the facts of the case to reach a verdict. Lawyers are the
only players in a trial who do not participate ... in deciding the case.
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designer litigation, aggressive advertising, and other problematic con-
duct, judicial activists have taken advantage of this vague antagonism
toward lawyers in general by claiming that the activists, and not ordi-
nary citizens or legislators, have the answer. Their answer is not to
decrease, but to expand the intervention of the judiciary in the lives of
all people, but to do so in new and subtle ways that make it look
appealing. Indeed, the reformers claim that they desire to increase
"access" to the judiciary to make the system more fair, more just, and
more responsive to the needs of the poor and middle-class citizens who
find litigation complex and very expensive.3 °7 They want to give those
who are unempowered the same advantages of the formal dispute reso-
lution system enjoyed by the rich. This has great appeal, but there is
more to this than meets the eye.
A. Access to Justice
Presupposing courts that function with a judge and lawyers in a
courtroom, one might think that access to justice is access to a deci-
sion based upon the resolution of disputed issues of fact and the appli-
cation of rules of law to those facts, but it is coming to mean much
more. Access to justice, as that term has been used during the last four
decades, implies the achievement of utopian goals through the judici-
ary. The goals today are essentially the same as those which defined
the notion of access to justice ever since it first gained wider currency
the 1960s with the birth of the Great Society. Consequently, we begin
with a brief review of the goals of access to justice, and then move to
recent changes in the judiciary designed to expand access, not just for
the poor but for other groups in society.
Access to justice became a major political issue following creation
of the Office of Economic Opportunity and the Legal Services Corpo-
ration (LSC) by Congress in the 1960s. Instead of taking cases dealing
with mundane issues such as divorce, activists focused on litigation
funded by the federal government to advance the political and social
interests of particular subgroups in society, especially the poor. As one
activist later reminisced, the "dynamic and burgeoning Office of Eco-
nomic Opportunity" afforded them the luxury of two-year fellowships
where they could "avoid any obligation to engage in day-to-day client
Id.
307. See Judge Denise R. Johnson, The Legal Needs of the Poor as a Starting Point for
Systemic Reform, 17 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 479 (1998); Alan W. Houseman, Civil Legal
Assistance for the Twenty-First Century: Achieving Equal Justice for All, 17 YALE L. &
POL'Y REv. 369 (1998); Margaret Martin Barry, Access to Justice: On Dialogues With the
Judiciary, 29 FORDHAM URB. L. J. 1089 (2002).
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intake, and, instead ... dream up test cases and class actions, launch
legislative initiatives, and organize community action programs. "308
Using imaginative, federally-funded lawsuits, anything seemed possi-
ble: "Poverty would be defeated within a few years. The inadequate
nutrition, slum housing, dismal education, and marginal health of the
poor in America would become historical artifacts, eliminated by the
efforts of lawyers with a mission. 3 °9 In the course of twenty-five years,
activist lawyers amassed an impressive number and variety of court
victories,31 ° while never actually achieving the social goals they had
envisioned for the poor.
However, conservative members of Congress grew tired of financ-
ing lawsuits against the government. Funded by federal tax dollars,
imaginative lawsuits offered courts the opportunity to order federal,
state, and local governments to take particular actions on behalf of the
poor. Following the Republican takeover of Congress in 1994, they
began an effort to restrict both funding and the type of legal services
provided by the LSC and affiliated organizations.31 ' In 1996, Congress
imposed comprehensive restrictions on the LSC and its lawyers to pro-
vide free representation to the nation's poor in civil litigation.312
Legislative changes by Congress reduced funding and forced
changes in activists' strategies for using the courts as a vehicle of
change.313 Still grappling with the diminished influence and potency
of the LSC, activists have continued to advocate legislative changes in
the form of increased funding for legal services. But the re-creation of
the former unified and heavily-financed system of legal services seems
unlikely. Consequently, new strategies for the twenty-first century
have focused on creating a new generation of activists within the com-
munity, and changing the judicial role and process. To shape the direc-
tion of the new, legal-assistance system, leaders in the bar and the
judiciary, law schools, community organizations, access-to-justice
boards or commissions and others are being encouraged to "take
account" of changes in the legal system, including the "increased use of
308. Lawrence J. Fox, Legal Services and the Organized Bar: A Reminiscence and a
Renewed Call for Cooperation, 17 YALE L. & POL'Y REv. 305 (1998).
309. Id.
310. See Allen Redlich, Who Will Litigate Constitutional Issues for the Poor?, 19
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 745, 773 (1992).
311. See David S. Udell, The Legal Services Restrictions: Lawyers in Florida, New York,
Virginia, and Oregon Describe the Costs, 17 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 337 (1998).
312. Id.
313. See Catherine C. Carr & Alison E. Hirschel, The Transformation of Community
Legal Services, Inc., of Philadelphia: One Program's Experience Since the Federal
Restrictions, 17 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 319, 330-31 (1998).
2007]
101
Williams: Reinventing the Courts: The Frontiers of Judicial Activism in the
Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 2007
CAMPBELL LAW REVIEW
alternatives to litigation to settle disputes and solve problems," and the
"growing number of persons, rich or poor, who are utilizing the legal
system through their own pro se representation," among other
things.314 Some clearly want to go back to the days of large, publicly-
funded programs for advancing court-mandated social policies. But
the appeal of alternatives to litigation for accomplishing the same ends
has prevailed as the preferred course of action. Because public funds
are scarce and because it is hard to persuade large numbers of lawyers
to take time out of their day to volunteer for socially-transforming liti-
gation, the goal is now to create new judicial processes and implement
new technologies that effectively eliminate the need for lawyers alto-
gether. The judicial process is recast as a means of ending conflict by
changing individual lifestyles, while computer technology promises to
make the value-based decisions universally available to rich and poor
alike.
Opportunities for becoming involved with the judicial system are
being expanded in new and innovative ways but will not result in fewer
lawsuits being filed. As we shall see, the number of lawsuits continues
to grow each year. Throughout the reform literature are repeated refer-
ences to state courts being called upon to provide solutions to a wide
array of new and perplexing problems associated with society's chang-
ing composition and complexity. The courts, it is said, must not only
rise to the occasion, but must, through visionary activities, anticipate
future needs and by doing so hold society together.3 15 This requires
increased interaction between the judges, the elite class of society, and
all other subgroups. But one aspect of this increased demand on the
courts is only obliquely acknowledged in the literature. Increased
demands being made upon the courts is a reference to the increase in
litigation, both civil and criminal, taking place primarily in state
courts. 3 16 For courts to become involved in solving the problems of
314. Alan W. Houseman, Civil Legal Assistance for the Twenty-First Century:
Achieving Equal Justice for All, 17 YALE L. & PoL'y REv. 369, 371 (1998).
315. TOFFLER, supra note 11, at 32.
316. Although it is considerably out of date given appellate court decisions over the
last fifteen years, for the best treatment on the expansion of liability, see PETER W.
HUBER, LIABILITY: THE LEGAL REVOLUTION AND ITS CONSEQUENCES (1988). Of particular
interest is Huber's description of the expansion of compensation for psychic injuries.
He summed up the trend in tort litigation:
Their vision was a shining one, grand enough to stir the mind, thrill the
heart, and inspire the young lawyer. Theirs was a promise of society made
more just, generous, and compassionate through the ministrations of activist
litigators. Where the private buyer and seller lacked the incentive or the
knowledge to make wise judgments about safety, the courts would intervene
692 [Vol. 29:591
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society, there has had to be a lawsuit of some kind which engages the
courts' coercive power. But if courts are to provide successful solu-
tions to new problems, however, three essential tactics are required:
1. Creating as many new theories of liability, as many new causes
of action, as there are new claims for relief by individuals or sub-
groups within society;
2. Finding new ways to actively bring people into the judicial sys-
tem without waiting for a formal written complaint to be filed and
then followed by the issuance of a summons; and
3. Continuing to increase the number of options by which the
outcome can be made to conform to therapeutic principles with-
out the need for making reference to any rule of law, or, con-
versely, by making reference to any rule of law that is useful to the
courts in a particular case.
It is only by recognizing new theories of liability or by expanding the
ways in which people become involved with the courts that judges can
be said to meet a pluralistic society's demands, and apply the growing
range of therapeutic options to individuals and groups; rules of law are
viewed merely as tools by which the courts can act upon people and
subgroups.
By expanding the potential scope of liability and by facilitating
the increased access of constituent subgroups, the courts can intervene
in the lives of more individuals and in greater depth than ever before.
As Deborah L. Rhode observed in her recent book, Access to Justice:
This nation also finds privately financed lawsuits to be a fiscally attrac-
tive way of enforcing statutory requirements without spending tax-
payer dollars on legal costs. Much of this country's environmental,
health, consumer, and antidiscrimination regulation occurs through
litigation.... As patterns of life become more complex and interdepen-
dent, the need for legal regulation becomes correspondingly
greater.... Unsafe conditions, abusive marriages, discriminatory con-
duct, and inadequacies in social services that were once accepted as a
to substitute their own greater insight. Where the individual lacked the
prudence, the foresight, or perhaps merely the wherewithal to secure
insurance against misadventures, the courts would intervene once again to
correct the error. The objectives were grand, the intentions were good, the
promises were wonderfully beneficent. Utopian promises always are.
But utopia, at least along the lines traditionally described, is
unattainable, and when the utopians succeed politically, they deliver only
tyranny in practice. A less overweening state is better, not because it
promises more than the traditional utopia, but because it delivers the closest
approximation to it in an imperfect world.
Id at 231.
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matter of course, now prompt demands for legal remedies and for
assistance in obtaining them. More and more of our every day life is
hedged about by law. . . . As law becomes increasingly crucial and
complex, access to legal resources also becomes critical.31 z
The courts remain essential, but rules of law, lawyers, and "tradi-
tional" judges are only marginally helpful when it comes to changing
the way people think and live. Lawyers, in particular, represent an
impediment to the courts' new role in society, above all, in cases
involving lifestyle. This was the point made by Justice Denise R. John-
son of the Vermont Supreme Court in her presentation at the Arthur
Liman Colloquium on the Future of Legal Services at Yale Law School
in 1998. "Relying on pro bono services of attorneys and federally
funded legal services programs will not enable us to provide meaning-
ful access to an overloaded justice system," observed Justice John-
son.3 18 "The old solutions also will not work because they assume that
the entire subject is best left to the legal profession and the courts. "319
Justice Johnson's solution was to restructure the entire judicial process
based upon her belief that the situation will not be remedied unless it
is "attacked as part of a broader problem of access to the justice sys-
tem."' 32 0 The explosion in pro se litigation includes people of moderate
income who would not qualify for public legal services even if they
were still available. Consequently, she concludes, "Our long-term strat-
egy must move beyond throwing more lawyers at the problem. Instead,
we must develop a new approach to doing the traditional business of
the courts that will meet the needs of diverse economic groups. Such
an approach should not only utilize scarce resources more efficiently,
but it also should serve a substantially greater population, and thus be
more likely to enjoy broad and continuing political support. "321
Because of the excessive cost of legal services, there needs to be
structural changes which will make the legal system more efficient for
its users.322 For Johnson and other activists within the judiciary, struc-
tural changes include "altering the lawyer's monopoly on the justice
system and demystifying the law so that lay people can understand
it.' ' 3 2 3 "Critical to any scheme for improving access to justice," said
317. DEBRA L. RHODE, ACcESS TO JUSTICE 8 (2004).
318. Denise R. Johnson, The Legal Needs of the Poor as a Starting Point for Systemic
Reform, 17 YALE L. & POL'Y REv. 479, 481 (1998).
319. Id. at 483.
320. Id. at 480-81.
321. Id.
322. Id. at 484.
323. Id.
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Johnson, "is a recognition that the monopoly lawyers hold on the jus-
tice system has become an unacceptable barrier to change. ' 324 While
lawyers are thought to remain essential in fully contested trials, such
litigation represents a relatively small fraction of the legal mattes
involving the poor, and reformers assert that the more routine cases
involving the poor may actually be made more complex by the overlay
of judicial procedures. 325 Consequently, paralegals and other non-law-
yers using standardized forms and/or technological devices are more
desirable as replacements for services once provided by lawyers in
cases such as real estate closings, uncontested divorces, preparing sim-
ple wills, probating simple estates, negotiating personal injury claims,
and collecting simple debts.
3 26
Among other structural reforms, innovative court-sponsored ADR
programs may have the most potential for simplifying procedures and
utilizing non-lawyer counselors to provide service to poor people (and
other types of litigants) in appropriate cases.327 Those cases which do
not require a lawyer must be "filtered out" by court personnel: "Filter-
ing out those cases that could be heard by a different kind of tribunal
may be more rewarding than simply pressuring parties to settle in an
ad hoc fashion. ' 328 Just as important, however,
[a] change that would benefit litigants across the board would be a
move toward a multi-disciplinary approach that would remove certain
aspects of family cases from the adversarial process. By multi-discipli-
nary, I mean using other professionals-social workers, mediators, psy-
chologists-to handle the difficult family problems that are not
primarily legal and that are not amenable to a merely legal solution.
Absent protection and power imbalance concerns, counseling, media-
tion and administrative hearings may be more suitable methods of
resolving family disputes.329
Justice Johnson concluded with these observations:
In my view, the way out of this morass is to recognize that the lack of
legal services for the poor is symptomatic of a deeper problem with
our nation's court system. Our society has outgrown its judicial sys-
tem. Nothing short of systemic reform can address these deficiencies.
Specific options include reconfiguring the monopoly lawyers have on
the justice system by reducing the complexity and formality of pro-
ceedings where appropriate. Because the poor are not the only people
324. Id.
325. Id. at 485.
326. Id. at 485-86.
327. Id. at 486.
328. Id. at 487.
329. Id. at 487-88.
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who are denied access through lack of representation, the most effec-
tive and politically viable strategy is to combine forces with other
groups calling for broad-based reforms. Much as the health care deliv-
ery system has undergone a sea-change in the past decade, moving
away from providing service on demand and excessive reliance on the
most intensively trained service providers, the crisis of access in the
judicial system will force us to recognize the need for systemic reform.
The collision of limited resources and increasing demand compels the
invention of a new paradigm for thinking about both resources and
needs. The judicial system must reassess its purposes with all users in
mind and reallocate limited resources according to priorities that do
not shut out the economically disadvantaged.3 3 °
In her remarks, Justice Johnson expressly attacks the role of law-
yers as gatekeepers of the legal system and the rule of law which
declares some to be right and others wrong, making some winners and
others losers.3 3 ' As the system has worked in the past, people went to
lawyers to determine whether or not they "had a case." The lawyers,
familiar with the law through education and experience, advised
potential litigants regarding the facts of their case and the potential for
recovery based on those facts. If the lawyer thought that a client had a
meritorious case, the litigant and lawyer would work out a fee arrange-
ment, and suit was filed. In this way, lawyers regulated to some degree
which lawsuits were filed and which were not. Everyone has always
had a right to represent themselves, but most often they elected in seri-
ous cases to approach the courts through lawyers. This is now chang-
ing because of the new role of the courts and the diminishing impact
of rules of law on outcomes. The term "access to justice" has come to
represent the process of moving away from decision-makers applying
fixed rules of law to reach a specific result on specific legal and factual
330. Id. at 489.
331. See, e.g.,John R. Tarpley, You hold the key to the courthouse, 40 Tenn. BarJ.,Jan.
2004, at 3 (arguing for more pro bono work by lawyers).
Well, folks, we 8,200 members of the Tennessee Bar Association hold the
key to help thousands of people in the state. We hold the key to the
courthouse or boardroom door for all of our clients but particularly for those
who cannot afford a lawyer. This key is our ability to practice law. We have
learned this special skill over a number of years, including 16 years of general
education and then years of intensive learning in law school. Then, we go
through that unspeakable right of passage-the bar examination. Finally, we
are a lawyer. Some of us go right into practice on our own, and others learn
to "practice" with more experienced lawyers. All of these years of learning
develop these special skills of ours. It is clear that we have something that
most people do not.
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issues framed by the parties in their pleadings. A key component of
that process is the elimination of those who "hold the keys" to the
courthouse, because they have become, as Justice Johnson said, "an
unacceptable barrier to change."332 But the scope of approaching
changes and the purposes to be served by them are even more radical
than anything we have seen so far.
In order to remove lawyers as obstacles to change and, thereby
increase access to the courts, reformers have turned to computer tech-
nology and, particularly, the Internet for an alternative that bypasses
lawyers and the courtroom setting altogether. In 1999, Chief Judge
Thomas Zlaket of the Arizona Supreme Court delivered the welcoming
address to the American Judicature Conference on the challenges of
pro se litigation (the Scottsdale Conference). He challenged judges,
court administrators, and the bar to prepare for the rapidly approach-
ing future where the idea of having a lawyer present in representation
of a client will be a myth in many civil courtrooms. Zlaket and other
reformers (as illustrated by numerous statements in earlier futures
commission reports and strategic plans, as well as scholarly literature)
argue that the expense of hiring a lawyer is escalating beyond the
reach of the poor and most middle-income people to the point that
some other way of providing access to justice for unrepresented liti-
gants is now necessary.333 As a result, the State Justice Institute, the
National Center for State Courts (NCSC), and the Open Society Insti-
tute joined forces to commission a conceptual study of a "fundamental
redesign of courts, including every aspect of the entire institution,
from building design to judicial training, from technology to the clerk's
role."'334 That study by Richard Zorza, entitled The Self-Help Friendly
Court: Designed from the Ground Up to Work for People Without Law-
yers,335 offers "a comprehensive vision, a vision of how a courthouse,
courtroom, court team, and court process could be planned together
from the ground up to provide simple, open, and affordable justice to
all."' 336 One could sum up the entire report as a comprehensive
approach for shifting to the state the cost and burden of virtually eve-
rything that is now done in private by lawyers and their clients and
332. Johnson, supra note 318, at 484.
333. See, e.g., Conference Materials, Eastern Regional Conference, Access to Justice
for the Self-Represented: Court and Community-Based Strategies and Solutions, May
10-12, 2006, N.Y. State Judicial Institute, White Plains, NY, http://www.courts.state.
ny.us/ip/ usticeinitiatives/conference.shtml.
334. RICHARD ZoRzA, THE SELF HELP FRIENDLY COURT: DESIGNED FROM THE GROUND UP
TO WORK FOR PEOPLE WITHOUT LAWYERS 11 (2002).
335. Id.
336. Id.
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paid for by private sources. People once outside the formal judiciary
are being brought into the courts in a multitude of ways, but advanced
computer technology coupled with a redesign of the judicial system
clearly offers the greatest promise for increasing access while reducing
costs and increasing efficiency.
As a rough draft of Zorza's book was already underway, the
National Center for State Courts, acting at the direction of the Confer-
ence of Chief Justices and the Conference of State Court Administra-
tors, was entering into other working arrangements to actually begin
designing a system that operates entirely without the use of lawyers,
and which supports substitutes for trials.337 Beginning in 2000, the
NCSC in partnership with the Illinois Institute of Design and Chicago-
Kent School of Law "launched a bold venture to use technology to
increase access to justice for self-represented litigants," with the "team
of design students, law students and their professors" working to reen-
gineer the courts from the "customers" point of view. 338 Professor Ron-
ald Staudt, IIT's associate vice president for law, business and
technology compared the venture to the birth of E-Trade or Amazon.
com. The explosion of self-represented litigants, coupled with the com-
plexity of the legal system, and "other barriers to entry" increases the
need to educate and assist them through the courts.
"Faculty and students are collaborating to analyze and redesign
current civil court processes to lift procedural, financial, and cultural
barriers that prevent effective access to justice. '339 A "299 element,"
internet-based system was designed and tested to help litigants through
the civil court process. "The system is a web-based program which
assists litigants throughout their court process, from choosing between
mediation and trial, to filing claims and tracking their case electroni-
cally, to honing their strategy, appearing in court, getting a fair resolu-
tion and seeking help from community organizations. "340 The system
helps litigants on both sides of a case "get their story straight" before
appearing in court, and an auction-type system is being designed for
getting fair value for liquidated assets.
341
337. Conference of Chief Justices and Conference of State Court Administrators,
Resolution 31 (adopted Aug. 1, 2002), available at http://www.courts.state.ny.us/ip/
justiceinitiatives/conference.shtml.
338. See Press Release, Ill. Inst. of Design, Illinois Institute of Technology Leads
Research in Redesigning Civil Justice Procedures in America (May 5, 2001), available
at http://www.id.iit.edu/news/articles/praccesstojustice.html (last visited May 19,
2007).
339. Id.
340. Id.
341. Id.
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As a guide for litigants attempting to navigate through the com-
puter-based judicial system, the collaborators designed new computer
software known as the Access to Justice Author (A2J Author). The A2J
Author uses computer icons augmented by visual and audio cues to
permit "non-technical authors from the courts, clerk's offices, legal ser-
vices programs, and website editors" to rapidly build "customer
friendly web-based interfaces for document assembly. ' 34 2 Just filling
out simple forms is difficult for many people. Consequently, some
other way of enabling people to "tell their story" had to be developed
that makes document assembly and electronic filing more widely
accessible to self-represented litigants. When entering the new judicial
system one is met by a computer-generated image of a woman standing
on a road called "Access to Justice." 34 3 She will guide you through the
system.
The computer can be programmed by "court staff and public
interest lawyers" to create A2J Author interviews by the woman with
prospective litigants which take them through a "branching" system of
questions and answers,344 functioning and arranged like a road
map.345 Depending on how the litigant answers one question, the com-
puter will generate the next question; the answer to that question will
determine the content of the following question, and so forth, leading
the litigant through the system by "asking only the questions that need
to be answered. ' 34 6 Importantly,
[tihe information provided by the self-represented litigant during [the]
initial diagnosis stage also helps the A2J System focus and refine the
information that it provides to the litigant at later stages, screening out
extraneous information that might otherwise confuse litigants. The
A2J System systematically captures key information about self-repre-
sented litigants to allow the court to improve its services to these
litigants.34 7
342. CHICAGO-KENT COLLEGE OF LAW, THE CENTER FOR ACCESS TO JUSTICE AND
TECHNOLOGY, MEETING THE NEEDS OF SELF-REPRESENTED LITIGANTS: A2J AUTHOR
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 3, http://www.kentlaw.edu/cajt/SJI-A2AuthorExecutive
Summary.pdf (last visited May 20, 2007) [hereinafter A2J AUTHOR EXECUTIVE
SUMMARY].
343. Id. at 1-2.
344. Id. at 3.
345. CHICAGO-KENT COLLEGE OF LAW, THE CENTER FOR ACCESS TO JUSTICE AND
TECHNOLOGY, MEETING THE NEEDS OF SELF-REPRESENTED LITIGANTS EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
17, http://www.ncsconline.org/WC/Publications/Res-ProSe-AccessJustMeetNeeds
ExecSumPub.pdf (last visited June 4, 2007).
346. Id.
347. Id. at 12.
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System modules have already been designed for routine matters
such as "Petition for Adult Name Change," and "Application for Waiver
of Court Fees and Costs." Some states have already begun using the
A2J Author tool for interviews related to landlord eviction notices, ten-
ant repairs complaint, and other matters.348
This project, like Zorza's book, is supported financially by the
State Justice Institute, Open Society Institute, and the Center for
Access to the Courts Through Technology.349
There may be some value in speculating about the possible conse-
quences of creating a state-supported, computer-based dispute resolu-
tion system. If people are given a choice between two options-one
cheap, the other expensive; one easy, the other hard-people will take
the cheap, easy way every time. If activists are successful in creating a
computer system as one component of, or as an alternative to the
"traditional" judicial system the computer-based system will not only
become the default system but may be used by people for anything and
everything. Every dispute in life has the potential to become a matter
for the new courts and their computers. Husbands and wives, children
and parents, employers and employees, coaches and players, quarrel-
ing neighbors, people offended by the use of certain words spoken by
others, no matter how inconsequential, will opt for the computer-
based system in the hope of finding an ally or receiving a value-based
decision predetermined to be therapeutic.
Moreover, the computer-based system will have a leveling effect on
all disputes. Even if one party hires an attorney to help him "tell his
story," the precision and sophistication of the lawyer will be lost in
translation to a form of rhetoric that does not accommodate the educa-
tion and experience that a lawyer brings to the case; and if the system
did accommodate narrowly framed factual and legal issues, the oppos-
ing, self-represented party will have the help of court staff to frame
their story in a way that is designed to put them on a level playing field
with the wealthier party. The computer generates questions which the
parties are required to answer as a precondition for receiving a deci-
sion, and court futures commissions advocate changing court forms
and communications to accommodate a minimal degree of education
and cultural sophistication. The Tennessee Futures Commission, for
example, recommends that all "forms and written communications to
the public by the legal system . . . be at the sixth-grade level of reading
proficiency. "350
348. A2J AUTHOR EXECUTIVE SUMMARY, supra note 342, at 4-5.
349. See Press Release, supra note 338.
350. To SERVE ALL PEOPLE, supra note 138, at 34.
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The need for simplifying the way factual and legal issues are col-
lected and processed is magnified by the movement to computer-based
technology as a means of resolving disputes. The communication of
facts and abstract concepts through questions and answers provided
by the litigants will have to be answered in equally simplistic ways by
the electronic dispute resolution system, even as the system of artificial
intelligence becomes more sophisticated. The Tennessee Futures Com-
mission considered it to be
easy to envision an electronic entry point to the judicial system, espe-
cially for the most common disputes-domestic relations, landlord-ten-
ant, etc. Rental-car agencies offer computerized directions to specific
destinations; hotels have touch-screen guides to a city. A more sophisti-
cated computer could guide a person through parts of the legal system,
spelling out legal rights and responsibilities, setting out various alter-
natives, and offering instructions on how to further access the
system. 3
5 1
More importantly, however, "as artificial intelligence advances, com-
puter models might apply principles of law to individual fact patterns,
and thereby offer forecasts of the rights and responsibilities of the par-
ties. The computer, in essence, would provide a mini-trial, and the
likely outcome would be a far larger number of cases resolved long
before they come to a traditional courtroom."352
Because the court staff which aids the self-represented litigant will
have greater information about how the computer-based system is set
up to respond to input, their help may be of greater value to the self-
represented litigant than help received by the other party from a lawyer
working outside the system. How the courts hope to do all of these
things and still maintain the illusion of neutrality and healing is
unclear. The courts are, nevertheless, working diligently to achieve
techniques of artificial intelligence for use in the judicial system. One
way to eliminate decisions which may not leave the parties feeling
good about their experience with the courts is to define those deci-
sions in advance to be therapeutic because they were rendered by a
judicial system which has defined itself as therapeutic.
Changing the judicial system to increase "access" is being justified
by reasons other than the high cost of hiring lawyers. In the Preface to
Zorza's book, Chief Justice Ronald M. George of the California
Supreme Court articulated reasons for changing and expanding access
to the courts. For a long time, observed Justice George:
351. Id. at 30.
352. Id.
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[T]he conventional thinking about courts was dominated by a tradi-
tionally narrow vision: two lawyers standing before a judge seated on
an elevated bench, arguing a matter for the judge to resolve by signing
a decision and sending the parties off to execute it. But society's expec-
tations have changed, as has the population appearing in our Courts
in every capacity. As a result, courts have expanded the focus of their
attention beyond the courthouse door and into the communities they
serve.
35 3
While cost was the major factor articulated by Justice Zlaket, the
need to reach outside the courthouse and into the surrounding com-
munity was the most important consideration for Justice George.
Reaching outside the courthouse doors will permit judges to intervene
in the lives of individuals and community affairs in ways never before
possible, all in the name of access to justice.
Justice Johnson, who wants to break up the lawyers' monopoly on
the judicial system, complained that lawyers are an "unacceptable bar-
rier to change. 35 4 But what, exactly, are those changes and what pur-
poses are lawyers obstructing? The answer can be found in the report
of the Tennessee Futures Commission. And, though it is lengthy, other
words could not convey so effectively, and in more straightforward
terms, the reasons for change:
Solving problems
If the judicial system is to. serve the public, its purpose must go
beyond merely clearing its own docket. It must play a part in actually
solving the problems that arrive before it.
The courts' role has traditionally been regarded as a "zealously
passive" one, dispensing justice as individual cases present themselves
at the courthouse.
The judicial system cannot solve every problem, of course, and
many problems will not be solved in any final sense.
But if it continues to deal with dysfunctional families by address-
ing one member's case, it is treating one arm while the spine is broken.
If it continues to preside over commercial disputes at a timing and
depth determined by the wealthier party, it is presenting itself as
checkbook justice. And if it sends the addict through one more round
of prison time, it is merely warehousing a problem for future
distribution.
Encouraging settlement discussions should be the least of a
court's active role. It will take assertive leadership to actually solve
problems.
353. Id. at 7.
354. Johnson, supra note 318, at 484.
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Alternative means
If the judicial system is to serve the public by solving problems,
the measure of success will have to change. An effective system will
have fewer verdicts, not more.
The right to a trial doesn't mean that a trial is the right choice.
Some changes in procedures can make for more efficient judicial
management, but real strides will mean resolving cases sooner and by
means other than trial.
In its broader sense, the phrase [alternative dispute resolution]
has enormous implications. It means that every court is a last resort.
Full trials should be last-chance surgery, not primary care.
355
In the constitutional process, judges are not interested (at least
professionally) in the underlying problems giving rise to conflict.
Whether or not a divorcing husband and wife hate each other is irrele-
vant as long as both abide by the terms of the final decree of divorce.
Custody, visitation, and property rights are often some of the more
nebulous issues courts deal with, but, as in other cases, they should be
determined by the facts and the law in each case. The problem with
lawyers and their "monopoly" on the judicial system is a basic problem
with law and the courts generally. If the courts were not bound to fol-
low rules of law in reaching specific outcomes there would be no need
for lawyers or trials, and judges would be free to do as they please;
hence, the call by Justice Johnson to "demystify law" by simplifying the
rules which govern the process and the outcome. The courts, after
using law to gain coercive power over people, can then diminish its
influence on the decision-making process. The lawyer's role in the
judicial system as the zealous defender of the client's legal rights and
interests will likewise be diminished. Judges will be free to act not
merely with discretion, but arbitrarily to implement their personal
social visions of changes in individual and collective lifestyle. The
number of trials will diminish if not vanish altogether. This will hap-
pen even though the number of "cases" continues to increase. There
will be, as the Tennessee Futures Commission envisioned, "fewer ver-
dicts, not more;" and fewer trials is exactly what they have
accomplished.
B. The Vanishing Trial
Between 1976 and 2002, the number of civil jury trials decreased
by about two-thirds in both state and federal courts while the number
355. To SERVE ALL PEOPLE, supra note 138, at 61-62.
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of civil dispositions during that same period increased 168% in state
courts and 144% in federal courts.356 Researchers at the National
Center for State Courts report that a principal reason for the recent
decline in civil jury trials is a significant change in judicial manage-
ment: "Today, judges are not merely managing cases but are shaping
litigation by deciding issues in cases as they arise and directing the
evidence-gathering process toward the resolution of issues. This shift
in focus from presiding over trials to managing the resolution of dis-
putes results in fewer cases moving to full trial. Trial judges not only
manage cases in order to move them expeditiously, but also to con-
serve judicial and litigant resources by actively promoting settle-
ment. '357 Moreover, "[t]he burgeoning use and availability of
mediation, arbitration, and other forms of alternative dispute resolu-
tion (ADR) also contributes to the declining number of trials by provid-
ing a means to settle cases outside the courtroom. "358
The Vanishing Trial has become the subject of the largest inquiry
ever undertaken by the Litigation Section of the American Bar Associa-
tion and has gained national attention.359 For decades the ABA has
been supporting more meticulous case management techniques by
judges, and the implementation of alternative techniques of dispute
resolution, including the effort to change the role of the courts in soci-
ety. But when the Vanishing Trial could no longer be ignored, the ABA
and their inquiring experts responded with a sense of puzzlement.
"What has caused this dramatic decline in trials?" asks Patricia Lee
Refo, Chair of the ABA's Section of Litigation.360 "While more work
needs to be done on this issue, there is no shortage of theories," she
adds.3 11 "Still, the trends are clear enough," she continues, "that we
must start asking what the diminishing trial means for our justice sys-
tem and our society. '362 One thing is certain: there is an increasing
number of graduating law students who will never participate in the
trial of a lawsuit. Even if they do, the preferred path is some alternative
technique of resolving the case. While settlement was always a possible
option for lawyers negotiating on behalf of their clients, it is now the
356. The Vanishing Trial: Implications for the Bench and Bar, Civil Action, 4 NAT'L
CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, Spring 2005, at 1.
357. Id. at 2.
358. Id.
359. Symposium, The Vanishing Trial, A.B.A. Section of Litigation Civil Justice
Initiatives Task Force (2003), available at http://www.abanet.org/litigation/vanishing
trial.
360. Refo, supra note 175, at 1, 3.
361. Id.
362. Id. at 4.
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prevailing dogma leaving all lawyers little alternative, whether as a
result of peer pressure or a court order, except to attempt some form of
ADR. The result is a growing dearth of lawyers qualified for trial: "Is it
possible that lawyers sometimes settle a case because they don't know
how to try one? And if there are fewer trials to go around, then surely
over time, fewer lawyers will have meaningful experience in trying a
case."
363
If people have to wait on lawyers to file suit then the lawyers are,
indeed, obstructing the courts in their new therapeutic, problem-solv-
ing role. Judges are still willing, in the words of the Tennessee Futures
Commission, to wait until "individual cases present themselves at the
courthouse;" but they are changing the "judicial power" to allow them
to initiate state involvement with individuals and subgroups and to
personally interject themselves and the expanding court team into the
lives of all people. This is a bold attempt to solve what the judges and
activists working with them consider to be the basic problems of life,
including the reorientation of the community away from the popular
branches of government toward the judiciary.
Trials, while still necessary to give state supreme courts opportu-
nities to make, for example, policy statements or to "send a message,"
have no place in the majority of cases, and are, consequently vanish-
ing. When the Tennessee Futures Commission said, "The right to a
trial doesn't mean that a trial is the right choice, ' 36 4 it implied that a
trial might be the right choice, but it is now presumed to be the wrong
choice, for that would require, as Justice Johnson put it, "service on
demand.
365
It may be comforting to lawyers to point out that the role of the
trial judge is also being changed beyond recognition. With the rise of
the Counter Culture in the 1960s there was a rejection of authority of
all kinds. The contempt for authority was noticeably visible in a num-
ber of ways: 1) the disavowal of God and of moral absolutes (including,
notably, the rebellion against the institution of marriage and prevailing
standards of sexual morality, destroying the unity of the husband and
wife and divorcing sexual intercourse from responsibility); and 2)
rebellion against the duly established authority of government. The
authority of courts of law was the object of contempt and remains so
today. The counter culture has not gone away but has only become
mainstream and vastly more influential in the effort to reengineer the
judicial system. An excellent example of this contempt for the authority
363. Id.
364. To SERVE ALL PEOPLE, supra note 138, at 61-62.
365. Johnson, supra note 318, at 489.
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of judges applying rules of law can be found in the Multi-door Court-
house Scenario prepared by futurists and distributed as part of The
Future and the Courts Conference in 1990:
It goes without saying that the public is deeply involved in and aware
of the assumptions, rules, and actual operation of the multi-door sys-
tem. Everything is open, above-board, and user-friendly. Gone is the
old fashioned courtroom, which had been little changed from the days
when it was in fact an anteroom of the king (with all the utterly obso-
lete and undemocratic notions of a king and his law lording it over
quivering vassals). Gone also is the robed and elevated judge, impervi-
ous and imperious behind his imposing bench, with a monstrous
banging gavel hammering out justice and declaring all and sundry
who did not rise, bow, scrape and defer to him to be held "in contempt
of court." Instead there has evolved a wide variety of roles and relation-
ships, as varied as there are people, their disputes, and the ways they
each think their disputes should be peaceably resolved. And, of course,
those who used the courts the most-the disenfranchised-were the
first to be consulted regarding structure and planning for the new
courts.
3 6 6
C. New Gatekeepers
The decision to take a case to trial will no longer be the preroga-
tive of the litigants or their lawyers, but will fall within the exclusive
province of a new set of gatekeepers-court bureaucrats consisting of
powerful, presiding trial judges and court administrators. These new
gatekeepers will evaluate each case as it comes in to determine its
potential for transformation, assign it to an appropriate track in the
justice system, and prescribe the appropriate therapeutic process for
clients to solve their underlying physical, social, psychological, eco-
nomic and political problems.367 New gatekeepers are necessary to "fil-
366. ALTERNATIVE FUTURES FOR THE STATE COURTS OF 2020, supra note 111, at 31.
367. See, e.g., To SERVE ALL PEOPLE, supra note 138, at 20-21.
Magistrates can play an important middle role, less than judicial
decision-making but more than clerical record-keeping. We envision
magistrates as the triage officers of the judicial system. We are not even sure
magistrate is the proper name, since the position is unlike the various present
magistrates. Gatekeeper, dispute facilitator, justice coordinator-all those
titles sound a bit stiff, but they do describe what we have in mind ....
Magistrates could have plenty to do as gatekeepers .... Magistrates might sort
out issues and facts short of final judgments. For that purpose, we
recommend that they be licensed lawyers, chosen by district judges from
candidates qualified by the Administrative Office of the Courts. Magistrates
might preside over preliminary hearings and various motions. Even more
broadly, they might exercise effective case management, which now falls
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ter out" those cases not requiring a lawyer because lawyers have
traditionally applied rules of law to the facts of a given case to deter-
mine whether a cause of action is available. This will no longer be
necessary for entrance to the judicial system or to a determination of
the appropriate outcome. Judges and their administrative staff will
hold the keys to the blessings of the material world in the form of court
computers as well as a wide range of options consisting of social ser-
vices, psychological counseling, drug therapy, work therapy, mentor-
ing, money damages, apologies, and the approval of the community.
No elevated bench or banging gavel is necessary for that. But real
judges are necessary in the problem-solving setting. Decisions have to
be made when the application of differential reinforcement, punish-
ment, or some other technique of behavioral modification is deemed
appropriate. Consequently, we have the emergence of an entirely new
kind of judge with a new role, as a recent article in Court Review
demonstrates:
There is a lot of talk these days about the role of a judge, especially
among trial court judges. Frequently, the discussion is framed in
terms of whether the judiciary should be expected to behave in one of
two polar-opposite ways. Should they be primarily almost aloof finders
of fact, impartial and nearly devoid of intimate contact with and
knowledge of litigants and their circumstances? Or should they be one
of many possible partners to a diagnostic, therapeutic oriented
response process to ameliorate underlying and messy problems of liti-
gants? These choices confront judges with the creation and develop-
ment of drug courts, domestic abuse courts, gun courts, mental health
courts, community courts, and other courts revolving around social
maladies. 36
8
The "choices" in judicial role have already been answered by the
Conference of Chief Justices and the Conference of State Court Admin-
below the horizon of the trial judge but above the authority of the court clerk.
They might play an important role in referring cases to alternative forums
and even to alternate community resources, ranging, say, from counselors to
public health agencies.
In that framework, the magistrates' success would be judged not just on
the volume of the caseload, but on the effective direction of it. Some of that
direction would be inside the court system. Some would be toward other
problem solvers.
The entire judicial system must move beyond the model of simply
processing cases. The magistrate, with more flexibility than a judge but more
authority than a clerk, can be a focal point of that movement.
Id.
368. Roger Hanson, The Changing Role of a Judge and Its Implications, COURT REV.,
Winter 2002, at 10.
20071
117
Williams: Reinventing the Courts: The Frontiers of Judicial Activism in the
Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 2007
CAMPBELL LAW REVIEW
istrators. Both supported the therapeutic model by joint resolutions
and have advocated that it be extended to general jurisdiction courts.
Litigants who are "filtered out" by gatekeepers are sent to judges
who are partners with the diagnostic, therapeutic team of experts as
well as volunteers from the community who, together, seek to modify
behavior and end conflict. But by filtering out those cases which do
not require a lawyer, they necessarily "filter in" those cases which do.
In other words, the same gatekeepers who decide when an alternative
technique will work to produce a therapeutic outcome, will also decide
when it is necessary to fall back to the "robed and elevated judge,
impervious and imperious behind his imposing bench. '36 9 The "tradi-
tional" judge will be there to prevent a "power imbalance," send a mes-
sage, reverse a policy statement by the legislature, or find in the
constitution a right or obligation that no one else can see. Traditional
trial courts are still necessary to build records for state supreme courts
which will not surrender authority given to them by state constitutions
or their growing political power as the judicial branch of government.
The ability of high courts to find in the various constitutions rights or
obligations not expressly or implicitly contained in them, or through
the use of the common law to create new theories of liability must be
preserved. The gatekeeping function and adversarial litigation will be
uprooted from the rule of law, except as the concept of law becomes
increasingly synonymous with judges as the self-contained embodi-
ment of law.
Gatekeepers will be powerful judges functioning as planners and
managers, deciding, perhaps with other judges or administrators, how
the case before them can best serve their purposes, or programming
court computers to make the same decision. Court administrators or
computer systems may make those decisions in the run-of-the-mill
case, but presiding judges will hold ultimate authority, subject only to
the control of the state supreme court. Coordination is possible
because the growing cadre of local administrators and their computer
systems are tied to the state supreme court's Administrative Office of
369. See OHIo COURT FUTURES COMMISSION, A CHANGING LANDSCAPE 26 (2000).
All courts should routinely make available a continuum of dispute
resolution, from mediation and other forms of assisted negotiation to
arbitration and traditional litigation. Court intake staff should be familiar
will all of these options, and trained to evaluate disputes and assign them to
an appropriate track. In some types of cases (e.g. juvenile and domestic cases
in which vital relationships need to be preserved) mediation may be a
mandatory first step-but the right to trial should be preserved and parties
should not be penalized if they fail to reach agreement through mediation.
708 [Vol. 29:591
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the Courts. Planning among the judiciary has the potential to become
a seamless function. Ultimately, the rule of law may become nothing
more than rules promulgated by courts or state legislatures prescribing
how cases will be assigned to different tracks within the judicial
system.
By advocating alternative dispute resolution, judges and the dis-
pute resolution team attack individual and group problems aggres-
sively. But the vision articulated by the many court commissions is
worded in ways that tend to deceive us. For example, they say that
"every court is a last resort," implying that everything short of trial is
something other than the work of the state. ADR is depicted as an
informal process, but in actual practice that is not true. What is true is
that the courts are morphing. The courts are transforming themselves
into an entirely new form of government, not just in appearance but
substantively different from the constitutional judicial system, and fun-
damentally at odds with legislative and executive functions which they
are usurping. But because we still think of the courts in the constitu-
tional context, with lawyers and judges in a courtroom, we are missing
the change. The judges and their team, employing subtle, manipula-
tive, and arbitrary techniques in place of the rule of law, are to become
our "primary care" physicians, our healers. At times we may need sur-
gery at the hands of the impervious and imperious judge behind his
imposing bench, but the new courts will make us whole without that if
possible. Either way, the courts intend to change us.
D. The Abolition of Due Process
Perhaps the best illustration of the rejection by activists of consti-
tutional forms and processes is the adoption by community courts of
dispute resolution techniques that bypass the constitution altogether.
These techniques are initiated without the necessity of filing a com-
plaint or the issuance of a summons. The Ohio Supreme Court's
Futures Commission recommended that, "Ohioans should be able to
use the courts to initiate non-adversarial dispute resolution processes
without filing a lawsuit. '370 The Futures Commission's "Vision State-
ment" anticipates that, "In 2025, Ohio courts will offer the public a
wide and diverse range of options for resolving disputes short of tradi-
tional litigation. Rather than being required to initiate a lawsuit in
order to gain the court's involvement, parties who bring civil disputes
to the courts will be able to file a request for mediation or other court-
370. Id. at 26.
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assisted negotiation process as a first step."' 3 71 In addition, the Futures
Commission also recommended that some low-level criminal and
delinquency cases be handled in a similar fashion with the victim's
consent. Cases such as neighborhood disputes, graffiti or shoplifting
could be diverted to alternative forms of court-annexed dispute resolu-
tion without the necessity of ever filing criminal charges.372
This is already happening, for example, in the Midtown Commu-
nity Court in New York City. Many quality-of-life problems in the com-
munity are not violations of the law and, consequently, do not come to
the attention of the police or the courts. But they do impact the entire
community by degrading the overall quality of life. The Midtown Com-
munity Court sought to address such problems in three ways:
. First, it established a mediation service to resolve neighborhood
disputes-for example, the opening of an adult movie house or the
operating hours of a noisy auto repair shop-before they escalate to
legal battles. In addition to helping the community deal with such
problems, the service conveys the Court's commitment to the commu-
nity and its quality of life.
Second, the Court set up a street outreach unit-staffed by police
officers and case workers from the court-to enroll potential clients in
court-based social service programs before they get into trouble with
the law. Five mornings a week, the outreach teams comb the neighbor-
hood, engaging likely clients-prostitutes, substance abusers, the
homeless-in conversation and encouraging them to come in for help
voluntarily.
Finally, the Court launched Times Square Ink, an on-the-job train-
ing program for ex-offenders who have "graduated" from community
service. Participants in the program learn job skills by staffing a copy
center that does copying work for local businesses and non-profits. By
providing ex-offenders with job training and assisting them in finding
jobs, Times Square Ink seeks to address the related problems of unem-
ployment and crime. 3 7
3
Such services "use the courts to initiate" dispute resolution
processes on the assumption that they are non-adversarial and solve
problems that impact the quality of community life before they result
in litigation. If, however, they are non-adversarial, why should the dis-
pute resolution process be initiated at all? Is it not apparent that some-
one has called the courthouse and complained to the court staff about
some other person-the operator of a noisy auto repair shop, an
371. Id.
372. Id.
373. JOHN FEINBLATT & GREG BERMAN, COMMUNITY COURT PRINCIPLES: A GUIDE FOR
PLANNERS 10-11 (1997).
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unwanted theatre? In New York, court "outreach teams" actively comb
the neighborhood looking for "potential candidates," encouraging
them to "voluntarily" come in for help. Is that not a threat? Is that not
an adversarial, coercive process? Obviously so, but the implication by
activists is that we can begin to assign grades or levels of court involve-
ment in the private lives of individuals depending on particular types
of personal activity, as well as the type of work being done by the
courts. The courts are still working through their staff or court volun-
teers, but as long as it is a low-level involvement, such as mediation or
job training, it is not only acceptable but desirable that they do so
without requiring the filing of a complaint. Courts should expand
their healing work in the community through court staff or community
volunteers as long as they are only nominally intrusive and coercive,
and do so to help people, including the broader community, with their
problems.
Preemptive judicial processes are intended to "convey the Court's
commitment to the community and its quality of life."374 Conse-
quently, the "help" offered by court staff or volunteers cannot be safely
ignored. If the court volunteer disturbs us when she knocks on the
door, how can she be safely told to mind her own business and get off
the property? Can we safely disregard the fact that she will return to
the court and file a written report of her visit? We know, because they
tell us, that they are compassionate people driven by an ethic of care,
and are only there to help us. But can we trust them to treat us fairly
and with respect regardless of how we might treat them, and regardless
of the fact that we ignored their overtures to change "voluntarily"
before they compel us to do so? Can we assume that the "low-level"
antisocial behavior attracting court attention today will not be subse-
quently expanded to encompass an even broader definition of "low-
level" activity that implicates each of us as sources of trouble for the
community? In short, can we ignore the constitutional rights of poten-
tial offenders without placing our own freedom in jeopardy at the
hands of judges who promise to act against people for the good of the
community?
Changes represented by community courts represent fundamental
changes in constitutional government. Not only have the courts dis-
pensed with the constitutional doctrine of justiciability, but they are
now dispensing with the constitutional doctrines that require a case or
controversy, standing, and ripeness. But the greatest loss of all is the
impending demise of due process. Activists are positing new concepts
374. Id. at 10.
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of due process to comport with the new form and function of the
courts in society, arguing: 1) that it is the "fairness of our decision-
making process that makes our courts unique";37 5 and 2) that public
trust and confidence in the justice system is determined more by the
relative fairness of the process than the accuracy of the outcome.376 In
other words, there must be some ideological basis for allowing court
staff and volunteers to interject themselves in peoples' private affairs in
multiple ways without requiring a formal complaint or the issuance of
a summons. And, as we have already seen, that basis lies in the realm
of human feelings and emotions rather than fixed precepts of morality
or reason. Opinion polls show that the fairness of the dispute resolu-
tion process affects public trust of judicial performance more than a
favorable outcome: "In the minds of litigants, the importance of a
favorable outcome is consistently outweighed by the impact of an
unfair process. '377 In other words, if judges treat people with respect
they can concern themselves with the social and psychological
problems of litigants and the community rather than the substantive
accuracy of any decision they would otherwise render according to the
rule of law. Being nice frees them up, so to speak, to solve problems
rather than render judgments required by the facts and the law.
Because state constitutions do not expressly define the judicial power
in a way that requires judges to wait until a complaint is filed before
they act, then they only have to find a politically-acceptable excuse for
not doing so. And what is or is not acceptable varies with group
identification:
Procedural fairness can mean different things to different people.
Among judges and lawyers, procedural justice is often defined as pro-
cedural due process, i.e., notice and opportunity to be heard before a
neutral and detached magistrate. But what does fairness mean to liti-
gants and the public? Something quite different. For litigants and the
public, fairness appears to consist of four principal elements: (1) neu-
trality; (2) respect; (3) participation; and (4) trustworthiness. 378
If the judge is perceived to be "free of bias, interest or improper
motives and committed to equality under the law," then he is consid-
ered neutral. If he is "courteous and respectful" he conveys the element
of respect. If he allows the litigants an "active voice" in the decision-
making process and is an "attentive listener" then he facilitates partici-
375. Warren, supra note 165, at 14.
376. Id.
377. Id. at 13.
378. Id. at 14.
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pation. Finally, it is generally presumed that judges are honest.
Consequently,
[t]rustworthiness is based upon a perception of the judge's motives,
i.e., whether the judge truly cares about the litigant (demonstrates an
"ethic of care") and is seeking to do right by the litigant. Trustworthi-
ness is not a measure of the judge's knowledge, skills, or abilities. It is
a measure of the judge's character, not the judge's competence. The
litigant usually does not feel qualified to evaluate the judge's compe-
tence, but often feels fully qualified, based upon the judge's reputation,
demeanor, and behavior, to evaluate the judge's motives.379
For this reason, knowledge of the law and the rules of legal procedure
play a very limited role in evaluating judicial performance, both from
the perspective of litigants as well as in court-sponsored evaluation
programs.38 °
For all of these reasons therapeutic, problem-solving courts tend
toward the abandonment of procedural safeguards that protect all of us
from oppression by the state. Nowhere is that more obvious than the
process now underway of dispensing with constitutional due process
as a basis for the exercise of the judicial power.
The courts want access to the people, and, as a result, we now
have a proactive judiciary engaged in ferreting out and solving the
underlying social, psychological, economic, and political causes of
conflict. The problem with lawyers is not that they are keeping the
people from getting to the judges, but that they are keeping the judges
from getting to the people. Judges are seeking to go outside the court-
room and into their communities, and new concepts and systems of
access will permit them to do just that. The flow of the judicial process
is being reversed. For a proactive judiciary bent on getting at the
underlying problems of life, lawyers armed with rules of law are stand-
ing, as obstacles, between the courts and the people. The use of law-
yers shall be minimized but not eliminated. In the therapeutic system
they may become, in concert with court computers, little more than
guides for people to help them "tell their story," but available, when
necessary, to try a lawsuit, make a record of the testimony, and prepare
the case for the appellate courts. In time, very few lawyers will have the
training and experience to participate skillfully in the trial of a lawsuit.
Their role will become increasingly meaningless as the gate-keeping
and filtering process makes their contribution less and less relevant to
the final outcome.
379. Id. at 14-15.
380. Id.
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Moreover, the very decision by the presiding judge or local court
administrator to send a case to trial represents a judgment by the gate-
keepers that a trial of the case is already considered by the courts to be
useful for some predetermined end. As the system operated in the past
all cases were originally headed to trial, subject only to decisions made
privately by litigants or their lawyers to achieve some result through
settlement or other disposition short of trial. But with decisions being
made not by the parties but by court officials, different criteria become
important. Why should court officials assign a case to the trial path
unless the factual or legal issues appeal to the courts? Before, none of
the factual or legal issues were of personal interest to the courts; they
were there merely as tribunals to make such decisions as the parties
demanded of them, and then only according to the rule of law. Com-
plaints still being filed with courts today conclude with a "demand" for
specific relief such as a money judgment or some other form of lawful
relief available by the courts. In the therapeutic setting, however, the
judges themselves are interested in the litigants and their problems,
and, more particularly, about the outcome of their dispute. Conse-
quently, judges and court staff will know better than anyone else,
including the disputing parties, how best to meet their real needs.
Only after the flow of the judicial process has been reversed, the
lawyers removed, and access to the courts made state-supported and
universal, will the judges be able, in Justice Brock's words, to come out
of their chambers or down from the bench to personally involve them-
selves in the private lives and everyday problems of the people. The
objective of Access to Justice from the perspective of Chief Justice
George is being achieved because "courts have expanded the focus of
their attention beyond the courthouse door and into the communities
they serve." Judges now express their social consciousness by initiat-
ing contact with individuals and groups in their communities, thereby
turning courts into self-starters. Judges have adopted an "ethic of care"
which compels a proactive posture. One of the best examples of this
trend is the Guardianship Review Program of the Maricopa County
Superior Court in Arizona,38 1 which uses volunteers recruited from the
community to "serve as the court's eyes and ears," by making personal,
court-initiated visits to the homes of elderly and disabled persons
under the care of court-appointed guardians.382
381. Letter from Deborah Primock, Program Director of Maricopa County Suprerior
Court Guardianship Review Program, to Potential Volunteer Guardians, available at
http://www.superiorcourt.maricopa.gov/volunteers/pdf/guardian.pdf (last visited
May 9, 2007).
382. Id.
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In the so-called "traditional" court exercising the constitutional
judicial power, the court would not act until a member of the family, a
neighbor, or, perhaps, an employee of the Department of Human Ser-
vices, brought instances of neglect or abuse to the attention of the
court by filing a petition requesting specific types of relief. In Mari-
copa County, however, things work differently. The court has aban-
doned its constitutional position and process in favor of an activist
position. After each unannounced visit, the court volunteer fills out a
report "indicating the status of the ward and any recommendations for
action." That report is then reviewed by court staff to determine
whether further action is necessary. In this way, Court Visitors "serve
as the court's eyes and ears."383
Several relevant points may be made from the example in Mari-
copa County: 1) if removal of untrustworthy fiduciaries cannot be
accomplished by the family or other persons having standing to do so,
then the executive branch has the responsibility of taking the actions
now being annexed to the judiciary; 2) the justification for seizing this
executive-branch function is the one philosophical principle that now
trumps all others: the ends justify the means; 3) the beneficiary is not
necessarily the abused or neglected ward (though some may benefit),
but the court which gains power in the community in the form the
"eyes and ears" of court volunteers; and 4) the courts political position
in the community, on which the program is based, is increased by
favorable press coverage, increasing public trust and confidence.
As judges leave the confines of the courtroom and go out into the
community, resisting the courts will be futile. When the court receives
information from its volunteers, court employees make decisions
about appropriate action. The court's own servants become witnesses.
All of the information and machinery necessary to the outcome are
self-contained within the expanded court setting. But good results are
the best guarantee that no one will object, but, to the contrary, will
praise the court for its caring and innovative approach to the solution
of infrequent problems. However, courts which try to anticipate
problems and prevent them threaten the liberty of everyone.
Moreover, as Access to Justice assumes a planning function for the
community, no one can effectively object to the plan because it will
have been made by the court through collaborative working arrange-
ments with individuals and groups in the community. The court's plan
will be the community's plan.
383. Id.
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If the new political praxis is to resemble the symbiotic relation-
ships in nature according to the theory of Transformational Justice,384
the interaction of subgroups would resemble a circle, at the center of
which are the courts, and all other subgroups and institutions would
be in orbit about them.385 The goal is to make the informal institutions
of society an arm of the state, providing sociological feedback and
assistance to the courts, but devoid of any claim to truth or moral force
in society.386 This is why they must work through the courts; the
courts are to be the only remaining oracle of values which has the abil-
ity to bring force to bear on the individual and targeted subgroups.
VI. BRAvE NEW JUDICIAL WORLD
The judicial leaders of the court futures movement accepted pre-
dictions of future catastrophic consequences if they failed to embrace
oncoming sociological, technological, economic and political change.
In the early days of this movement futurists predicted a fractured,
ephemeral, and chaotic existence for all people who did not prepare
for and embrace accelerating changes expected by the twenty-first cen-
tury. Fixed principles of law, which could not be changed easily, were
incompatible with the design of a system that could adapt to the
onrushing future. The term "therapeutic jurisprudence" may not have
been coined until 1987, but Toffler and other futurists-the "under-
ground sociologists"-had been talking to judges about similar con-
cepts at least fifteen years earlier. Toffler told the Hawaii conference in
1972 and the Antioch Conference in 1977 that laws could not be writ-
ten, enacted, and repealed fast enough to keep up with "all of this
accelerating social turnover, not to mention the turnover of technology
and business forms," and was even more to the point when he
384. Colleen Danos, Transformational Justice, CENTER COURT, Fall-Winter 1999, at 3.
385. Courts are not going away; they are expanding their reach through
collaborative arrangements that expand the formal legal system in new ways involving
many other people and groups. See Kerper, supra note 223.
The case method assumes a single decision maker-a judge. In contemporary
society, decision making is more commonly made by relational networks
such as committees, communities, families, workteams, agencies, or
organizations with multiple constituencies. In the world of real life lawyers, it
is far more likely to be one of these groups who will determine the client's
fate rather than a judge.
Id. at 356.
386. See, e.g., Richard L. Fruin Jr.,Judicial Outreach to Religious Leaders, THE JUDGES'
JOURNAL, Spring 2003, at 34 (demonstrating how religious leaders are brought into the
work of the courts).
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observed that "[t]he law in this case is dead. '38 7 He went on, however,
to propose a solution: "The answer to the crisis, therefore, lies not in
the law, but in the reconstitution of social order. '388 The reconstitution
of social order was to be accomplished by the subordination of law to
alternative, non-legal methods of resolving disputes based on past cul-
tures and new technologies. Every major initiative taking place within
the judiciary today is designed, directly or indirectly, to accomplish
this one great vision of utopian dreamers. Activists in the judiciary
have accepted the reconstitution of the social order as the goal of the
judicial branch by redefining the judicial power. Consequently, we
have a concept of law as the multifaceted, coercive techniques of social
engineering in the hands of judges.
The ease with which these changes are taking place is astonishing.
A flourishing economy puts money in the pockets of people commit-
ted to this process, but, more importantly, it puts money in the form of
tax dollars in the hands of governments. The changes in the judiciary
continue to be funded openly by the federal government, especially the
United States Department of Justice. The Bureau of Justice Assistance,
an arm of the United States Department of Justice, has been the source
of many of the start-up grants for the countless thousands of problem-
solving courts springing up around the country. Moreover, change is
being driven from the top down-by judges, high-ranking lawyers, poli-
ticians, professors, social scientists, journalists, and a host of other
elite people within society who are working with the courts in a variety
of ways. The courts achieve "buy in" by including influential people in
the planning process so that the resulting plan, reached through the
consensus process, can rightly be said to be "their" plan. In addition,
some legislators who despise judicial activism are willingly appropriat-
ing money to expand court programs and administrative offices,
amending statutes, and passing legislation leading to constitutional
amendments to allow courts, especially state supreme courts, to
expand their power over inferior trial courts, ordinary citizens, social
institutions, and other branches of government. The economy is pay-
ing for an army of activists with utopian, socialist agendas for govern-
ment and deterministic views of human life. A new form of political
symbiosis is taking shape which puts the judicial system at the center
of a new ecological system of government, and, consequently, at the
center of life. Nothing is left to the ordinary citizen, the family, or the
church; the visions, the values, the outcomes of the judges are every-
387. JUDGING THE FUTURE, supra note 39, at 30.
388. Id. at 18, 30-31.
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thing. Judicial collaboration with communities is only an illusion.
Power is not being shared. Rather, the power of the judicial branch of
government is changing and expanding in more subtle and intrusive
ways that make it impossible to control. The counter culture which set
out to decrease the power of the state over them has succeeded in
achieving the exact opposite result.
The many aspects of this movement have proved to be easy to sell.
As agendas for change are formulated at the state level, it is always
possible to find a few legislators who support the social agenda of the
judiciary. They eagerly sponsor legislation bringing about desired
changes, and many changes require no legislation at all. In addition,
judicial leaders are always able to find some trial judges who share the
same bent toward activism. All of this is done on a piecemeal basis,
and often in ways that make it look like the demand for change is com-
ing from some place other than the state supreme courts and the court
organizations which support them. Judicial activists have been success-
ful in engaging the support and political power of state and local bar
associations, community volunteers, state judicial councils, state
comptrollers, governors, legislators and others. It is not necessary that
any of those working locally to pass new legislation or implement
change know anything about the origins or ideological underpinnings
of the reform movement. In fact, it is far better if people at the state
and local level know nothing about any of this. All that is required is
for reformers to propose changes that they claim will increase judicial
efficiency and accountability, and save money. All kinds of people,
both in government and in the community, will remember only the
bare claim (one that is greatly disputed) that the new plan will save
money, hold people accountable, or increase the responsiveness of the
judiciary to public demands.
Opponents of judicial activism hold a losing hand because they
cannot take the time to explain person-to-person the ideology of the
reform movement and the fallacy of efficiency. Activists have success-
fully clothed themselves with a form of secular righteousness. More
importantly, however, opponents of activism will lose because political
pragmatism has become the dominant philosophy of the judiciary; the
ends justify the means.389 If there are ways to cure someone's drug
addiction, or solve a man's problem with anger, is it not better that we
do so? Why should we be concerned with the constitution or with laws
generally if we can achieve a socially desirable outcome?
389. See generally BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, LAW AS A MEANS TO AN END: THREAT TO THE
RULE OF LAW (2006).
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The introduction of therapeutic concepts into the judiciary
changes everything. Lawsuits which once served as a means for liti-
gants to resolve discreet legal issues existing between themselves over
property rights, for example, are now a means of presenting trial
courts with the opportunity to act upon the parties or society in ways
considered by the judges to be economically, sociologically, psycholog-
ically, or politically beneficial to the individuals and the commu-
nity.390 As the fountain of many blessings for society, the judiciary is
creating dependent constituencies which no longer view involvement
with the judiciary as something to be avoided. Rather, the courts have
become the gateway to new kinds of entitlements based upon all of the
things necessary to heal people physically and psychologically, namely
the redistribution of wealth, the reinforcement of self-esteem, moral
standing, and political power, as well as the application of drugs or
other forms of modification necessary for physical or psychological
healing. The very concept of justice in the constitutional setting is
essentially dead. 391 Because treatment is now encompassed by the
judicial power granted to the courts by state constitutions, it necessa-
rily becomes a right. Access to the courts logically requires access to
treatment, whether that treatment is for mental illness (Mental Health
Courts),3 9 2 drug addiction (Drug Courts), 3 93 domestic violence or
390. See NoLAN, supra note 175, at 1541 (explaining this view of justice from the
perspective of the criminal law). See also Douglas A. Van Epps, The Impact of
Mediation on State Courts, 17 OHIO ST. J. ON Disp. RESOL. 627 (2002).
In short, courts react to the spiraling increases in case filings by
developing new case management techniques. Mediation was not a primary
factor in addressing court caseloads. A more accurate view of mediation's
impact in the court environment may be that it has opened the door to courts
thinking differently about how they serve citizens and the very role of the
court in a community.
Judges are beginning to think of litigants not just as cases to pump
through a system, but as persons in their communities with problems to
solve. Mediation, and the sensitivity it brings to finding solutions parties can
live with, is paving the way for the era of the problem-solving court.
Id. at 630-31.
391. See NOLAN, supra note 76, at 204-08.
392. Elizabeth Neff, Utah Will Try Mental Health Court to Help Offenders Through
Treatment, Not Jail Time, THE SALT LAKE TRIBUNE, June 4, 2001, at B1. ("Presiding over
the state's first mental health court, Bohling will take part in a collaborative effort
aimed at providing nonviolent, mentally ill offenders with treatment instead of jail
time. The court was developed by a task force that included law enforcement,
prosecutors, public defenders and care providers.").
393. Continue Drug Court: A Worthy Investment, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, June 3, 2001,
at 2. ("Drug court provides meaningful treatment to drug-addicted defendants who
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juvenile delinquency (Family Courts),394 homelessness (Community
Courts), and is being expanded into general jurisdiction courts. One
group of activists supporting the work of the courts has begun a pro-
gram called Demand Treatment!, which works to increase public
demand for the therapeutic intervention for people with drug or alco-
hol related dependencies.395 It is precisely programs such as this
which will serve as a pretext for expansion of the courts' role.
A. Changing Lives
For proponents of a sociological and psychological approach to
conflict resolution, resolving the immediate problem or conflict is
never enough. Advocates of problem solving admit that the ultimate
goal in every case is a change in the lifestyle of those who come under
court supervision. In the case of drug courts, becoming "clean and
sober" is only the first step toward graduation:
Almost all drug courts require participants (after they have become
clean and sober) to obtain a high school or GED certificate, maintain
employment, be current in all financial obligations-including drug
court fees and child support payments, if applicable-and have a spon-
sor in the community. Many programs also require participants to per-
form community service hours-to "give back" to the community that
is supporting them through the drug court program. One drug court
requires prospective graduates to prepare a 2-year "life plan" following
drug court graduation for discussion with a community board to
commit non-violent crimes. It is a progressive alternative to sending drug users to jail,
which is much more expensive and where there is little or no effort to rehabilitate
them. The program attacks the core of drug-related crime instead of just treating the
symptom of lawbreaking by imposing jail terms.").
394. Elaine De Valle, New Statewide Court to Handle Family Matters, THE MIAMI
HERALD, May 6, 2001, at IA ("Our goal continues to be the creation of a fully
integrated comprehensive approach to handling all cases involving children and
families while at the same time resolving family disputes in a fair, efficient and cost-
effective manner ... that does not cause additional emotional harm to the children
and families who are required to interact with the judicial system.").
395. Demand Treatment!, http://www.jointogether.org/keyissues/demand-
treatment.html (last visited June 7, 2007) ("The Demand Treatment! model proved to
be an effective, low cost way to increase local leadership, establish new programs and
change local policies to improve alcohol and drug treatment. Partner communities
were able to increase treatment capacity, increase funding, incorporate screenings and
brief interventions for substance use into routine practice, and establish an ongoing
effort to increase quality treatment. Although Demand Treatment is no longer an
active program activity of Join Together, the work continues in these communities. Join
Together will continue to publish updates on their success and lessons learned.").
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assure the court that the participant has developed the "tools" to lead a
drug-free and crime-fee life.
39 6
No detail of life is too insignificant for court attention:
Individual counseling covers such topics as the art of changing behav-
iors and believing in yourself, anger management, use of time, lifestyle
roles and responsibilities, Rational Emotive Therapy (RET) (shame,
guilt, anger, depression, anxiety, perfectionism, grief and self-esteem)
domestic violence and other issues pertinent to the specific client's
particular needs and circumstances.
39 7
The social transformation within the family and the community
extends, advocates argue, far beyond the original goals of healing by
increasing the number of drug free babies born to drug court partici-
pants, the reunification of families as participants regain custody of
their children, as well as education, training and job placement for par-
ticipants.3 98 Obesity has now been labeled an illness by the federal
government, and advocates of problem-solving courts have discussed
the use of such courts, after acquiring control over someone through a
violation of the law or some other form of litigation, to treat eating
disorders such as anorexia and bulimia.
Direct modification of the inner, mental and emotional life that
motivates such behavior has never been a goal of the constitutional
system. Rather, that system operated only indirectly to the extent that
experience with the trial process itself may have an impact on the con-
science or, at least, the rational calculus of a given participant. Thus,
the criminal justice system, for example, may, in its retributive faculty,
lead a convict to admit to himself the wrongness of the actions for
which he stands condemned, to accept society's judgment, and to
resolve voluntarily to reform his way of thinking and, hence, future
behavior. Likewise, a judgment imposing damages in a civil suit for
trespass may indirectly cause the defendant voluntarily to forego
future opportunities for trespass. This is a desirable, but not an essen-
tial, result of the process. Unfortunately, many do not respond in such
fashion. Of central importance within the philosophical framework of
the constitutional judicial system, however, is the proposition that,
once a convict has served his time or a tortfeasor has made his plaintiff
whole, the judicial system can maintain no further nor deeper claim on
396. OFFICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS, DRUG COURT CLEARINGHOUSE AND TECHNICAL
ASSISTANCE PROJECT, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, LOOKING AT A DECADE OF DRUG COURTS 1
(1999), available at http://spa.american.edu/justice/publications/decade1.htm.
397. Jerry L. Colclazier, Therapeutic Jurisprudence: The Nuts and Bolts of Drug Courts
in Oklahoma, 71 OKLA. BAR J., Aug. 2000, at 23.
398. LOOKING AT A DECADE OF DRUG COURTS, supra note 396, at 1.
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them. Respect for the integrity and dignity of the every person was of
central importance, such that the risk of future anti-social behavior
was deemed a necessary condition for freedom. In this way, the tradi-
tional system appealed to a man's moral sense and capacity for reason-
ing (as opposed to a mere conditioned reaction) with a view to the
future consequences of his actions.
B. New Assumptions
The justice system that reformers are creating is based on funda-
mentally different premises. First of all, it rests on certain basic suppo-
sitions about human nature that deny that human beings can or
should aspire to transcend their base nature. Within the behavioristic
framework, what is most important is the result of the process, i.e.,
that the certain types of anti-social behavior cease, and that preferred
forms of behavior take their place. The process by which the individual
comes to such result is important only insofar as it is effective in pro-
ducing new forms of behavior, regardless of its implications for the
individual's essential moral and psychological integrity. This implicitly
means that behavioral modification can and should become
mandatory. In every case, the "consent" obtained by the court from its
client is coerced by the threat of the "traditional" system and is there-
fore illusory. It is only a short step from coerced consent to mandatory
modification.
Moreover, with regard to the procedural and substantive nature of
the new system, it will not be possible to make decisions about the best
means for directly bringing about changes in behavior or lifestyle in
any principled manner. By its nature, behavioral modification is exper-
imental, varying from one litigant to another. Individual experiences
with the environment and genetic makeup are like snow flakes; no two
are ever alike. As behaviorists, therefore, judges and their teams deter-
mine on a case-by-case basis what works for the client and what the
end result should be. Their task in every case is to modify the man so
that he will live the life the judge has determined for him.
Consequently, therapeutic outcomes can only be arbitrary, and
are understandable only in reference to the assumptions judges per-
sonally make about the way life should be lived. What difference does
it make even if it is possible to prescribe a universal target outcome in
the form of lifestyle change, and call that outcome the product of law?
Is that not tyranny? Are not people subjected to standardized outcomes
the creation of those who create the template for life? Who wants to
live in a world where they are manipulated by the state to be a particu-
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lar kind of person? People subject to such arbitrary power are no
longer free!
In former times, people held different views about the evil propen-
sities of all people, especially those in government, and wanted to
restrain them by creating forms and processes that mitigated against
abuse by government. For this reason, we all had to take risks that bad
things might happen to us in the course of life if we had any chance to
maintain our liberty. The threat was not just an act of violence or neg-
lect by private citizens, but of tyranny on the part of those in control of
government, and between the two, the latter threat was deemed to be
far more serious. While some of us could be hurt by the isolated act of
a criminal, the potential for many to be harmed by the few in control of
government was much, much greater. If the state could intervene to
prevent us from being harmed in the first place, it could just as easily
intervene for other purposes-to control and dominate us to further
the power of those who control the state. Consequently, the state had
to be restrained by making it wait until some overt violation of law had
been committed that, by law, required the state to act. The courts had
to sit back and wait for someone with proper standing to bring that to
their attention. That restraint had to apply to all people, including
those who might violate the rule of law, if the rest of us were to remain
free.
This belief in the need to restrain the state no longer exists
because our beliefs about human nature have changed entirely. The
problem of sin has been replaced with a belief in the basic goodness of
all people. The Public Trust and Confidence Movement promotes belief
in the virtue and trustworthiness of judges as a group, in comparison
to the ordinary man. We are literally witnessing the veneration of
judges, both as individuals and as a group. The increasingly popular
programs of Judicial Outreach effectively personalize the judiciary. If
the individual judge is trustworthy then, by inference, all judges must
be people whom we can trust to make decisions for us.
As the role of the courts change, techniques now considered dan-
gerous for particular subgroups of society may be viewed differently.
Racial profiling and statistical scatter maps used to identify the people
and places associated with antisocial behavior may become the keys to
unleashing the flow of money and resources the courts provide; and
just imagine how intoxicating it will be when judges finally come to
believe that they hold the keys to the health and happiness of other
people. Healing, caring judges would be remiss-indeed, it would be
unethical-if they did not bestow upon others the benefit of their wis-
dom, their experience, and their healing hands.
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C. Loving Big Brother
Those who experience the therapeutic care and guidance of
judges in confronting life's problems will confess the goodness and
care of those who healed them. By the end of George Orwell's anti-
utopian novel, 1984, the principal character had come to love Big
Brother; beaten to the verge of death and then restored to a life of
plenty, he became thankful for the omnipotent hand providing for him.
And court literature points to a similar effect emerging from partici-
pants in the therapeutic process. Out of dozens of possible examples,
one issue of the Mississippi Supreme Court's newsletter makes the
point in an article on one Drug Court graduate and his judge. 399 The
former drug addict with a "new daddy smile" glowing on his face
showed off his six-week-old daughter to a courtroom of recovering
drug addicts like himself: "I feel like without it [Drug Court] I would
be dead today because I had gotten bad onto drugs ... I want to say
'thank you' to anybody who had anything to do with it."40 0 And the
judge was equally pleased with the results, making reference to the
graduate's daughter as a reason for keeping his life together. "She
needs you. We are rebuilding lives and families," the judge said. 40 1
Reference to the graduate's baby daughter, while true, is an example of
the utilitarian, emotive levers used by therapeutic courts to gain the
advantage over their clients.
Some may see in such statements the indicia of success, and mini-
mize the importance of transitioning to a therapeutic form of govern-
ment. But we are witnessing the emergence of a centralized,
authoritarian government based upon the work of a technologically-
competent elite. Some believe the pragmatic, therapeutic state has the
potential to become the greatest threat to human liberty. 40 2 Advocates
of therapeutic jurisprudence openly rely upon purely pragmatic con-
siderations for the move away from "traditional" court processes which
focus on particular litigants with well-defined disputes to be decided
by adversarial proceedings along settled principles of law. Because the
law identified certain acts as being acceptable and others unaccept-
able, the judge or jury served as a "trier of fact." The task was simply to
determine whether the person committed an act proscribed by law or
399. Administrative Office of the Courts, Drug Court Rebuilds Lives, Grads Say, Miss.
CTS., May-June 2001, at 1.
400. Id.
401. Id.
402. Peter Augustine Lawler, The Therapeutic Threat to Human Liberty: Pragmatism
vs. Conservatism on America and the West Today, in VITAL REMNANTS: AMERICA'S
FOUNDING AND THE WESTERN TRADITION 305 (Gary L. Gregg ed., 1999).
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which violated a civil duty owed to others; the result was then deter-
mined by the rule of law. One cannot help but recall Dean Wigmore's
description of cross-examination of witnesses as "the greatest engine
ever invented for the discovery of truth. '40 3 But the concept of rules of
law derived from transcendent moral principles, applicable to all peo-
ple in all places, died in the nineteenth century, and the search for
truth has morphed into the consolidated techniques of social control.
As court dockets become increasingly crowded, as the rising
prison population threatens the state's ability to deal with the problem
of crime, as drug addiction continues to spread throughout the popula-
tion, and as divorce introduces more extreme forms of violence within
the home and community, reformers advocate therapeutic principles
and the redesign of the judicial system, as technical alternatives which
anticipate and prevent antisocial behavior, speed up the resolution of
disputes, decrease recidivism, and save money.40 4
Efficiency becomes a value-an end in itself-and all other justifi-
cations for change tend initially to bend to the demand for mechanical
efficiency rather than the rule of law and the constitutional process.
But the question naturally arises, will this always be true? Can there be
a point at which power is sufficiently consolidated in the hands of
judges that they can abandon their appeal to public trust and confi-
dence, to efficiency, to therapy, to social justice, and begin exercising
power for the sake of power?
VII. CONTROLLING THE CONTROLLERS
Judicial pronouncements of healing and of problems solved reflect
a basic and profound change in the way people are viewed by the com-
munity of intellectuals driving the reform process. There has been a
change not only in the concept of justice, but also about the nature of
individual responsibility. In the past, a person was held responsible for
his behavior because he was free to make choices between different
courses of action.40 5 Consequently, if a person is not free to make real
choices, the argument for punishment or for the imposition of civil
penalties fails. How can we punish someone who is only the product of
body chemistry and past reinforcement? Such a person is not truly
free to choose one course of action as opposed to another. His behav-
ior would be entirely predictable if we could only know in detail all of
403. 5 JOHN H. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 1390 (James A.
Chadbourne ed., rev. ed. 1974).
404. NoLAN, supra note 76, at 283.
405. Craig Haney, Making Law Modern: Toward a Contextual Model of Justice, 8
PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 3, 7 (2002).
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the subtle and complex reinforcements to which he had been previ-
ously exposed.
Behaviorism, as well as neurotechnology, treats us as if we are
machines capable of being programmed to respond in particular ways
to changes in the environment or to physical modifications. If a per-
son is only the product of his environment or is genetically predis-
posed to certain types of behavior, it may not be fair or just to impose
upon him those sanctions required by the law, but it is fair to therapeu-
tically modify him. Indeed, it is his right.
A. The Abolition of Man
In the past, the principal tool of government for shaping the
thoughts and actions of people in a mass society has been propaganda,
and propaganda in the form of court communications is still an impor-
tant tool of the court reform movement. Now, behavioral engineering,
using techniques (of which propaganda is one) developed in the social
sciences, is being applied by the courts to bring about cognitive
changes in individuals and entire communities. When C. S. Lewis
wrote the Abolition of Man4 °6 in 1962, he anticipated the present-day
application of the techniques of behaviorism, neurotechnology, and
eugenics. This is the point in history at which we have now arrived.
The techniques by which man could be controlled were controversial
even then, and were of particular concern to all those who loved liberty
and still believed that God created man in His own image. Man,
observed Lewis, had gained mastery over Nature preliminarily to gain-
ing control over the nature of man:
I am only making clear what Man's conquest of Nature really means
and especially that final stage in the conquest, which, perhaps, is not
far off. The final stage is come when Man by eugenics, by prenatal
conditioning, and by an education and propaganda based on a perfect
applied psychology, has obtained full control over himself. Human
nature will be the last part of Nature to surrender to Man. The battle
will then be won. We shall ... be henceforth free to make our species
whatever we wish it to be. The battle will be won. But who, precisely,
will have won it?4 0 7
Skinner recognized the attack on behaviorism and replied to
Lewis in his book, Beyond Freedom and Dignity,4 °8 that man is not
being "abolished." What is being abolished, Skinner argued, is "auton-
406. C.S. LEwis, THE ABOLITION OF MAN 37 (1962).
407. Id.
408. Skinner, supra note 98.
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omous man," the man of "freedom and dignity."4 °9 It is "man as man,"
"man as thou not it" that is being abolished, so that scientists can
begin dealing with people as they would any other natural object. The
conclusion for Skinner was quite logical. The science of behaviorism
can be applied to reengineer man and design a culture, but it requires
that we abandon any presupposition that leaves the individual or God
in control:
His abolition has long been overdue. Autonomous man is a device
used to explain what we cannot explain in any other way. He has been
constructed from our ignorance, and as our understanding increases,
the very stuff of which he is composed vanishes. Science does not
dehumanize man. It de-homunculizes him, and it must do so if it is to
prevent the abolition of the human species. To man qua man we readily
say good riddance. Only by dispossessing him can we turn to the real
causes of human behavior. Only then can we turn from the inferred to
the observed, from the miraculous to the natural, from the inaccessible
to the manipulable.4 10
Behaviorism denies that there is anything unique about human
life-nothing that sets us apart from all other life forms. All appeals to
the higher faculties of man-reason, self-consciousness, a sense of
moral responsibility-are dismissed as mere delusions. We are only the
product of our environment, our body chemistry or the many unscien-
tific influences of our homes and communities-the words and actions
of our parents, teachers, friends, colleagues, pastors, and others. Our
behavior is determined by the external environment or from condition-
ing which occurred prior to birth and now resides in our genes.411
Consequently, as Francis Schaeffer pointed out, the technology of
human behavior treats us as if we are not capable of free will, or of
independent, original thought; nor is there any room for the existence
of a sovereign God.412
B. The Board of Planners
The principles of behaviorism also contain a major contradiction
that has profound implications for society. Obviously, all people acting
independently of one another cannot set the behavioral standards and
409. Id.
410. Id. at 200-01.
411. For a brief rebuttal to Skinner's view of man by one of the great Christian
thinkers of the twentieth century, see FRANCis A. SCHAEFFER, BACK TO FREEDOM AND
DIGNITY 33 (1973).
412. FRANcis A. SCHAEFFER, The God Who Is There, in A FRANCIs A. SCHAEFFER
TRILOGY 113, 117 (Crossway Books 1990) (1968); He Is There and He Is Not Silent, in
SCHAEFFER supra, at 278 (1978).
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conditioning applicable to all other individuals.4 13 That would be tan-
tamount to anarchy. There must be, therefore, some person or group of
persons making essentially moral decisions about which thoughts and
actions are appropriate for the rest of the population, and which future
out of a number of possible futures is preferred. In the background of
Skinner's 1948 utopian novel, Walden Two, was a small group of indi-
viduals called the "Board of Planners. '414 These were the controllers,
the people who decided which forms of environmental conditioning
would be required for each individual in the community, so that the
entire community would function as a single, peaceful, productive
unit. Because of the work of the controllers, there was, situated within
the surrounding society, a community of happy, contented, productive
workers going peacefully about their assigned tasks free of the
problems which plagued the rest of the world. The principles of beha-
viorism are currently applied, according to Skinner, in haphazard,
unscientific ways by all sorts of people within society: parents, teach-
ers, neighbors, psychologists, preachers, and many others. But the goal
of behaviorism is to eliminate the unscientific application of these
techniques, and apply them in scientifically coordinated ways that
make each of us achieve our full potential for the good of the commu-
nity.4 15 And so, the protagonist in Skinner's novel, Frazier, put the
issue directly to the skeptical Castle: "My question is," asked Frazier,
"have you the courage to take up and wield the science of behavior for
the good of mankind?" This is the question that the state courts have
answered in the affirmative. As Lewis so astutely observed, "[Tihe
power of Man to make himself what he pleases means, as we have seen,
the power of some men to make other men what they please. "416
The key which has, until recent decades, been missing is the
power to unify or consolidate all of the techniques of control in the
hands of a single group of people having a position of power over all
people. For man to advance in revolutionary ways he must throw off
evolutionary forces which are, by definition, slow and random. Man
must assume responsibility for change that is not only planned and
coordinated, but constantly moving us toward some higher future exis-
tence. But the disciplines-the technicians holding the tools by which
man could be controlled and propelled into the future-were frag-
mented. Each worked separately from the other to study man but
413. See generally Leff, supra note 142, at 1229.
414. B.F. SKINNER, WALDEN Two 48 (Macmillan Publishing Co. 1976) (1948).
415. See Skinner, supra note 98 (discussing Skinner's views on behaviorism and
man).
416. LEWIS, supra note 406, at 37.
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lacked the power to consolidate the process of application by which
one set of techniques could be applied in conjunction with the tech-
niques of other disciplines. There was no planning and no central
authority capable of directing the forces of individual and social
change in one direction or another. Consequently, we had to await the
day, now here, when all of the techniques employed by all of the vari-
ous experts could be applied and directed by one elite group: the
judiciary.
But the techniques of control need not be overtly violent as Orwell
thought. As we have seen, they can be very subtle and manipulative,
and can be cast as the necessary and efficient answers to the vexing
problems of life. The bars which control us need not be on the
outside. Indeed, the courts are in the process of placing those bars on
the inside. As Aldous Huxley put it, "The shotgun has its place but so
has the hypodermic syringe. 41 7
Our belief in democracy and representative government are also
illusions. If our personal behavior is determined by our environment,
we are incapable of making truly original, independent decisions
about the affairs of government. Our belief in human freedom and in
representative government is, like so many other things we believe
about ourselves, only a fiction created by the literature of freedom and
dignity we were exposed to in our homes and schools. Behaviorism
tends toward a centralized, authoritarian form of government-the
therapeutic courts-to create the new man for the new future. The very
nature of the techniques now employed by the courts are inherently
denigrating to the moral and intellectual faculties and dignity of man
at the hands of an authoritarian, paternalistic system of judges. But
they also insult the rule of law as reflections of truth about life and
about the world in which we live, thereby implying that rules of law
and of outcomes determined by law are not only unnecessary for the
survival of society but are therapeutically counterproductive. By
pragmatically and emotionally contrasting what activists call "more
humane" forms of dispute resolution with the detached and imper-
sonal application of rules of law to specific issues, they make their case
for overthrowing the constitutional system of courts. In that regard, we
should understand that therapeutic, problem-solving courts are not
courts. Problem-solving judges are not judges; they are behaviorists.
The principles they apply are not legal principles at all, but principles
derived from the technology of human behavior. Not only do such
"courts" denigrate man, but they manipulate the way we think about
417. ALDous HUXLEY, BRAVE NEW WORLD REVISITED 69 (1958).
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the work of the state and its impact on life. Activists have appropriated
the lexicon associated with the constitutional judicial system, and have
given old words new meaning in a way that effectively changes the way
we think about the role of the courts and the need for controlling indi-
vidual and collective life.
C. The New Man for a New Age
Once courts have the therapeutic bars in place, what will the final
product look like? How will the modified man think and act? The
details are, of course, missing to some extent and may vary among
individuals. Some things are clear, however. The family, church and
broader community, which once were the impetus for good character,
have become, activists argue, much weaker than they once were. Con-
sequently, the role of the courts must change to prop up the skeletons
of these failed institutions. This is a recurring argument for changing
the role of the courts in society. For the reformers, there is no longer
any fixed definition of the family or any of the other basic institutions
of life; they are significant only as utilitarian instruments of shaping
and controlling behavior. As a result, the courts feel free to redefine the
entire community as they see fit, and to take over the task of creating
the kind of people necessary for a just and peaceful future.418 "The
burden on government and law," observed the Tennessee Futures
Commission, "is to reinforce communities and families that contribute
418. The need for an experimental analysis of human behavior to cure the problems
brought about by the decay of the family were illustrated in B. F. Skinner's novel,
Walden Two, in which the protagonist, Frazier, notes the tension in moving from the
traditional family, now in decline, to the utopian family where human behavior is
modified by government to conform to community norms:
The significant history of our times is the story of the growing weakness
of the family. The decline of the home as a medium for perpetuating a
culture, the struggle for equality for women, including their right to select
professions other than housewife or nursemaid, the extraordinary
consequences of birth control and the practical separation of sex and
parenthood, the social recognition of divorce, the critical issues of blood
relationship or race-all these are parts of the same field. And you can hardly
call it quiescent.
A community must solve the problem of the family by revising certain
established practices. That's absolutely inevitable. The family is an ancient
form of community, and the customs and habits which have been set up to
perpetuate it are out of place in a society which isn't based on blood ties.
Walden Two replaces the family, not only as an economic unit, but to some
extent as a social and psychological unit as well. What survives is an
experimental question.
SKINNER, supra note 414, at 128.
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to the development of good character, self-reliance, respect for others,
and respect for self. '419 This is a basic tenet of behaviorism (and, one
might add, Marxist doctrine) which holds that the state is the source
of the intangible attribute of personal and collective character. It is
error to think this can only be for good; the fictional behaviorist who
programmed the Manchurian Candidate was from the Pavlov Institute
in Moscow. Our empty shells have to be programmed to move and act
in ways that are consistent with judicial values articulated by the
courts and their various commissions, and applied by therapeutic trial
courts. "As we have seen," observed Skinner, "man is not a moral
animal in the sense of possessing a special trait or virtue; he has built a
kind of social environment which induces him to behave in moral
ways."'42 Skinner found such statements to be convenient; the reform-
ers, in fact, are actively working to create a new social environment
based upon naturalistic concepts of man and relativistic concepts of
moral behavior.
Every citizen should vehemently deny that government has any
role to play in the formation or reinforcement of character or other
personal attributes. Where the family and the community have failed
to adjust to the new realities or have been undermined because of
them, the courts will carry the increased burden being thrust upon
them. Instead of adjudicating disputes based upon the facts and law,
the courts will expand their mission to "reinforce communities and
families that contribute to the development of good character." But
which families and communities contribute to these new virtues? By
what standards and by whom shall it be determined that families and
communities are doing what they should in this respect? This "bur-
den" implicitly requires that courts begin defining good character, self-
reliance, respect for others, and respect for self. Can there be any
doubt that these abstract concepts will be defined by the courts in
ways that make them relative to the work of the courts? Men and
women will be people of good character only insofar as they promote
the goals and purposes of those who create them. Character becomes
relative to the personal visions of the judges, for they are determined in
reference to the beliefs and lives of the judges who will ultimately make
that determination. The judges, then, become the embodiment of
"good character, self-reliance, respect for others, and respect for self."
This effectively makes judges a kind of amplified humanity-little
gods, but gods nonetheless; and the little gods will judge the rest of us
419. To SERVE ALL PEOPLE, supra note 138, at 55.
420. Skinner, supra note 98, at 198.
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in respect to their lives and values. In fact, the new judge, as he sits on
the bench, speaks to the Rotary Club, instructs a class of children, or
walks down the street, becomes a pattern for life.
Conduct and beliefs that promote the goals and the power of the
judges will become the definition of good character. However, we
should keep in mind as we surrender this function to them, that a
fixed definition of abstract concepts is impossible. The work of the
judges and the decisions they make will become increasingly arbitrary.
Judges will have nothing outside of themselves and the environing cul-
ture on which to base their decisions. Already, the therapeutic
"options" being provided to the courts are being used by judges to
require that clients maintain good jobs, pay their debts, support their
families, etc. One can be a poet or an artist, but he had better not give
up his day job. The elimination of drugs or violence is never the final
goal. Ultimately, lifestyle change, and, as Toffler said, the reconstitu-
tion of society is the goal.
The techniques of modern science used to manipulate and control
people do not provide superior answers to problems or issues of life.
As Professor Arthur Allen Leff of Yale Law School so irrefutably
demonstrated, there can be no normative ethical system in the absence
of God.42 1 In his classic essay, Unspeakable Ethics, Unnatural Law,422
Leff observed that
the so-called death of God turns out not to have been just His funeral;
it also seems to have effected the total elimination of any coherent, or
even more-than-momentarily convincing, ethical or legal system depen-
dent upon finally authoritative extrasystemic premises. If we are trying
to find a substitute final evaluator, it must be one of us, some of us, all
of us-but it cannot be anything else. The result of that realization is
what might be a simultaneous combination of an exultant "We're free
of God" and a despairing "Oh God, we're free."4 23
To every authoritative pronouncement of man there will be others,
Leff demonstrated, who will say, "Oh, yeah, sez [sic] who?" Therefore,
control of the courts as propagators and enforcers of moral values for
everyone else takes on extraordinary political importance, and helps to
explain why so much money is being invested in state judicial
elections.
The therapeutic resolution of conflict and related decisions about
lifestyle become the tools of the judiciary in the service of competing
social interests, and competing social interests advance the power of
421. Leff, supra note 142, at 1229.
422. Id.
423. Id. at 1232.
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the judges. The controversial decisions of the appellate courts and the
new "hands-on" work of the trial courts are but flip sides of the same
coin; both work together to bring about the personal visions of those
who are in the business of reforming the courts and society. The result
is not the rule of law, but the rule of men. Consequently, court reform
literature contains both an appeal to efficiency and an appeal to the
creation of more virtuous individuals and communities. Judges are
becoming both artists and engineers.
It remains to be seen how successful the courts will be at trans-
forming sinners into people of good character. If, as behaviorists
believe, man was not created by God in His image, and if there is no
source of truth outside ourselves by which to judge the words and
works of the visionaries, then there just might be something to their
claim that we are only part of the cosmic machine. If the past is any
indication of how things will be in the future, however, the prospects of
their success look dim. Perhaps Professor Leff said it best in the
afterword to his famous essay:
All I can say is this: it looks as if we are all we have. Given what we
know about ourselves and each other, this is an extraordinarily unap-
petizing prospect; looking around the world, it appears that if all men
are brothers, the ruling model is Cain and Abel. Neither reason, nor
love, nor even terror, seems to have worked to make us "good," and
worse than that, there is no reason why anything should. Only if ethics
were something unspeakable by us, could law be unnatural, and there-
fore unchangeable. As things now stand, everything is up for grabs.4 24
Mankind is not likely to be transformed by the judiciary, but it is
certain that we can be increasingly controlled by the judiciary. Judicial
activism is creating an omnipresent tyranny capable of influencing
large numbers of people and entire communities. Already tens of
thousands of people all across the country, driven by a secular faith,
are joining in the work of the courts through judicial outreach and
collaborative working arrangements. The transcript from the National
Conference on Public Trust and Confidence in the Justice System,
recorded delegates, many of them representing non-governmental orga-
nizations, using terms like "trust in," "have confidence in," and "have
faith in," to refer to the judges and the work of the courts with the goal
being to convert as many people as possible to the faith. Are not these
the people who will be the "eyes and ears" of the courts? At the same
time, many people fear and distrust the courts. The December 15,
2003, issue of Newsweek was devoted to "Lawsuit Hell: How Fear of
424. Id. at 1249.
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Litigation is Paralyzing Our Professions." Appearing daily on televi-
sions all across the country are solicitations to file suit. "If you are
concerned about the care of a loved one in a nursing home, give us a
call," says one firm.
These two groups-one having faith in the judiciary and the other
fearing the judiciary-are both witnessing and reacting to the same set
of events. Some are pleased with the expanding role of the courts in
society, while others have had enough of it. In fact, however, there may
be considerable overlap in the views of the various subgroups to the
work of the judiciary. Those who hate oppressive malpractice suits
may, nevertheless, support court decrees advancing other political and
social agendas they favor. Abortionists, for example, have to pay mal-
practice insurance premiums just like other doctors. The court reform
movement is, in part, an attempt to expand the intrusion of the judici-
ary into the lives of every person while imparting a kinder-and-gentler,
therapeutic appearance to the work of the judiciary. By doing so, court
reform brings in those who now harbor hard feelings toward the
courts. Instead of being harmed, we are going to be healed. Hopefully,
those people who now fear the judicial system will someday come to
appreciate all that the courts are doing for us.
Is it possible that the legislative branch will take steps to curb
judicial power? Perhaps, but the legislative and executive branches,
exhausted by the cost of large, regulatory bureaucracies, have found
the courts and private litigation a cost-effective way to regulate most
activities of life and do so in ways that are more acceptable to people.
In a sense, they are accomplices in the expanding role of the courts in
spite of occasional protests about what some call the "imperial
judiciary." '425
The bars which control us, whether they are on the outside or the
inside, always have a physical component; even the processes of the
mind are based on the physical body. Power is useless unless it is
applied. This may be the single most important feature of the judicial
system, for it is the place where the power of the state is ultimately
applied in a physical way to individuals and targeted subgroups.
Actions which take place in a courthouse can have a very real and
tangible impact on people involved in litigation. The judiciary has
become both the primary vehicle and path of least resistance for social
engineers who realize the ability of the courts to inflict physical and
psychological harm on individuals. The courts thereby coerce more
425. See, e.g., Edwin Meese III, Imperial Judiciary-And What Congress Can Do About
It, POLICY REVIEW, Jan.-Feb. 1997, available at http://www.hoover.org/publications/
policyreview/3574172.html (last visited May 20, 2007).
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desirable forms of behavior. During modern times, technology has
become an increasingly important component of power because it
makes it possible for those who control the state to move against peo-
ple quickly and at great distance. With the local courthouse strategi-
cally located in each county, and often in multiple cities within
counties, and with a local staff of law enforcement, social workers, vol-
unteers and others ready to carry out judicial plans and decrees, the
courthouse is the place where judges wield the power to influence vast
numbers of people.
With the advent of new technologies, however, the home or even
the individual mind could well become the judiciary's final place of
residence. The first mock trial in virtual reality has already been con-
ducted by the Courtroom 21 Project at the William and Mary Law
School,4 26 and judicial scenarios envision the future use of brain
implants as a means of determining guilt or innocence.427
D. The Final Question
We can be thankful that some people are able to reverse the course
of their lives, saving themselves and others from drug abuse, violence,
or more subtle forms of antisocial behavior. However, what cost are we
willing to pay to make such changes take place even if it is possible to
do so? The outcome is certain, however, if we remain headed down the
road we are on. One way or the other, by faith or by fear, the courts
will control us, and there will be no place to which we can retreat or
flee, not even the inner sanctum of our minds.
There remains, then, one unanswered question: Once the courts
have succeeded in gaining control of individual behavior for the collec-
tive good, who will control the controllers? If there is any chance that
this movement can be resisted, it is important that the public and the
representative branches of government know about and prepare for the
approaching changes being thrust upon us by visionaries with utopian
dreams of a new judicial system and the transformed world it will
bring forth.428
426. See David Horrigan, Technology on Trial: Operating in Virtual Reality, 9 L. &
TECH. NEws, May 2002, at 21.
427. This scenario from Florida's Sixth Judicial Circuit is described in ENVISIONING
JUSTICE, supra note 48, at 135-37.
428. Frank V. Williams, III, The Future of the Legal Profession and the Judicial System,
DICTA, April 22, 2002, at 6.
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